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TO Mr FATHER
"These are exciting times for Malaysia, a time of tremendous opportunities and tremendous challenges; a time when billions can earned and lost; a time when the frontiers of economic development are being pushed back faster than the eye can see and the mind can comprehend; a time when new paths are opened up destinations unknown.
It is at times such as these, when stakes are high and temptations are so great, that the traditional values are put to test. It is at times such as these that honesty may be cast to the wind, and trustworthiness thrown to the dogs. We have already seen blatant examples. We have seen clear examples of the new morality. We have seen clear example of corruption of every kind, the buying and selling of favours, and the buying and selling of men. There will be many more examples, to warn us, to shock us and toeducate us.....We owe it to the future generations tocontinue to be honest, efficient and trustworthy"
Tun Hussien Onn, The Third Prime Minister of Malaysia (1984)
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the desirability and the feasibility 
of the privatisation programme of the electricity sector in 
Malaysia, and its progress and achievements to date. Using 
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Method the efficiency 
of the National Electricity Board (NEB) is assessed in 
comparison to the Electricity Generating Authority, 
Thailand (EGAT) and the Central Electricity Generating 
Board (CEGB), United Kingdom. It is found that its 
efficiency lags behind that of EGAT and the CEGB. However, 
the financial performance of NEB is better than that of the 
EGAT where its been able to achieve its financial targets 
set by two of its major lenders, the World Bank and the 
Asian Development thus enabling it to undertake capacity 
expansion programme. With rapidly increasing demand of 
electricity due to an expanding economy, privatisation is 
seen to be a strategy to increase the efficiency of the 
electricity sector.
The Theory of Bureaucracy, Property rights theory and X- 
Inefficiency theory provide the theoretical framework in 
which assessment of the privatisation programme is made. 
They highlight the problems faced by the bureaucrats in the 
electricity sector; government and political intervention, 
patronism, rent-seeking activities and corruption, self­
maximisation interest of the politicians and the 
bureaucrats, the lack of competitive environment, which 
have contributed to the inefficiency of the sector in 
Malaysia.
Although the privatisation programme has been accompanied 
by electricity reform such as industry restructuring and 
the creation of a regulatory body to regulate the industry, 
TNB still exhibits its pre-privatisation period 
characteristics such as lack of competition and positive 
regulation, government and political intervention. 
Recommendations on how to increase efficiency include
(iii)
further restructuring of the industry such as the vertical 
separation between generation and transmission activities 
and the horizontal break up of TNB, promotion of 
competition, full privatisation of TNB, positive regulation 
and less government and political intervention.
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INTRODUCTION
1.2 Objectives and Methodology 11.3 Plan of Study 2
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
The objective of this thesis is to examine the desirability 
and the feasibility of the privatisation programme of the 
electricity sector in Malaysia. It also assesses the 
progress and the achievement of the privatisation programme 
to date, in achieving its intended objectives.
The study adopts both Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
approach and qualitative approach in assessing the 
desirability and feasibility of the electricity 
privatisation programme in Malaysia. It looks at the 
objectives and rationale of the privatisation programme in 
Malaysia in relation to its economic development. The 
debate on the theoretical perspective of private versus 
public enterprises and the empirical evidence to support 
both prepositions are discussed. Proponents of the Public 
Choice Theory have put the behaviourial aspects of 
bureaucrats as a source of inefficiency in public 
production. It is argued that bureaucrats are primarily 
concerned with the maximisation of their own interest and 
use more labour and capital inconsistent with the optimal 
management practices. As a result of these technical 
inefficiencies production in public sectors takes place 
below the production possibility curve. The property right 
theory focuses on ownership at the centre of their 
rationale for the inefficiency in public enterprises. The 
nature of the principle agent relationship does not provide 
incentive for managers to be efficient as public 
enterprises are not profit motivated. In addition the 
principle are not efficient in monitoring, supervising and 
forcing the public managers to be optimal in their 
production. The X-efficiency theory argues that performance 
is primarily explained by economic and institutional 
environment. They argue public enterprises operate in an
environment that is not conducive to efficiency. Most of 
them are protected from competition which leads to 
complacency and little innovation. The threat of bankruptcy 
as the ultimate sanction of bad results does not exist as 
subsidies are available to finance deficit. The empirical 
evidence on the performance of the public sector versus 
private sector based on previous studies done in the United 
Kingdom, United States, Europe and Malaysia is presented. 
The- study then focuses on the underlying factors which 
contribute to the inefficiency of the public sector in 
Malaysia in relation to the Theory of bureaucracy, property 
rights theory and the Ex-efficiency theory. Institutional 
evidence is used to support the relevance of the theories 
in the public sector in Malaysia as a justification for 
government privatisation programme.
The DEA method is used to compare the efficiency of the 
energy sector in Malaysia, Thailand and United Kingdom. In 
addition financial performance of National Electricity 
Board was evaluated in comparison to utility in Thailand 
and United Kingdom.
The feasibility of introducing competition in the 
electricity sector is examined as a necessary prerequisite 
to achieving efficiency. Practical problems in relation to 
the implementation of competition and regulatory policies 
are also discussed.
1.3 PLAN / STRUCTURE OF STUDY
Chapter 1 explains the objectives, methodology of the 
research and plan of the study.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Malaysian economy, 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) which was introduced in 1970, 
its objectives, problems and achievements. The chapter also 
discusses the objectives and rationale of the privatisation
programme in Malaysia, the views and criticisms on the 
policies and its implementation so far. The status of the 
privatisation programme and the evaluation of its 
achievement are also discussed.
Chapter 3 focuses on the debate in relation to the 
theoretical perspective of private versus public 
enterprises. The Theory of bureaucracy. Property rights 
theory and the X-Efficiency theory are discussed. Studies 
in the United Kingdom, United States and Malaysia based on 
empirical evidence which support both propositions are 
highlighted. The institutional evidence on the relevance of 
the public choice theory, property rights theory and X 
efficiency theory which contribute to the inefficiency of 
the public sector is critically examined.
Chapter 4 looks at the energy policy in Malaysia. It 
provides an overview of the electricity sector and the role 
of the utility in the development of the country.
Chapter 5 establishes method and criteria for assessing the 
performance of the electricity sector in Malaysia. Using a 
software developed by David Hawdon of University of Surrey, 
the DEA efficiency of the electricity sector in Malaysia is 
measured in comparison to that in Thailand and United 
Kingdom.
Chapter 6 looks at the financial performance of the NEB 
using the financial ratios as required by major lenders of 
the NEB such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank. Its performance is then compared with the Electricity 
Generating Authority, Thailand (EGAT) and the Central 
Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) in United Kingdom.
Chapter 7 looks at the privatisation programme of the 
electricity sector which was implemented in 1992, its 
problems and achievements in meeting its intended
objectives. It also assesses the Government policies 
towards achieving efficiency objective of the sector.
Chapter 8 evaluates the present industry structure and 
provides an alternative model where efficiency of the 
electricity sector could be enhanced. It examines the role 
of the regulatory body and its effectiveness in ensuring 
fair competition and the proper development of the 
electricity sector in Malaysia.
Chapter 9 provides the conclusion of the study.
CHAPTER 2 : THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME
IN MALAYSIA
Since 1983, the Malaysian Government has embarked on an 
ambitious privatisation programme. As at July 1993, it has 
privatised 37 public enterprises and 73 projects and is 
poised for massive privatisation programme in the Sixth 
Malaysia Plan (1991 - 1995) and the Seventh Malaysia Plan 
(1996-2000)1. The Privatisation Masterplan released in 
1991, identifies 37 public enterprises and government 
projects to be privatised during 1990-1992 period.^ In 
addition another 56 public enterprises are to be structured 
and prepared for privatisation during the same period.
This chapter provides an overview of the privatisation 
programme in Malaysia and will be divided into the 
following sections: Section 2 provides the background of
the country and the economy before 1970, when the 
Government introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP). It 
also looks at the NEP which covers a 20 year period from 
1970 -1990. It discusses the impact of the policy on the 
public and the private sectors in the Malaysian economy and 
analyses the problems and achievements of the policy 
towards achieving its objectives. Section 3 examines the 
privatisation policy in Malaysia, its objectives and 
rationale, and views and criticisms from different groups 
of the community. Finally Section 4 summarises the 
privatisation programme so far, its problems and 
achievements in meeting its objectives.
 ^ Seventh Malaysia Plan is in the process of preparation. The DirectorGeneral of Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister Department confirmed that privatisation programme will be pursued more vigorously during this period as 
reported in The New Straits Times 30.7.1994.
 ^ It is not known whether this target has been achieved or not.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME IN MALAYSIA
2.2 Background and the economy 62.2.1 The Economic System 72.2.2 Problems of the Economic System 92.2.3 The New Economic Policy (NEP) 102.2.4 Achievements of the NEP 27
2.3 Malaysian Privatisation Programme 332.3.1 Objectives and Rationale 332.3.2 The Debate of the Privatisation Policy 362.3.3 The Status of the Privatisation Programme 412.3.4 Achievements of the Privatisation Programme 44
2.4 Conclusions 53
2.2 BACKGROUND AND THE ECONOMY
2.2.1 The Economic System (Pre NEP Period)
The Country
Malaysia is a federation of 13 states comprising 11 from 
the Malay Peninsular and 2 from Borneo Island i.e Sabah and 
Sarawak. Peninsular Malaysia was a British colony until 
Independence was granted in 1957, then known as Malaya. 
Sabah and Sarawak joined the peninsular components states 
to form the Malaysian federation in 1963.^
Malaysia is a multiracial country with an estimated 
population of 18.6 million^. For political purposes, the 
population is categorised into Bumiputra, the indigenous 
people, and the non Bumiputra i.e the non-indigenous people 
of migrant stock (Arief, 1991). The Malays and other
indigenous groups^ constitute about 54 per cent of the 
population, Chinese 35 per cent and Indians 10 percent.
Most of the Bumiputras are in the rural areas and engaged 
in traditional agricultural activities such as farming, 
fishing and padi planting*. By contrast the non-Bumiputras, 
particularly the Chinese are mainly concentrated in urban 
centres, focusing on modern sector including manufacturing, 
commerce and financed. As a result of this division of
 ^ Singapore was a member of the federation for 2 years from July 1963to August 1965 before it became an independent republic.
 ^ Population Housing Census of Malaysia, Department of Statistics. NewStraits Times 1.4.1992.
 ^ Malays is the largest of the indigenous group. Other indigenousgroups include the Iban, Murut, Sakai and Kadazan.
* 73 percent of the total 1.4 million employment in this sector in1980 was Bumiputra. See 5th Malaysia Plan, p 102.
 ^ The Chinese constitutes 53.4 percent of .the employment in theconstruction, 50.4 percent in manufacturing and 53.3 percent in finance, insurance, real estates and business service in 1980. Fifth Malaysia Plan, p 102.
economic activities by ethnic groups the Bumiputras are 
economically backward, while the non-Bumiputras 
economically far more better off. The ratio of the 
Bumiputra household income to that of the non-Bumiputra in 
1987 was 1 : 1.6 {Malaysia, 1989). The incidence of
poverty® among the Bumiputras in 1987 was 23.8 per cent in 
Peninsular, 35.5 per cent in Sabah and 24.7 percent in 
Sarawak while 7.1 per cent and 9.7 percent among the 
Chinese and the Indians in Peninsular respectively 
(Malaysia, 1989)
The Economy
Malaysia adopted a basically laissez-faire approach to 
economic development during the colonial period and 
continued the strategy in the post-Independence period 
(Gale, 1985/ Jomo, 1990) . For most of this period 
government intervention was minimal and the government 
confined its role in providing infrastructure, health, 
education and social services. The main economic activity 
of Malaysia before independence was the production of 
primary commodities such as rubber, palm oil and tin for 
export market.
However, since 1957 the Malaysian economy has undergone 
significant structural transformation and rapid growth. In 
the 1960's the country experienced considerable 
diversification of economic activities. The private sector 
played a leading role in the development of the economy 
during the sixties where private investment, domestic and 
foreign, played a crucial role in attaining high economic 
growth. Gross National Product (GNP) in constant prices 
rose on average by 6 per cent per annum while per capita 
income also increased by 30 per cent against the population
® For 1987, the poverty line is about $350 per month for a householdof 5.14 persons in Peninsular Malaysia, $429 per month for a household of 5.24 persons in Sarawak and $533 per month for a household of 5.36 in Sabah. Mid Term Review of 5th Malaysia Plan, p 45.
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growth of 3 per cent per year. Private investment also 
grew, at an average annual rate of 9.6 per cent as compared 
to 1.9 per cent of the annual growth rate of the public 
sector during the same period (Malaysia, 1970) .
Private investment in the fifties and sixties was largely 
focused on investment in perennial crops such as rubber 
and oil palm and tin mining®. However, during the later 
part of the 60's, private investment shifted away from 
these traditional activities into the manufacturing sector. 
This shift in private investment was associated with the 
industrialisation strategy that began to make noticeable 
impact in the later part of the 1960s (Arif,1991). Private 
and foreign investments^® grew rapidly in the manufacturing 
industries^. Average annual growth of the manufacturing 
output from 1960 - 1970 was 10.4 per cent in terms of value 
added and 12.8 per cent in terms of gross value of 
manufactured goods (Malaysia, 1970). The trend towards more
private investment in manufacturing , trade , and commerce
and away from agriculture and mining has resulted a higher 
growth rate of GNP than projected in the 1960-1970 period. 
During this period, GNP in constant prices rose on the 
average of 6 per cent per annum which exceeded the target 
rate of 4.9 per cent in the First Malaysia Plan.
Besides depending on the primary commodity products of
rubber, oil palm and tin of which Malaysia is the world
largest producer, it ventures into the manufacturing sector 
producing and exporting such goods as electronics products 
(Price,1988). Since 1980, Malaysia adopts a heavy 
industrialisation programme (Ariff,1991/ Jomo, 1990). The
® Mainly tin and iron ore.
In 1969, 62.1 percent of total share capital of $4,678 billion inlimited companies is foreign owned.
“ Industrial sector is now the largest sector in Malaysian economywith manufacturing output such as electronics, rubber products, textiles, air conditioners being exported to world market. See J.Faaland, p 17.
diversification of the economy has led to rapid economic 
growth and GDP in constant price grew from an annual 
average of 5.0 percent during 1961-1965 to 5.4 percent in 
1966- 1970 (First Malaysia Plan) . The economy grew further 
by 7.3 percent during 1971-1975 period (Second Malaysia 
Plan), and 8.6 percent during 1976-1980 (Third Malaysia 
Plan) . However, the performance of the economy declined 
during 1981-1985 period (Fourth Malaysia Plan) due to the 
recessions. During this period GDP grew by 5.1 percent. 
Since 19 8 8 the economy grew very rapidly in real terms by 
8.9 per cent, in 1989 by 8.8 per cent and in 1990 by 9.4 
per cent (Muhamad, 1991).
Despite the structural transformation and diversification 
in the economy, the peasant activities in the agricultural 
sector are still important^% This activities include rice 
farming, small holder cultivation of rubber, coconut and 
inshore fishing.
2.2.2 Problems of the economic system
Although the laissez-faire economic system was a successful 
formula in achieving high rates of growth, it has however 
clearly failed in meeting the socio-economic goals of 
reducing income inequality and raising the income levels of 
the poor especially the rural areas (Arif, 1991).The 
incidence of poverty remained high at 49.3 per cent in 1970 
(Faaland,et al, 1990). The free enterprise economic policy 
has allowed the various communities to continue their 
separate but unequal development thus exacerbating the 
economic disparities between the Bumiputras and the non- 
Bumiputras, the rural and the urban sectors (Gale, 1985). 
The glaring economic disparities (Faaland,et al, 1990) and
The peasant activities still contribute significantly to the Malaysian economy. For example smallholder sector contributed 6 8 percent of the total production of rubber. In the oil palm industry smallholder accounted for 53 percent of total hacterage while padi planting in which Malaysia is 73 percent self sufficiency level is 100 percent through peasant farmers. See 5th Malaysia Plan pp 134-135.
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the excessive communal politicking (Jomo, 1990 ; Arif,
1991) triggered the racial riots in May 1969. As a result 
of the disturbances the government formulated the New 
Economic Policy to redress the problems of ethnic 
inequalities. The promulgation of the NEP is contained in 
the Second Malaysia Plan for 1971 - 1975 and the Outline 
Perspective Plan (GPP) spread over a twenty-year period 
from 1970 to 1990.
2.2.3 The New Economic Policy (NEP) (1970 - 1990) 
Objectives
The NEP had two broad objectives namely the restructuring 
of the society and the eradication of poverty. The Second 
Malaysia Plan outlining the NEP states that:
" The Plan incorporated a two-pronged New Economic Policy for development. The first prong is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. The second prong aims at accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function. This process involves the modernisation of rural life, rapid and balance growth of urban activities and the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community in all categories and at all level of operations, so that Malays and other indigenous people will become full partners in all aspects of economic life of the nation ". (Malaysia, 1970 p.l)
The launching of the NEP in 1970, marked the turning point 
in the development of the Malaysian economy and had 
extensive effects on the position of private investment. 
Development strategy was focused on two central 
distributional objectives. Firstly, the eradication of 
poverty irrespective of race and secondly, the 
restructuring of society to correct the identification of 
race with economic function. The Government felt that in
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order to achieve these objectives it had to participate 
directly in the economy. The Second Malaysia Plan announced 
that the Government would :
" Participate more directly in the establishment of a wide range of productive enterprises .....through wholly-owned enterprises and joint ventures withprivate sector..... in a new selected growthareas.....and for creating a Malay commercial andindustrial community". (Malaysia,1970 p.7)
The Government, including State Economic Development 
Corporations, statutory bodies and other government 
agencies, would assist and create opportunities for the 
Malay community to participate in commercial and industrial 
activities. In terms of employment and ownership the NEP 
targeted that within a period of 20 years the Malay and 
other indigenous people would manage and own at least 3 0 
percent of the total commercial and industrial activities 
in all categories and scale of operations (Faaland, et al,
1990). The Plan outlining the strategy by saying :
" The programmes in the field of commerce and industry provide for new enterprises to be set up through such institutions as PERNAS, UDA, MRD andSEDCs. These enterprises....... ...to help trainMalays and other indigenous people to participate more actively in commerce and industry and to promote the establishment of a Malay commercial and industrial community.......  ". (Malaysia, 1970 p.72)
In line with these objectives and the strategies the 
Government increased its development expenditure in 
industry and commerce during the Second Malaysia Plan 
(1971-1975). The allocation for commerce and industry 
increased five fold from $137.0 million in the First 
Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) to $583.6 million in the Second 
Malaysia Plan (1971-1974) . At the same time, development 
expenditure for economic activities doubled from $2.2 
billion to $4.87 billion during the same period.
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Government participation in industry and commerce through 
the establishment of public enterprises and trust agencies 
was substantial. Since the implementation of the NEP it has 
made its presence felt in the economy through commercial 
and industrial activities in manufacturing, mining, banking 
and finance, construction, trading, transport and 
communications, agriculture, fishing and forestry.
Impact of the NEP on the public sector
There were three major impacts of the NEP on the public 
sector. Firstly, there was a tremendous growth in size of 
the public sector through the creation of the public 
enterprises. Secondly, there was a huge increase in 
employment in the public sector and thirdly a high increase 
in public sector expenditure.
a) Growth of the public sector
The increasing involvement of the public sector in national 
economic activities has led to an expansion in the number 
of public authorities engaged in commercial as well as 
socio-economic activities.
Initially, the public sector comprised the Federal 
Government, 13 State Governments and 4 public authorities 
(Malaysia, 1986) . At the time of independence in 1957 there 
were only 23 public enterprises in Malaysia (Salleh and 
Hui, 1990) . However, this grew to 30 in 1960, 154 in 1969 
and 1,144 by the end of the NEP period in 1990. In terms of 
their roles and functions, the public authorities were 
divided into 3 categories, namely socio-economic, 
commercial and industrial and public authorities as 
explained in the figure 1 (Malaysia, 1986).
The public sector in Malaysia can be broadly classified 
into 4 categories; the Federal Government, State
13
Commercial + Sodo Economic Objectives
Commercial + Industrial Objectives Public Utilities
PUBLIC SECTOR IN MALAYSIA
G o v m
mcMi-.'imm Aumpmnm
SEDCsCommercial + Socio-Ecoo Objectives
1. Rubber Ibdustxy SmatUioldeis Dev. Authorities (RISDA)
2. Pedestal Laud Dev. Authoiily (FELDA)
3. Pedestal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation. Authority (FELCRA)
4. Malaysian Rubber Dev. Authority (MARDKÎ)
5. Urban Development Authority (UDA)
6. Malayan Railway
7. National Corporation (PERNAS)
fotes:
iEDCs ; State EconomicDcvdopmait Corps.
'JFPEs : Nan-Financial Public Enterprises.
iource : Fifih M<dc^ sia Plan, 1986 - 1990
1. National OH Corporation (PEIRONAS)
2. Malaysian Airline System. (MAS)
3. Heavy hodustries Corp. Malaysia (HICOM)
4. Petbadanan Nasional Shipping Line (PNSL)
5. Cement Industries Malaysia (OMA)
6. Malaysia Shipyard and E i^ ee rin g  (MSB)
7. Malaysian Internationa! Shipping Line (MISQ
S. Perak Hanyoong Cement Bhd
9. Kedah Cement Bohad
10. Sabah Shipyard
11. Sabah Energy Corporation
12. Cement Manufacturer (Sarawak)
13. Food Industries Malaysia (FIMA)
14. Malaysian Steel Corporation (PERWAJA)
1. National Hectridty Board (NEB /  TEN)
2. Sabah Electricity Board (SEB)
3. Sarawak Electricity Board
4. Malaysian Highway Authorijy (MHA)
5. Penaittg Port Comtrtirion (PPG)
6. Kelang Port Authority
7. Kucing Port Authority
8. Bintiihi Port Authority
9. Johor Port Authority
10. Sabah Port Authority
11. Rajang Port Authority
Figure 1 Public sector in Malaysia.
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Government, Local Government and the Public Authorities 
which is also known as the Non Financial Public Enterprises 
(NFPEs) . As shown in Figure 1, all the 13 state governments 
and the NFPEs are directly involved in commercial and 
industrial activities to implement the NEP and achieve its 
targets. Public enterprises were set with a clear 
objectives which falls under three types; commercial and 
socio economic objectives, commercial and industrial 
objectives and providing essential services (public 
utilities). All public enterprises undertaking commercial 
and industrial objectives are supposed to make profit and 
compete with the private enterprises in the private sector 
(Puthuchery, 1987).
Table 2.1: Growth of the public enterprises in Malaysia1969 - 1992
Year Number
(a)
Growth Index (1969 = 100) (b)
1969 154 100.0
1974 460 298.7
1979 874 567.5
1983 1,050 681.8
1984 1,133 735.7
1985 1,187 770.8
1986 1,212 787 . 0
1987 1,203 681.2
1988 1,181 666.9
1989 1,185 669.5
1990 1,143 617.2
1991 1, 144 617 . 8
1992 1,189 642 .1
Source : 1969-1979 data calculated from Salleh (1990)Table 2.1983 - 1990 statistics from ICU Ministry of Finance 
(1993), Table 1, p.20.
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Table 2.1 shows the expansion of the public enterprises in 
Malaysia from 1969 to 1992. It is evident that rapid growth 
took place within the first ten year period after the 
implementation of the NEP from 1969 to 1979. During this 
period the number of public enterprises grew by five and 
the half times from 154 in 1969 to 874 by 1979." The 
exceptionally high growth was due to the vigorous 
implementation of the NEP with the formation of State 
Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) and their 
subsidiaries and other public enterprises to participate in 
the commercial and industrial activities.
Despite the recessions which hit the economy in the early 
eighties and the implementation of the privatisation 
programme in 1983, the number of public enterprises were 
still increasing from 1983 to 1986 period." This was 
because of two reasons. Firstly, the implementation of the 
privatisation programme was slow at its initial stages due 
to legal, administrative and expertise constraints. 
Secondly, despite the implementation of the privatisation 
programme by the Federal Government, there was an increase 
involvement in commercial and industrial activities by the 
State Economic Development Corporation Boards (SEDCs) of 
various states through the creation of new public 
enterprises. This trend could be interpreted as lack of 
direction and approach towards implementing the overall
“ Analysing in detail shows that 720 public enterprises were created during the ten year period. This means that almost 2 public enterprises were 
being created every week during this period.
In 1983, the government started to get concern with performance of the public enterprises. The Land Minister directed that those public enterprises under his Ministry which have been making losses up to five years must be closed down. Malaysian Business, June 1983.
In the same year fifty public enterprises ceased operations, 34 sold to Bumiputra and 11 transferred to National Equity Corporation (NEC). Malaysian Business, Jan 1-15, 1990
In 1986 the Minister of Public Enterprises said that loss making public enterprises should be wounded up or privatised since they are a burden on public funds and would ultimately affect poverty alleviation programme. Malaysian Business, May 16, 1987.
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privatisation policy which were based on adhoc and 
piecemeal basis. In 1984 IMF cautioned Malaysia on the 
rapid growth of the public enterprises which was affecting 
Malaysia's balance of payments and investment pattern."
It was only in 1985 when the Government introduced the 
Privatisation Guideline for private sector's used.
Since 1987 the number of public enterprises started to 
decline as a result of (a) the privatisation programme 
being implemented more vigorously, (b) the closing down or 
merger of losing public enterprises" and (c) the reduction 
of development expenditure of the government due to the 
recession which put a stop on the expansion of new public 
enterprises. In 1987 public development expenditure was 
revised from M$7.6 billion to M$4.7 billion.
b) Growth of public sector employment
Table 2.2 shows the growth of the public sector employment 
from 1970 to 1992.
The NEP gave regard to the creation of employment as an 
important objective. The Second Malaysia Plan outline this 
strategy as :
"in implementing development projects particularly in the public sector, deliberate efforts will be made touse more labour intensive techniques These andother measures.... aim for higher rates of labour absorbtion...." (Malaysia,1970 p.5).
Table 2.2 reveals that there was a high increase in the 
level of employment in two time period / the first was 
between 1975 and 1976 and the second between 1980 and 1982 
(Column d) . The increase in employment level in 1975 and
Malaysian Business, May 16 1987.
Such as National Livestock Development Authority (Majuternak), Kelantan State Land development Authority (Takdir). Malaysian Business, May 16, 1987.
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1976, by 5.5 percent and 11.0 percent respectively, is 
associated with the high increase in the number of public 
enterprises being created in the Third Malaysia Plan (1975- 
1979). During this period the number of public enterprises 
grew from 460 to 874 (Table 2.1, column a). However the
Table 2.2 : Malaysia - Public Sector Employment {'000) (1970- 1990)
Year Totalemploy­ment
(a)
Publicsector
(b)
% of Public sector emp­loyment
(c)
Annual % growth of public sec­tor amp (d)
Index (1970 = 100)
Public Total emp- sector loyment (e) (f)
1970 3340 398 11. 9 - 100 . 0 100 . 0
1975 4020 520 12 . 9 5 .5 130 . 7 120 . 4
1976 4376 577 13 . 2 11 . 0 145 . 0 131 . 0
1977 4476 582 13 . 0 0 . 9 146 . 2 134 . 0
1978 4542 597 13 .1 2 . 6 149 . 8 136 . 0
1979 4700 622 13 . 2 4 .2 156 . 3 140 .7
1980 4817 693 14 . 4 11 . 4 174 .1 144 . 2
1981 5011 757 15 .1 9 .2 181 . 7 150 . 6
1982 5123 807 15 . 8 6 . 6 192 . 2 154 . 6
1983 5429 805 14 . 8 -0 .2 202 . 0 162 . 5
1984 5565 811 14 . 8 0 . 7 203 . 8 166 . 7
1985 5625 815 14 . 5 0 .7 206.0 168 . 4
1986 5707 829 14 . 5 1.7 208 . 3 170 . 9
1987 5851 836 14 . 3 0 . 8 210 . 1 176 .1
1988 6088 844 13 . 7 1 . 0 212 .1 182 . 3
1989 6351 847 13 . 3 0 .4 212.8 190.1
1990 6621 850 12 .8 0 .4 213 . 6 198 . 2
1991 6849 854 12 . 5 0 . 5 214 . 6 205 .1
1992 7060 859 12 . 2 0 . 6 215 . 8 211.4
Source : Annual Statistical Bulletin 1970-1992 issues
high increase in level of employment in the 1980-1983
period. between 6.6 percent to 11.4 percent is associated
with a special recruitment exercise known as "Operasi 
Penuh" to fill in the 80,000 job vacancies in various
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government departments." This was a special recruitment 
exercise to facilitate the development programme as 
stipulated in the Fourth Malaysia Plan. However, there was 
a drop in the level of employment in 1983 due to (a) 
closing down of some loss making public enterprises, (b) 
selling of some public enterprises to the Bumiputras in 
line with the NEP" and (c) the transfer of a large number 
of public enterprises to the Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
(PNB) , a trust unit set up by the Government in 1979 to 
mobilise Bumiputra savings and investment. Since then the 
level of employment in the public sector marginally 
increased.
c) Growth in public sector expenditure
Table 2.3 shows the growth of the public sector expenditure 
from period 1970 to 1987.
The growth of the public sector expenditure during the NEP 
period corresponds to the growth of the number of public 
enterprises and employment level as discussed above. 
Following the same trend, public sector expenditure grew 
rapidly during 1970-1980 period (Table 2.3, column a) . 
Public sector expenditure per capita has also increased in 
nominal term from about M$328 to over M$1796 per head 
during the same period. The Government cut its public 
sector expenditure from M$33.2 billion in 1983 to M$31.9 
billion in 1986 due to recession. With declining 
international trade, prolonged and deep recession, 
commodity price collapse and a sharp cut in development 
expenditure by M$1.5 billion the GDP growth was negative
"Operasi Penuh" is a crash recruitment exercise to fill massive number of vacancies arising from resignations and retirements and the creation of new posts. This exercise is distinct from the centralised recruitment by the Public Service Commission. Far Eastern Economic Review, October 1981, p. 16.
This exercise was undertaken before the implementation of the privatisation policy but in line with the NEP to create Bumiputra entrepreneurs. 
This was later incorporated in the privatisation policy.
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Table 2.3: Total Government Expenditures 197 0 - 1987
Year Public sector expenditure
($ million)(a)
GNP at market prices
(b)
Public sector expenditure as % of GNP
(c)
GNP expen­diture per capita ($ million) (d)
1970 3568 12155 29.3 328
1975 8652 21606 40.0 725
1980 24340 51390 47.4 1796
1981 31275 55602 56.2 2222
1982 32511 56690 54.5 2241
1983 33216 65154 50.7 2231
1984 33033 74182 44.5 2163
1985 31482 71838 43.8 2008
1986 31926 66543 48 .5 1981
1987 33296 69757 47 . 7 2067
Source : Ghee (1990),. Table 1 p..15)
for the first time in 1985. Since 1986 the public
expenditure has been increasing at a declining rate as the 
government discarded its counter-cycle budgetary 
strategy."
Although some^® believe that the public sector is much too 
large the issue of what is the right size of public sectors 
employment is debatable. The World Bank tends to make 
comparisons on the basis of government employees per 1000 
inhabitants.^^ Using this criteria Malaysia has the highest
However, the rapid increase in employment in public sector has increased financial commitment of the government in the long run in terms of pension benefit of the civil servants. For example since 1982 allocation for pension has been increasing rapidly as follows: M$0.59 billion in 1982 to M$0.85 billion in 1985. Investors Digest, KLSE Dec, 1986.
For example Noordin Sophie (1987) . 
Malaysian Business, 1.5.1985 p 17.
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ratio of 46 as compared, to average of Asia 30, Africa 20, 
Latin America 38 and developing nation 29 in 1985." 
However, one has to be careful when using this criteria. 
Higher ratio is not necessarily bad for the economy. One 
has got to look at the underlying causes for the growth and 
its economic and financial implications on the government 
and the economy. A small public sector employment could be 
attributable to the inaffordability of the government to 
provide infrastructure and basic needs of the population. 
However, in the case of Malaysia the tremendous expansion 
of the public sector in terms of the large number of public 
enterprises being created, the high level of employment and 
the increase in level of public sector spending has created 
financial difficulties to the Government.
Impact of the NEP on the Government finance
Although the NEP had successful policies in 1970's in 
redressing the economic disparities between the Bumiputras 
and the non-Bumiputras, problems were created for the 
government and the economy in the 1980's. The policy had 
two significant implications on government finance. Firstly 
it increased public expenditure and secondly it increased 
the government debt.
a) Increase in Government expenditure
The direct participation of the Government in the economy 
and the increase in the size of the public sector has 
increased operating and development expenditure creating a 
huge budgetary deficit as shown in Table 2. 4.
ibid
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Table 2.4: Government Revenue and Expenses (1970-1992)
Year Revenue
(a)
OperatingExpendi­ture(b)
CurrentSurplus/Deficit(c)
Develop­ment expen­diture (d)
Total expendi- ture (e)
OverallSurplus/Deficit
(f)
1970 2 ,400 2,161 239 715 2,876 - 476
1975 5,117 4 , 900 217 2,151 7,051 - 1,934
1980 13,927 13,692 235 7,463 21,155 - 7,228
1981 15,806 15,686 120 11,358 27,044 -11,238
1982 16,689 16,684 5 11,485 28,169 -11,480
1983 18,608 18,374 234 9,669 28,043 - 9,435
1984 20,805 19,791 1, 014 8,407 28,198 - 7,393
1985 21,114 20,066 1, 048 7,142 27,208 - 6,094
1986 19,518 20,075 -557 7,559 27,634 - 8116
1987 18,143 20,185 -2,024 4,741 24,926 - 6783
1988 21,967 21,812 155 5,231 27,043 - 5,076
1989 25,273 24,832 441 7,696 32,528 - 7,225
1990 29,521 27,105 2, 416 10,689 37,794 - 8,273
1991 34,053 31,296 2,757 9,565 40,861 - 6,808
1992* 39,250 37,075 2,175 9 , 688 46 , 763 - 7513
_
Note ; * estimate
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin 1970-1992
Development expenditure was at its highest during the 
vigourous implementation of the NEP in the Third Malaysia 
Plan (1980-1985). In 1981 and 1982 development expenditure 
reached M$ll billion but declined to M$8 billion towards 
the end of the period in 1984 (Table 2.4, column d) . During 
the 1981 and 1982 period the deficit was at its highest 
both at about M$ll billion (column f) implying that all 
development expenditure was funded through borrowing. 
However, development expenditure was trimmed down from 1985 
and 1987 in line with the government budgetary deficit 
(column f). In 1987 the Government revised its development 
expenditure by 62 percent from M$7.5 billion in 1986 to 
M$4.7 billion (column d) in 1987. The development 
expenditure in the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) was also
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revised and reduced by 2 8 percent from M$69 billion to 
M$49.3 billion.
b) Increase in government debt
The high development expenditure during the first decade of 
the NEP and the counter-cyclical budgetary strategy during 
1980 -1982 contributed to the high external debt position 
of the country.
The development expenditure of the Non Financial Public 
Enterprises (NFPEs) constituted a high proportion of the 
public sector expenditure. Twenty seven per cent of the 
Federal Government development expenditure was allocated 
for the NFPEs in the Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990 
(Malaysia, 1986). In order to finance their expenditure the 
NEPEs relied on loans in both the domestic and 
international markets which often required a Government 
Guarantee.
Table 2.5 shows the Federal Government outstanding debt 
from 1975 to 1990.
The dependency of the government on external market loans 
increased with an increase in development expenditure. 
External market loans which constituted 12 percent of total 
loan in 1975 increased to 16 percent in 1981. As public 
development expenditure increased in the Fourth Malaysia 
Plan (1980-1984) and the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1985-1989), 
foreign^ loans also increase correspondingly. This has 
resulted financial problems to the government as the 
Malaysian currencies depreciated against other major 
currencies such as the Yen, the US dollar and the Sterling 
(Chapter 6) . However, the high economic growth of an 
average of 9 percent per annum from 1988 to 1990 (Mahathir,
1991) has improved the financial performance of the 
government and since 19 87 has reduced the dependency
Table 2.5; Federal Government Outstanding Debt (19 7 0 - 19 92)
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Year ExternalMarketLoans(a)
External Pro]eat Loans (b)
SupplierCredit
(c)
TotalExternalDebt(d)
DomesticLoans
(e)
GrandTotal
(f)
GrowthIndex1975=100
(g)
1975 1,348 1, 077 - 2,425 8,755 11,180 100
1980 2,190 2,663 - 4 , 853 18,286 23,139 207
1981 4,796 2 , 973 - 7,769 22,376 30,145 270
1982 9,036 3 , 494 - 12,530 28,460 40,990 367
1983 12,271 3 , 875 - 16,146 32,927 49,073 439
1984 14,652 4,672 - 19,324 36,080 55,404 496
1985 17,826 6,164 - 23,990 44,169 68,159 610
1986 20,310 8,000 - 28,310 45,698 74,008 662
1987 18,940 8 , 689 - 27,629 54,796 82,425 737
1988 17,265 7,925 732 25,922 63,121 89,043 796
1989 16,375 7,253 554 24,182 65,763 89,945 805
1990 16,182 8 , 125 419 24,726 69,988 94,714 847
1991 16,639 8,468 257 25,364 73,708 99,072 886
1992 14,695 7,898 119 22,712 76,070 98,782 884
_
Source : Calculated from Annual Statistical Bulletin - 1970 to 1992 issues
external market loans. By 1992 external market loan 
constituted only 15 percent of the government total loan. 
One of the reasons for this reduction is the prepayment of 
external loans by the government from the privatisation 
proceedings since the implementation of the privatisation 
programme.
Besides the increased in development expenditure, the 
dependency of the state governments and the public 
authorities has also contributed to the financial problems 
of the government. Table 2.6 shows the extent of this 
dependency from 1966 to 1986.
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Table 2.6 Outstanding Loans Due to the Federal Government from Public Authorities, State Governments and Others ($ Mil) ; 1966 1986
Public Authorities/ Public Companies 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986
Public Authorities
FELDA 96 266 716 1, 532 2,554 3,469
NEB 91 86 110 380 845 1,363
Malayan Railway 59 75 105 143 380 847
PKA 52 61 131 247 282 279
MARA - 30 122 273 306 299
UDA - - 103 351 799 1, 210
LPN 73 - 102 66 68 143
Others - 169 302 127 1,826 4,389
Sub Total 371 687 1, 691 3,119 7,060 11,999
Public Companies
Syarikat Telekom - - - 547 1,708 4, 686
PERNAS - 5 130 274 563 593
MIDF 37 38 130 120 65 22
MISC - 72 94 280 446 306
MSE Sdn Bhd - - 39 117 128 122
Bumi Investment Trust - - - - - -
Others 2 11 123 310 685 1,337
Sub Total 39 66 516 1, 648 3,595 7,066
State
State Governments 172 302 815 1,808 3,769 6 ,480
Others 114 126 114 614 642 9,133
Sub Total 286 428 929 2,422 4,411 15,613
Total 695 1,181 3,136 7,189 17,919 40,651
Source : Calculated from Salleh and Rani (1991), Table 4.3,, p . 72.
The level of borrowing of Public Authorities has increased 
by 17.5 times from just $687 million in 1970 to $12 billion 
in 1986. Three public authorities were highly dependent on 
Government loans - Federal Land Development Authority 
(FELDA), National Electricity Board (NEB) and Urban
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Development Authority (UDA). NEB has increased its level of 
borrowing by 11 times from just 86 million in 1970 to 1.4 
billion in 1986 in order to finance its development 
programmes. FELDA, a land relocation scheme to alleviate 
poverty has also increased its dependency on the Federal 
Government loans by 29 times. UDA has also relied heavily 
on government loans to undertake development projects in 
the urban areas for Bumiputra participation in commercial 
activities. Public companies and State Government have also 
increased their reliance on Federal Government loans for 
their expansion and growth. Forty percent of the loans in 
1986 went to public companies and state government which 
under the NEP are entrusted to increase the Bumiputra 
participation in commerce and industry. The reliance of the 
public authorities, public companies and state Government 
had imposed financial burden on the Federal Government.
The financial difficulties of the government are 
exacerbated by the involvement of the Government in the 
commercial and industrial projects. Such projects include 
the M$1.2 billion Perwaja Steel Mill, M$850 million Penang 
Bridge, M$0.3 billion Daya Bumi Complex, M$1.2 billion 
Komtar Complex, the national Proton car project and other 
heavy industrial projects. These projects, which were 
funded largely by foreign loans, have taken their toll on 
government budgets because of (a) the depreciation of 
Malaysian currencies against the Yen" and (b) these 
projects did not yield sufficient returns to service the 
loans (Jomo, ed, 1988).
The financial difficulties faced by the public sector and 
the economy have created pressures for change. One of the 
alternatives for the Government was to call for 
privatisation policy.
Most of the loans were from Japan especially the Perwaja Steel Mill 
Mill, Daya Bumi Complex and the Proton car projects.
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Impact of the NEP on the private sector
The implementation of the NEP has various impacts on the 
private sector. Firstly, the Government has introduced 
several legislative measures which constraints business 
activities (Arif, 1991). The most controversial among them 
is the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975 which 
empowers the Minister of Trade and Industry to impose 
conditions, including the compliance of the 3 0 per cent 
Bumiputra share in line with the NEP, before a licence is 
issued or renewed Secondly, investors find it difficult to 
conform to the 3 0 percent equity compliance. This was 
because (a) most investors were not receptive to the idea 
of outside equity participant in their companies^'^ and (b) 
in many cases there were not enough individual Bumiputras 
to take up the equity allocated to them due to shortage of 
capital and lack of experience in business activity. This 
has affected the investment growth in the country. To 
overcome the problem of shortage of capital within the 
Bumiputra community the Government hold the shares in trust 
for the Bumiputras and later transferred them to Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (PNB), a unit trust set up to mobilise 
Bumiputra savings in the capital market.
The Government claimed that the regulations associated with 
the implementation of the NEP were not designed to stifle 
private sector activities (Muhamad, 1991). Policy-makers 
argued that the NEP has never been a negative factor. The 
fact that the Malaysian economy continued to grow at 
credible rates during the 1970s and 1980s is cited as 
evidence. Critics, however, claimed that the Malaysian 
economy could have grown at a faster pace, had it not been 
for the NEP. While the critics could have been right one
Basically there was quite a resentment on the part of the Chinese community on ICA and has been politicised by certain parties those within the ruling party and the opponent party. As described by the Prime Minister, "Even hawkers associations complained about the ICA when they were in no way affected by it. People have been asked to protest against it when it does not involve them at all". Malaysian Business, Oct 1980.
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could argue that this is the price the government is 
willing to pay in order to achieve better distribution of 
wealth, incomes and political stability."
There were two main concerns of the business community on 
the regulatory aspects of the implementation of the NEP. 
Firstly, many believe that some of these regulations have 
little relation to the realities of regulatory requirement 
(Arif, 1991). Secondly, it creates incentives for 
corruption for the government officials with substantial 
discretionary powers.
However, the recessionary period which started in the early 
eighties have contributed to a shift in Government policy 
on the implementation of NEP. According to a senior 
Government official interviewed by the Far Eastern Economic 
Review in 1983,^* the Government favours no more than 
minimal participation in business in the future. By June 
19 86 the Government made a decision to relax the 3 0 percent 
Bumiputra equity and employment NEP requirements in order 
to stimulate private investment.
2.2.4 Achievement of the NEP 
Employment and poverty level
The growth and expansion of the private sector activities 
have facilitated the increase of Bumiputra participation in 
the economy. Investments in the new and existing 
industries provided additional opportunities for employment
The Prime Minister said it is better that Malaysia have a slower development with political stability than high economic growth with no political stability {Far Eastern Economic Review, Oct 30, 1981) This statement probablyintended to remind the critics of the rationale of the NEP policy and the consequence of growth without equality policy before 1970 which led to racial disharmony in 1969.
Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1983.
Far Eastern Economic Review, June 1986.
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restructuring and equity participation. The Bumiputra 
labour force in the manufacturing sector in 1985 rose to 
46.2 per cent while in finance, insurance, real estates and 
business services increased to 38.2 per cent {Malaysia, 
1986) . The Bumiputra membership of registered 
professionals" also increased to 14.9 per cent in 1980 and 
further rose to 21.0 per cent in 1984 (Malaysia, 1986). In 
the corporate sector many Bumiputras were involved in 
management role and continued to build up the capacity of 
managerial skills. This was facilitated by efforts of 
trust agencies in particular the PNB through the 
acquisition and expansion of companies. This resulted in 
the increase in the number of trained Bumiputra managers 
who continued to advance further in the industrial sector.
Most of the employment opportunities were in the urban and 
established growth areas, thus contributing to the 
reduction in urban poverty. The incidence of poverty" in 
1987 was reduced dramatically from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 
17 percent in 1987 (Salleh and Yusof, 1989 p.31)
Ownership Structure of Investment
With regard to achieving 3 0 percent corporate ownership by 
the Bumiputras, in January 1981 the Government introduced 
a scheme designed to transfer millions of dollars of 
government-owned shares, worth M$1.5 billion at market 
value, to Bumiputras which were held by the National
Definition of professional includes architects, accountants, dentists, surveyors, lawyers and veterinary surgeons.
There measuring of poverty level could be done by the "absolute" and "relative" approach. The "absolute" poverty approach is measured by taking a poverty line income and then estimating the proportion of household or individuals below the poverty line income. The "relative" approach is measured by taking the average in come of, say 4 0 percent of households or individuals that are found to be below the relative poverty line. In 1987 the poverty level income was M$350 for a family of 5.12 in Peninsula, M$429 for a household of 5.24 in Sarawak and M$533 for a household of 5,36 in Sabah. (K. Salleh and A.Yusof, 1990)
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Table 2.7 : Malaysia - Ownership of share capital (at par value) of limitedcompanies, 1971-1990 (M$ Million)
Ownership Group 1971
(a)
1980
(b)
1985
(c)
19 9 0 Average Annual growthrate(%) 1972-801986-90 (d) (e) (f)
Malaysian residents 2,512 .80 18,493.40 57,666.60 84,920.70 20 .90 8 .00
Bumiputra indi­duals and trust agencies
279.60 4 , 050.50 14,883.40 21,796.20 31 .40 7.90
Bumiputra indi­duals 168.70 1,880.10 9,103.40 15 , 084 .20 23 .50 10 . 60
Trust agencies 110.90 2,170.40 5,780 .00 6,712 .00 39.00 3 .00
Other Malaysians residents 2,233.20 14,442 .90 42,783.20 63,124.50 18.80 8 .10
Chinese 26,033.30 36,116.00 6 .80
Indian 927 .90 1,297.10 6 .90
Others 987 .20 1,044 .80 1 .10
Nominee companies 5,585 .10 9,517.90 11 .30
Locally controlled companies 9,249 .70 15,148.70 10 .40
Foreign residents 4,051.30 13,927 . 00 20,297.80 26,325.80 13 .30 5 .40
Share in Malaysian companies 2,159.30 7,791.20 12,672.80 17,284.80 14.20 6 .40
Net assets of local branches 1,892 . 00 6,135.80 7,625 .00 9 , 068 .00 12 .30 3 .50
Total 6,564.10 32,420.40 77,964.40 111,273.50 16 .70 7 . 90
Source; Salih and Yusof (1989) Table 12, p.38.
Mid Term Review, 5th Malaysia Plan 1986-1990 p. 70
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Equity Trust (ASN) on behalf of the Bumiputras. Any 
Bumiputra individual above the age of 21 was allowed to 
invest in the shares indirectly by purchasing up to 50,000 
trust units at a transaction price of M$1 a unit. However, 
this was reviewed in 1990 whereby the age limit was reduced 
to 18 years of age to allow more Bumiputras to participate 
in the investment scheme. The maximum amount of shares that 
could be bought was also increased to 100,000 units. Return 
from the shares came in the form of dividends and capital 
appreciation in bonus issues.^
Table 2.7 shows that Bumiputra individuals and trust
Investment of both National Equity Corporation (PNB) and its subsidiary,National Unit Trust (ASN) grew rapidly arising from the transfer of the government shares in private companies as shown below:
PNB ASN
Investment(M$millions) No of companies Investment(M$millions) No of companies
1981 2,916 97 536 59
1982 3,693 127 809 77
1983 4, 779 135 1129 97
1984 5, 515 153 1793 103
1985 6163 159 2496 111
1986(July) 6338 160 3223 111
Source : Investors Digest, Oct 1986, p5.
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below : Returns from investing in the National Unit Trust was high as shown
Pre-tax profit (M$ million) Dividend (%) Bonus (%)
1981 75.4 10 10
1982 96 . 9 10 8
1983 159.8 10 8
1984 254 . 0 10 7
Source : Malaysian Business,
40
September 1, 1985.
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agencies have increased their share of ownership and 
control of the corporate sector from 1.5 percent in 1970 to 
19.5 per cent in 1990, which is short of the 30 percent 
target under the NEP. There were various reasons for the 
failure to achieve this target. Firstly, there was 
insufficient capital among the Bumiputras to take up the 
entire 3 0 percent equity stake. Many shares reserved for 
the Bumiputras were not taken up. There were also many 
cases where the non Bumiputras benefiting from this policy 
through using of the Bumiputras names to buy the shares 
specially allocated for them. Secondly, the Bumiputras 
community by and large were not exposed to business 
environment and therefore were slow to take advantage of 
the investment opportunity created by the government. 
Thirdly, there were Bumiputras who sell their shares for 
quick short-term gain. Fourthly, the recession which hit 
the economy in the mid eighties slowed down economic growth 
affecting both public and private sectors investment 
programmes in the country.
However, the ownership of capital owned by the Bumiputras 
in 1990 could be higher than the 19.5 percent official 
figure achieved. This is because Bumiputra shares in the 
nominee companies were not taken into account. Nominee 
companies were holding shares worth M$9.5 billion in 1990 
(Table 2.7, column d) However, the lack of available 
data from the nominee companies on the breakdown of 
ownership among ethnic group makes it impossible to resolve 
this issue.
Poor financial performance of the public enterprises
Despite the achievement of setting up of the public 
enterprises to create Bumiputra commercial society.
However, if one assumes that the entire shares in the nominee companies owned by the Bumiputras, which is most unlikely, then Bumiputras ownership of capital increase from 19.5 percent to 28 percent - still short of the 30 percent target.
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financial performance of the public enterprises was not 
satisfactory until 1990. As shown in Table 2.8 below 
government involvement in the commercial activity was 
tremendous.
Table 2.8: Public enterprise in terms of ownership as at June 1993
Type of Ownership Total % FederalGovernment StateGovernment RegionalAgency
WHOLLY OWNED (10 0%)
Equity (MR Mil) 8,393 . 5 34 . 8 5,438.8 2,798.2 156 .5
Number of PEs 413 34 . 7 124 264 25
SUBSIDIARY (51% - 99%)
Equity (MR Mil) 12,965 . 8 53 . 8 11,547.0 1,356.3 62 . 5
Number of PEs 405 34 .1 233 158 14
SHARE HOLDING (20%-50%)
Equity (MR Mil) 2,489.3 10 .3 1, 968 . 9 498 22 . 3
Number of PEs 285 24 . 0 152 127 6
INVESTMENT COMPANY (<2 0%)
Equity (MR Mil) 256. 7 1.1 159 . 6 96.9 0 . 3
Number of PEs 86 7 . 2 39 46 1
TOTAL
Equity (MR Mil) 24,105 . 3 100 19,114.3 4,749.5 241 . 6
Number of PEs 1,189 100 549 595 46
_
Source : ICU Ministry of Finance (1993), Table 13 p.32.
By June 1993, its equity in public enterprises committed 
was M$24 billion. Table 2.9 reveals that public enterprises 
losses were between M$1.6 billion to M$2.5 billion between 
1985 to 1989. However net profit has improved tremendously 
in 1990 and 1992 to M$8.47 billion and M$9.66 billion 
respectively. Although the Table does not provide the 
average rate of return for the public enterprises which 
will indicate return on investment, it nevertheless shows 
that the number of profit making enterprises were on the
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increasing trend. There are various plausible reasons for 
this which will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Table 2.9: P r o f i t a b i l i t y  of public  en te rp r ise s  1980 - 1992 (M$ Mil)
Year
No of PEs
P R O
Amount F I TNo of PEs
L O S SAmount E S
NET PROFI
1980 257 2.758 161 (100) 2,658
1981 335 3.210 223 (201) 3,009
1982 366 3,453 299 (606) 2,847
1983 445 4.168 318 (1.448) 2,720
1984 495 5.557 357 (546) 5.011
1985 493 5J#2 452 (1,631) 4,341
1986 492 5.629 501 (2,420) 2U%9
1987 528 4,656 474 (2,041) 2.615
1988 587 5,804 412 (1.844) 3,960
1989 639 5.446 349 (2,502) 2,9M
1990 675 9,379 288 (908) 8/#l
1991 636 10.504 268 (841) 9,6M
1992 120 7.004 36 (153) 6.851
Note : 1992 f igu re  as a t  30/6/93
Source : ICU Ministry of Finance (1993) Table 8, p .27.
2.3 MALAYSIAN PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME
2.3.1 Objectives and Rationale
Based on the above, one could therefore conclude that the 
underlying rationale for the privatisation programme in 
Malaysia is one of economic pragmatism rather than one of 
ideological motives. The objectives of the Malaysia's 
privatisation programme can be summed up as follows:
I Privatisation programme has a number of objectives.First, it is aimed at relieving the financial and 
administrative burden of the Government undertaking and maintaining a vast and expending network of
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services and investment in infrastructure . Second, privatisation is expected to promote competition, improve efficiency and increase the productivity of the services. Third, privatisation by stimulating private entrepreneurship and investment, is expected to accelerate the rate of growth of the economy. Fourth, privatisation is expected to assist in reducing the size and presence of the public sector with the monopolistic tendencies and bureaucratic support in the economy. Fifth, privatisation is also expected to contribute to contribute meeting the 
objectives of the NEP especially as Bumiputra entrepreneurship and presence have improved greatly since the early days of the NEP and they are therefore capable of taking up their share of privatised services" (EPU, 1985 p.l)
The Prime Minister in his speech stresses the importance of 
the privatisation programme to the Malaysian economy and 
says.
" The fact has to be faced was that development will not be possible at the desired pace unless the shortages of the Government fund can be made up through private sector investment and participation " (Muhamad, 1984, p.5).
The Prime Minister further stresses the significance of the 
privatisation programme by saying :
" The alternative to privatisation may be to stop improving or providing the needed facilities. This will result increasingly poor services and will stifle growth. Development will be retarded and the second prong of the NEP poverty eradication will not be accomplished". (Muhamad, 1984, p.5)
The Government argues that the size of funds required for 
investing in utilities has increased by leaps and bounds. 
Thus, private sector participation will lessen the burden 
of the government concerning funds. Privatisation is 
expected to provide impetus towards raising competition, 
efficiency and productivity. The Government also claimed 
that the performance of many public enterprises in 
industry and commerce is unsatisfactory as they make losses 
despite enjoying monopolistic positions and various
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supporting measures from the Government (Muhamad, 1984). 
Furthermore, it is argued that protection of several public 
enterprises from market forces has bred complacency, 
inefficiency, low productivity in the public enterprises 
(Omar, 1 9 9 0 ) In addition public enterprises require 
subsidies and copious injections of capital by the 
Government. The Government believes that Government-owned 
corporations transferred to the private sector would be 
more profitable. The Government also argued that publicly 
owned enterprises have been less successful or have run at 
a lost because the government's management methods and 
culture differ greatly from those the public sector 
(Muhamad, 1984; Sallehudin 1 9 8 4 ).
The Government expected privatisation to stimulate growth 
through the private sector investment in the economy. Since 
the early 1980s the Government has stressed the country's 
reliance on the private sector as the primary engine of 
economic growth. The Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981 - 1985)
called for the private sector to play a leading role in 
providing stimulus to growth and spear-heading further 
industrialisation (Malaysia 1986).
Privatisation policy also aims to reduce the size of the 
public sector through the withdrawal by Government from 
active and direct participation in the economy. From 1970 
to 1982 public sector employment constituted 12 per cent to 
15.8 percent of the total labour force in the economy. The 
Government claimed that the public sector is already 
oversize and in view of this the Government will continue
Hanafiah Omar is the head of task force on privatisation programme in the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister Department.
This could be interpreted similar to view put forward by Hanafiah Omar (1990). The complacency attitude of the public enterprises due to lack of competition or complacency attitude due to government commitment to bail ailing companies. The complacency attitude is similar to the "quite life" described by the Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy and the complacency due to lack of competition put less pressure on the public enterprises to perform as described by Leibenstein X-Efficiency theory.
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to down size its role in the economic production and 
business as " the government cannot afford forever run 
institutions in order to sustain or create employment". 
(Muhamad, 1984 p.5)
The last Government objective of the privatisation 
programme is to contribute to meeting the objectives of the 
NEP . To some this is a logical extension of the country's 
13-year-old NEP which is intended to transfer a 30 per cent 
share of corporate ownership to bumiputras^^
2.3.2 The debate of the privatisation policy - Views and criticism
Business community
The business community welcomes the Government initiative 
to adopt the privatisation policy (Tan,S,S 1984/ Tan, K.S, 
1984; Ibrahim, 1984; Kushairi, 1984) - for two reasons.
Firstly, privatisation will open up more scope for private 
sector to participate in the development of the economy in 
areas normally monopolised by the public sector. Better 
investment opportunity will attract more investment from 
domestic and foreign investors which will then create job 
opportunities for the population. Secondly, privatisation 
will liberalise the economy from government rules and 
regulations associated with the implementation of the NEP 
which is characterised by inefficiencies, malpractice and 
corruption in the public sector.
Many potential investors were enthusiastic about the policy 
but remain cautious as to its practical success^\ Many 
industrialists have pointed out that it was vital for the 
government to balance its social and economic objectives 
and provide specific guidelines on the privatisation policy
Far Eastern Economic Review, September, 1983. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1983
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before it is implemented. It is argued that in the absence 
of specific guidelines it is difficult for the government 
to implement the programme due to the massive state sector. 
In addition some observers believed that many of the 
enterprises which the government is keen to divest are 
perennial losers.
Trade unionist
There were mixed reactions among the trade unionist; 
private sector unions applauded the privatisation policy 
(Narayanan, 1984), while the public sector trade unions 
(CUEPECS) expressed their concern and sceptism (Ahmad, 
1984) .
The private sector unionists advocate that privatisation 
will increase the efficiency, productivity and performance 
of privatised enterprise. It is claimed that only the 
fittest can survive the competition in the business world.
Nevertheless, the public sector unionists who opposed the 
privatisation policy (Ahmad, 1984) regard privatisation as 
being against the interest of public sector workers for 
three reasons. Firstly, privatisation will ultimately 
weaken the power base of trade union in the public sector. 
Ahmad Nor argues that since government departments 
constitute the majority of trade union members, 
privatisation will hit at the very foundation of the labour 
movement. Secondly, the government goals for higher 
productivity and efficiency may not be achieved as the 
public employee is used to an environment that has evolved 
to meet social objectives and the needs of the public as 
opposed to profitability objectives of the private sector. 
Thirdly, the security of the lower income group which forms 
the largest portion of employees in the public sector will 
be threatened. He argues that these employees with their 
lower level of education and little specialised skills will
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be easy targets for exploitation by unscrupulous employers 
in the private sector.
The above views and sceptisms were shared by some of the 
public (Muzaffar, 1984). He argues that privatisation will 
further weaken an already weak labour movement. Workers in 
the same industry will not have the collective strength 
since they will be organised on the basis of in-house 
union. Since union leaders in-house unions will have to 
negotiate wages on their own with their respective 
managements, they will become more dependent upon the 
goodwill of their bosses. This will enable the employer to 
manipulate the workers. However, an industrial relation 
legal expert argued that private sector unionisation would 
better guarantee workers rights than the public sector 
workers' collective agreements under the National Joint 
Councils (NJCs) . This, according to the view, will allow 
former public sector workers to pursue collective 
bargaining, take industrial action and exploit full union 
participation in the private sector. He therefore 
anticipated that with the implementation of the 
privatisation programme there will be an increase in cases 
arising from trade union disputes in the long run.
The Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) (Zainal, 198 8) 
also opposed the privatisation policy - on two grounds. 
Firstly, privatisation would increase cost of goods and 
services made available to the public by virtue of its 
profit oriented operations. Secondly, as agreed by others 
(Tan, 1984; Muzaffar, 1988), privatisation will deprive 
the lower income group and the poor of certain essential 
services.
Some labour leaders also believe that Malaysia is not ready
” B. Lobo presenting a paper titled " Security of tenure in employmentand privatisation" at the Third Lawasia Labour Law Conference in Kuala Lumpur. New Straits Times 22,8.1992.
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for the privatisation of basic welfare services as the 
incidence of poverty is still considered high at around 30 
per c e n t C U E P E C S  (Ahmad , 19 84) reminded the government 
of its moral obligation and responsibility to provide 
certain basic social services to the public. It says the 
Government should continue to maintain and provide social 
services such as education, telecommunication, electricity, 
sanitation and transportation at a cost affordable by the 
people. The MTUC has cautioned the Government to be 
cautious in its privatisation programme as failure in its 
implementation which would result in reversing towards 
state control would not only incur heavy financial 
constraints but would also jeopardise employer-employee 
relationship by virtue of changed working environment.
Academics
Some members of the academics expressed pessimistic views 
about the Government privatisation objectives of achieving 
better performance, efficiency and productivity in the 
public sector, (Tan, 1984; Puthucheary, 1985; Muzaffar, 
1986; Jomo 1990) . They raised the issue of whether the 
inefficiencies of the public sector are the characteristic 
of public sector and therefore can only be overcome through 
privatisation. The arguments against the policy were 
various. Firstly, improvements in the performance could be 
brought about by; (a) examining the public sector 
critically in order to overcome its shortcomings and be re­
reformed, (b) better supervision at managerial level and 
providing better incentives which would increase motivation 
for the worker to work harder and increase productivity (c) 
greater accountability and more effective control over the 
public sector and (d) clearly defining the objectives and 
roles of the public enterprises with specific criteria for
Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), September 1983. The figure quoted by FEER is in contradict with official figure. By 1984 level of poverty was reduced to 18.4 percent (Fifth Malaysia Plan, Table 3-1, p.86). By 1987 level of poverty had further reduced to 17 percent (see page 28).
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measuring their performance, achievement or shortfalls in 
order to improve productivity and efficiency. They argue 
that the public sector can be more efficiently run as 
demonstrated by some public enterprises without resorting 
to privatisation. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the 
public sector expenditure will be reduced considerably as 
private sector activities are also supported by the 
government through subsidies, loans and protective 
legislation. Thirdly, privatisation will not resolve the 
government's fiscal problem because the Government would 
only be able to privatise profitable or potentially 
profitable enterprises and activities because the private 
sector would only be interested in these enterprises. Thus, 
Government would lose income from the more profitable 
public sector activities and would be stuck with financing 
the unprofitable enterprises. This would undermine the 
potential for cross-subsidization within the public sector. 
Fourthly, privatisation exercises may not achieve their 
alleged advantages and benefits by invoking NEP 
restructuring considerations, supposedly to increase 
Bumiputera wealth ownership and business opportunities. It 
is claimed that with increase Bumiputera competition where 
collusion cannot be arranged, political influence and 
connections will become increasingly decisive. Thus, 
privatisation will primarily enrich the few with strong 
political connections to secure profitable opportunities. 
Fifthly, some argued that retrenchment is almost inevitable 
consequence of privatisation (Putucheary, 1987). Thus 
privatisation may therefore exacerbate the unemployment 
problem not only because workers in the public sector are 
retrenched but also because fewer new recruits are employed 
in the public sector. However, some felt that privatisation 
may not reduced private sector employment, as given the 
choice many of those in the public sector would remain in 
the public sector. It is argued that redeployment of these 
staff to other Government department will not reduce public 
sector employment.
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2.3.3 The Status of the Privatisation Programme
Since the implementation of the privatisation programme the 
Government has set up an Inter-Departmental Committee on 
privatisation under the chairmanship of the Director 
General of the Planning Unit in the Prime Minister
Department. In line with the programme, privatisation units 
have also been set up in some government departments to 
examine the feasibilities of privatising their departmental 
operations. The Government has encouraged the private
sector to submit their proposals for the consideration of
the Committee on Privatisation.
However, initially there was a lack of proper planning and 
coordination among the various agencies involved in the 
implementation of the privatisation programme. It was only 
in 1985 that the Economic Planning Unit published 
guidelines on the privatisation policy supposedly for the 
use of the private sector. However, the ten-page guidelines 
are more of a document explaining the general policy of the 
privatisation than providing a specific guide as to what 
and how privatisation should be approached. This could be 
interpreted as a signal that the government was flexible 
in its approach to implementing the privatisation 
programme. This is reflected in the guidelines as.
"Government will have to give careful consideration before selecting services and interests that will be privatised. The private sector on its part should also assess, from its point of view, those interests of the Government that it feels can be taken over and managed successfully by private interests. ..." (EPU, 1985 p. 4)
The Guidelines further acknowledge its shortcomings by 
saying,
"Government is currently examining the various services and interest that can be privatised...The Guidelines do not provide a complete list of the areas that can be privatised....The private sector is welcomed to put up proposals " (p 6)
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The flexibility of the policy has given broad power to the 
decision makers involved in the programme. In addition, it 
has created an element of uncertainty in the implementation 
of the programme. This is reflected in the Guidelines as,
"Whether a privatisation proposal is accepted or not rests entirely with the Government. Government is not obliged to privatise irrespective of the merits or demerits of the privatisation scheme." (p.8)
This to some extent has discouraged entrepreneurs to 
participate in the programme at the initial stage of the 
implementation of the policy and contribute to the slow 
progressed of the programme.
The lack of clear approach has caused (a) duplication of 
responsibilities between certain ministries and privatised 
companies which at times caused friction among them^^ and 
(b) problems of accountability between ministries 
especially between the Ministry of Energy, Post and 
Telecommunication and the Ministry of Finance on the 
privatised companies. This is largely the result 
conflicting roles and interests between the two 
ministries.
In 1991 the Economic Planing Unit published the 
Privatisation Masterplan (PMP). In his foreword message the 
Prime Minister acknowledges the implementation problem by 
saying,
"Indeed the Malaysian is still apprehensive of this
As revealed by the Deputy Minister of Finance. He confirmed that the Finance Ministry will come up with a guideline defining more clearly the power of ministries in controlling the privatised companies. The Star, 16.3.91.
As pointed out by the Minister of Energy, Telecommunication andPost.
The Ministry of Energy through the Electricity Supply Department acts a regulator while the Ministry of Finance as the majority shareholder of the privatised companies such as Syarikat Telekom Malaysia (STM) and Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB).
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policy and do not fully understand the Government's views of methods. It is therefore important that the Government make public its Privatisation Masterplan so that the public can not only participate but also understand the approach adopted by the Government" 
(EPU, 1991 p.iii)
Part of the problem in understanding the policy, as 
discussed above, was the lack of clear approach by the 
Government itself. This is being rectified as the Prime 
Minister acknowledges,
"We have identified some of the privatisation bottlenecks and taken the necessary remedialactions the Government has devised very clearprinciples and taken steps to streamline the administrative machinery and procedures...." (p.iii)
The PMP provides better guidelines, if not a complete one, 
than the previous Guidelines.^
The privatisation programme as laid out in the PMP is 
broadly based. It has identified a total of 246 entities 
and activities to be privatised ; 69 projects to be
privatised within 2 years, 107 within 3 to 5 years and the 
rest beyond five years. The programme covers various 
activities of the economy including telecommunications, 
energy, water supply, airline, airports, shipping, roads 
and highways, broadcasting, postal services, railways and 
government owned industries such as cement factories and 
steel mills. The Government has drawn an Action Plan 
reviewed annually to monitor the progress of the 
privatisation programme.
The Government by 1992 has listed thirteen public 
enterprises on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange as below:
The PMP is a more complete guidelines as it explains the implementation policy, the conceptual framework, related privatisation issues, the Government action plan, the approach to project implementation and the government administrative machinery involved.
44
1) Sports Toto Malaysia Berhad 1985
2) Malaysia Airline System 1985
3) Malaysian International 1986
Shipping Corporation (MISC)
4) Tradewinds Berhad 1988
5) Syarikat Guia Padang Terap 1989
Sdn Bhd
6) Cement Manufacturers Serawak 1989
Berhad
7) Lori Malaysia Berhad 1990
8) Edaran Otomobil Nasional 1990
Berhad
9) Holiday Villages Sdn Berhad 1990
10) Cement Industries Malaysia 1990
Berhad (CIMA)
11) Pernas International Hotels 1990
and Properties Berhad
12) Syarikat Telekom Malaysia 1990
13) Tenaga Nasional Berhad 1992
2.3.4 Achievement of the privatisation programme
Relieving the financial and administration burden of the Government
The privatisation programme, as at June 1993, had saved the 
Government M$16.8 billion^ in the form of $13 billion 
capital expenditure and $3.8 billion in operating 
expenditure besides raising M$6.7 billion*^ as revenue 
proceeds from the sale. The 73 projects involve the 
construction of infrastructure and utility schemes such as 
roads, water supply, electricity, communication services 
and postal services, and the taking over of government
As revealed by the Director General of EPU in New Straits Times11.6.1993.
Deputy Prime Minister / Minister of Finance in opening a seminar on "National Conference on Privatisation: The Challenges Ahead". New Straits Times,8.10.1993.
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functions by the private sector.
Some of the biggest infrastructure projects under the 
privatisation programme include the $6.6 billion North 
South Highway, the $9.9 billion Kuala Lumpur Airport Rail 
Plan, $1.0 billion Light Rail Transit Project and the M$9 
billion'^  ^ electricity power projects. The Government's 
expenditure on transport infrastructure has been reduced by 
50 percent from $12.9 billion in the Fourth Malaysia Plan 
(1981-1985) to $6.8 billion in the Fifth Malaysia Plan 
(1986-1990). Similarly public sector expenditure for 
telecommunications infrastructure contracted from $779 
million in the Fifth Plan to $41 million in the Sixth Plan 
(1991-1995).
The financial implications of the privatisation on the 
Government finance are of two magnitude. One, the one-off 
proceeds received from the privatisation programme have 
improved Government financial position. For example the 
Government made a prepayment^® of M$1.47 billion of 
external market loan in 1987 to reduce external debt to 
M$18.94 billion (Table 2.5, col a). This saved the 
Government on interest payment and overcoming future 
losses due to the depreciation of the Malaysian currency. 
Second the proceed and the savings has enabled the 
Government to allocate more funds to achieve NEP 
objectives. The financial gains has led the Government to 
pursue more ambitious privatisation programme in the 
future. The Cabinet in 1993 has decided to privatise and 
sell most of the 1,189 federal and state-owned companies 
with a total paid up capital of $35.78 billion^.
Director General of Electricity Supply Department. New Straits Times, 03.09.1994, p.8 .
Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1, 1988.
Statement by Deputy Prime Minister in New Straits Times, 30.6.1993.
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Based on the financial benefits discussed above it could be 
concluded that the privatisation policy has significantly 
reduced the financial burden of the government in providing 
infrastructural development to the country. Similarly the 
policy has greatly reduced the administrative 
responsibility of many government departments in terms of 
recruitment, planning, monitoring and supervision of the 
privatised projects.
Although the programme has generated $6.7 billion there was 
an issue of underpricing. A new issue is said to be 
underpriced when the initial returns are positive or 
negative.^Some argued that the Government could have 
earned more if the shares were correctly priced during the 
listings. However, although this is true, the issue of 
underpricing in new listing is a long standing issue and is 
not specific to the privatised companies. In fact, one 
could argue that the so called underpricing premiums is 
what makes the capital market alive. The investor's 
expectations of high capital appreciation from the listing 
by the investors provide the capital market with the 
funding it needs from companies. Studies in the United 
States, United Kingdom, Canada and Hong Kong give an 
average premium of 10 to 15 percent, Australia 2 0 to 3 0 
percent and Singapore 35 to 45 percent and 40 percent in 
Malaysia.
In the case of the privatised enterprises, the Government 
has not really lost in any way. This is because the 
privatisation (listings) has only been partial. In fact the 
government stand to benefit more adopting this approach as 
it still holds majority shares. A case in point is when the 
Malaysian Airline System (MAS) was listed in 1985 only 30 
percent of its shares were listed. The Government gradually
Investors Digest KLSE, April 1993. 
ibid, p 6 .
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decreases its shares making profits from capital 
appreciation in the process and finally divested all its 
shares to the private investors by 1994.^° The Government 
still owns about 7 0 percent of Syarikat Telekom Malaysia 
(STM) and could reap similar benefits in the event of 
divesting its interests further. TNB's®^ share price 
increased from M$4.50 a share to M$14 a share in 1994 with 
Government still holding 70 percent of the total shares..
Increase efficiency and productivity through competition
There are very few studies done to assess the performance 
of the privatised firms in terms of increased efficiency 
and productivity. Some studies using the partial 
productivity indicators have shown reasonable success in 
increasing productivity.®^ However privatisation has 
sometimes led to the tendency of increased price of the 
services rendered. It is claimed that Telekom Malaysia's 
has invested in $18 billion since its privatisation 
proposal to abolish the free 100 three-minute calls was 
rejected by the Government
Stimulating private ownership and investment
The privatisation programme has led to the expansion of the 
capital market and has increased the participation of the 
private sector in the economic development of the country. 
The 13 privatised companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) were valued at a total of $29.35 
billion at offer price. As at June 1992 their combined
By 1993, when the Government divested its shares in the Malaysian Airline System, its share price had gone up by almost triple.
TNB is the privatised electricity utility firm.
A study by Ismail Md Salleh (1990) shows that the privatisation of Port Klang has increased performance in terms of number of vessels calling at KCT and KPA, monthly handling, turn around time and rate of crane-handling.
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market value increased by 122 percent to $60.09 billion®^. 
They constituted about 33.4 percent of KLSE market 
capitalisation of $195 billion. By end of 1993, the 15 
privatised firms listed on the KLSE has increased their 
market value to $84.3 b i l l i o n . There was no evidence of 
insufficient liquidity fund in the capital market with the 
implementation of the privatisation programme. Since 1983, 
111 companies were listed on the Main Board and Second 
Board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange®® at an average of 
12 listings per annum.
However, it is interesting to note that allocation by the 
financial institutions to fund the purchase of shares by 
individuals has been an increasing trend. As at end of July 
1994, $9,876 billion has been loaned for this purpose.®®
This suggests that funds obtained by the newly listed 
companies through the KLSE were not only derived from 
private savings but also of borrowing from financial 
institutions. One could therefore argue that the allocation 
of funds by financial institutions for the individual to 
buy shares has given opportunity for more people to 
participate in the creation of a share holding society and 
distribution of wealth in the society.
Reducing the size and presence of the public sector in the economy
Privatisation has transferred about 82,550 government 
employees to the private sector in the privatised 
companies. However, there are no indications that 
Government involvement and participation in business has
Business Times 1.7.92.
New Straits Times, 8.10.1993. 
New Straits Times, 12.6.1993. 
Utusan Malaysia, 1.10.1994.
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been reduced. At the federal level Khazanah Holdings Bhd®? 
a Government owned holding company was formed in September 
1993®® to take over from Ministry of Finance Corporation 
the equity investments in 37 companies, six of which are 
listed on the KLSE.®^ Listed companies on the KLSE owned by 
Khazanah Holdings are Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), Telekom 
Malaysia Berhad (STM), Hicom Holdings Berhad, Perusahaan 
Otomobil Nasional Berhad (Proton) Edaran Otomobil Nasional 
Berhad (EON), and Petronas Dagangan Berhad. Other companies 
owned by Khazanah Holdings include the National Oil 
Corporation, PERWAJA Steel Sdn Bhd and Bank Bumiputra
Malaysia Berhad. The total investment is estimated to be 
worth $7 billion at par value or $72 billion at market 
value.®® As Khazanah Holdings is expected to spearhead
Malaysia's investment in mega and strategic projects 
locally and abroad, it is hard to see how government
participation in business is going to be reduced.
In addition there were plans by the Public Enterprises
Ministries to turn various public enterprises (agencies) 
into business conglomerates to compete with local and 
international private companies.®^ Although the Government 
has decided to privatise and sell most of the 1,189 Federal 
and State owned companies which have a total paid up
The company's Board of Directors comprises of The Prime Minister as the chairman, the Deputy Prime Minister as the deputy chairman and three directors each from the public and private sectors. The company has a paid up capital of $100 million and an authorised capital of $500 million. New Straits Times 9.8.1994.
New Straits Times, 16.9.1994.
As reported in the newspaper (33) , Ministry of Finance Inc in separate notices dated 13.9.1994. announced that the changes in its interests as substantial shareholder in Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), Telekom Malaysia Berhad (STM) , Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Berhad (Proton) Edaran Otomobil Nasional Berhad (EON) and Hicom Holdings Berhad. It announced that the exercise involved 
the " sale of interest in voting shares" to Khazanah Holding.
New Straits Times, 19.09.1994.
The Minister of the Public Enterprises Ministry said that studying is being conducted by the Ministry, Economic Planning Unit, the respective State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) and MARA to find ways to convert its agencies into conglomerates in order to enhance the competitiveness of the Bumiputra entrepreneurs. New Straits Times, 10.2.1994.
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capital of $35.78 billion, it will retain some percentage 
of equity to ensure the Government benefited from future 
profits in the privatised firms.
Meeting the objective of the New Economic Policy
Social objectives
The savings and the proceeds obtained from the 
privatisation programme have improved the financial 
position of the Government. This has two economic 
implications for the NEP. Firstly, as has been pointed out 
earlier it has enabled the Government to channel its funds 
to other projects aimed at eradicating poverty and 
improving social services which slowed down during the 
early 80's. Secondly, the improved financial position of 
the government has enabled it to set up the Entrepreneurs 
Rehabilitation Fund in 1990 with the objective of providing 
financial assistance to Bumiputra companies and 
entrepreneurs which were facing financial difficulties 
during the economic slow down in the late 1980s. Under the 
scheme the Treasury received 497 applicants from 
entrepreneurs for a total of $1.87 billion loan. However 
only 386 applications with a loan of $646.6 million were 
approved.
Redistribution of wealth
Trust Agencies®^ were allocated substantial shares in
As revealed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. The Star, 30.6.1993.
Figures revealed by the Finance Minister in New Straits Times23.4.1992.
Such as the Amanah Saham Bumiputra, Amanah Saham Johor, Amanah Saham Pahang etc.
51
privatised companies®® as a means of distributing the 
equity derived from privatisation to the Bumiputras.®® The 
Government has allocated funds interest free for the poor 
to buy shares in the Trust Agencies, In 1992 PNB launched 
a nationwide exercise to select poor®? Bumiputras to be 
given an interest free loans to invest in National Equity 
Trust and Bumiputra Equity Trust (ASB) . ®® The special loan 
scheme comes under the $5 00 million revolving fund by the 
Government to help the poor Bumiputras invest in ASN.®^ 
Each candidate is entitled for a maximum of $5000 each. As 
at June 1993, 92,868 poor families have benefited from the 
scheme?® The Johor, Selangor and Pahang State Governments 
have a similar schemes for the poor to invest in the State 
Trust Agencies.?^ The PNB has identified between 150,000 -
170,000 of poor families.?^ The states of Johor, Pahang and 
Selangor state governments has also identified 5,186,?® 
4,000?4 and 3,707?® poor families respectively. However what
It is the policy of the Ministry of Finance to give priority in allocating shares to trust agencies in privatised companies. Bumiputra companies (100 percent owned) with a paid up capital of $25,000 registered with the Ministry of Finance are also eligible to apply for the shares allocated to the Bumiputra community. Utusan Malaysia, 12.5.19 93
For example The Ministry of Finance allocated 3 00 million shares of Hicom Holdings Berhad which owned by the Ministry of Finance Inc when it was privatised in April 1994. The shares were distributed to PNB, companies and institutions selected by the Ministry.
®? Those who are below poverty level. The number of poor families asidentified by the EPU was between 150,000 - 170,000 in 1992. However no detail were given as to the criteria used in classifying the group.
New Straits Times, 26.2.1992.
Each candidate is entitled for a maximum of M$5000 (£1250) each.
This is 65.05 per cent from the 142,765 poor families registered under this scheme. Some those registered were not entitled for the scheme due to incorrect and discrepancies in providing information and doubtful applications. Utusan Malaysia, 7.6.1993.
The loan is payable within 15 years.
?^ Including the non-Bumiputra.
?^ Johor State Government defines poor as those earning less than $175a month and supporting more than 5 children.
New Straits Times 20.6.1992.
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is not clear is whether those poor families identified by 
the various state governments by virtue of different 
institution and criteria used will also be entitled for the 
interest free loan provided by the ASN at the national 
level. ?®
The role of the Trust Agencies in wealth distribution will 
be significant in the future. Six states, Pahang, Johore, 
Selangor, Sabah and Sarawak have each established unit 
trust with Perak, Trengganu, Penang and Negeri Sembilan in 
the process of creating their own.?? The role of the unit 
trust could be seen in two perspectives. Firstly, it could 
create an investment opportunity for the Bumiputra society 
through holding shares in companies not listed on Kuala 
Lumpur stock Exchange. This would help to alleviate the 
problems of getting Bumiputra fund to take up the 3 0 
percent quota reserved for them in companies. The trust 
schemes also provide a better opportunity for more 
Bumiputras to invest in those companies through the 
purchase of unit trust shares. This avoids the common 
problems of individual Bumiputra shareholders, given the 
opportunity to buy the shares at premium rates, selling 
their shares for short term gains which has partly hampered 
the achievement of the 3 0 percent Bumiputra equity 
participation set by the NEP.?® Secondly, the unit trusts 
could be allocated shares in the privatised companies. The 
unit trusts could secure long term benefits to its holders
New Straits Times, 10.17.1994.
If there is no coordination or policy on this matter there is a possibility of a large proportion of the poor families identified by the states will be entitled to another interest free loan of $5000 by PNB. If this happens then one could argue that this facility will increase the income of the selected poor family by about $100 a month on the basis of 10 percent return per annum. For example ASB/ASN and ASJ has given a consistent return of not less than 13 percent per annum in terms of dividend and bonus.
?? New Straits Times, 16.8.1994.
The Prime Minister revealed that many Bumiputras bought shares for quick gains and for purchase of luxurious items. Some Bumiputras also lent their names to non Bumiputras to purchase units allocated for Bumiputras and acted as sleeping partners only. New Straits Times 16.8.1994.
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since they normally hold shares for long term investment.
Allocation of shares of the privatised firms were made to 
the Bumiputra and the Indian community. The Government?® 
clarified that the Chinese were not allocated shares 
because their level of equity participation in the stock 
market was already high.®® Shares were allocated to 
Bumiputra and Indian companies, state governments and 
cooperatives. Bumiputra companies with a paid up capital of 
$25,000 registered with the Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Trade are eligible to apply for the shares.®^ 
MOCCIS a Bumiputra cooperative with 5,000 members was 
allocated 3 million TNB,s share.®® Four companies belonging 
to the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), a component party 
in the Barisan Nasional ruling party, received a total of 
10 million Telekom shares when it was floated in the KLSE 
in 1987.®® The state government of Perak received allotment 
of 3 million Telekom shares and 4 million TNB share®^ while 
Penang received 2 million TNB share®®.
2.4 CONCLUSIONS
The Government rationale for privatisation policy is based 
more on economic pragmatism than ideology. The perceived 
oversize, low productivity and inefficiencies of the public
?® statement made by Deputy Finance Minister in The Star, 13.5.1992.
When the NEP was formulated in 1970, the ownership target was by 1990 the Bumiputras would control 3 0 percent of the corporate equity, non Bumiputras 40 percent and the foreigner 40 percent. However by 1990 the Chinese community controls about 6 0 percent of the equity in the corporate sector. Calculated from Table 2.7
New Straits Times, 2.3.1994.
Berita Harian, 21.6.1992.
The four companies are Maika Holdings which received 1 million shares and SB Management Services Sdn Bhd, Advance Personal Computers Sdn Bhd and Clear Way Sdn Bhd which received 3 million shares each. The Star, 7.5.1992.
The Star, 13 .10 .1992 .
The Star, 18.6.1992.
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sector which drain public funds are clearly among its 
fundamental concerns in seeking to reduce its direct 
involvement in the economic activities of the country. The 
NEP policy associated with high development expenditure of 
the Non Financial Public Enterprises had extensive impact 
on the financial position of the Federal Government. Many 
of the public enterprises were loss making and had been a 
financial burden to the Government. The privatisation 
policy announced in 1983 is therefore a new approach to 
national development strategy. It has placed the private 
sector to play a leading role in the economic development 
of the country.
Specifically, privatisation aims at relieving financial and 
administration burden of the government, increase 
efficiency, accelerate growth, reduce the size and role of 
the government in the economy and contribute to the 
achievement of the NEP. However, some of the objectives of 
the privatisation policy are in conflict with each other a 
trade off between social and economic objectives, a trade 
off between equity and efficiency.
The Government is adopting a cautious approach in 
implementing the privatisation programme. It still holds a 
majority shares in those companies privatised and listed on 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Evidence also suggests 
State Governments were intensifying the setting up of 
joint-venture activities with the private sectors and thus 
the number of public enterprises has not been reduced.
Financially, the privatisation programme has raised the 
much needed revenue for the Government to pursue with its 
NEP objectives. Distribution of wealth among the public 
especially the poor was done through the trust agencies. 
Since the privatisation programme public enterprises had 
improved their financial performance and the number of loss 
making public enterprises was on the decline. With the
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Strong financial benefits gained from the privatisation 
programme, and with a strong Government of Barisan Nasional 
which has been in power since independence one can expect 
that the privatisation policy to be implemented at a 
vigourous pace.
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CHAPTER 3 : ASSESSING THE COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - THE CASE OF MALAYSIA
Many policy makers have frequently expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the performance of public enterprises. 
It is claimed that a large number of public enterprises in 
many countries are loss making, draining public funds in 
order to finance losing public enterprises (Hemming and 
Mansoor, 1988; Ramanadham, 1989) . As a result of the 
perceived non performance of the public enterprises, both 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector 
activities have been seriously questioned. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the perceived non performance of the public 
enterprises in Malaysia has among other things led to the 
government in redefining the roles of the public and 
private sectors providing more opportunity for the
participation of private sector in the economy and by 
privatising the public enterprises.
The object of this chapter is two folds. One is to look 
into the issue of comparative performance of the public and 
private enterprises and the other to examine the
performance and problems of the public enterprises in 
Malaysia. This chapter will be divided as follows: Section 
2 focuses on an overview of the theoretical perspective of 
public versus private enterprises. Section 3 looks at 
briefly issues on performance evaluation and its problems. 
Section 4 highlights the empirical evidence on the
comparative performance of public and private enterprises 
in the United Kingdom and United States and some European 
countries. It also discusses the performance of public 
enterprise in Malaysia in comparison with the private 
sector.s. Section 5 examines the problems of the public 
sector in Malaysia and followed by Section 6 on the 
Government's action to remedy the situation. Section 7 
summarises issues raised in previous sections in the 
chapter.
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3.2 OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Case for government intervention
The main justifications for government intervention in the 
economy are to correct market failure. There are two 
aspects of market failure. Firstly, the failure of the 
market system to achieve Pareto optimality efficiency in 
the allocation of society's scarce resources and secondly, 
the failure to serve social goals other than efficiency 
such as distribution of income. Theory suggests that market 
failure within the category of efficiency tends to occur in 
the presence of monopoly and oligopoly market structure, or 
in the existence of significant externalities and public 
goods.
The main sets of tool available to governments to deal with 
market failure are rules, public ownership, taxation and 
expenditure. Thus, one way of correcting market failure is 
through public ownership by setting up public enterprises 
to supply goods or services in the economy. Rees (1984) 
offers a listing of public enterprise's objectives which 
could be divided into four categories. The first includes 
allocative objectives consisting of technical efficiency 
and economic efficiency; the second distributional 
objectives; the third financial objectives and the fourth 
macroeconomic objectives. The last objective involve the 
effects of public enterprises policies on the employment 
level, inflation rate, balance of payment and the growth 
rate of the economy.
However, there are several theoretical arguments which 
suggest that public enterprises would not be able to 
achieve pareto optimality.
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Theoretical case for public enterprise inefficiency
3.2.1 Theory of Bureaucracy (Public Choice Theory)
The proponents of the Public Choice Theory have put the 
behaviour of the bureaucrats and public managers at the 
centre of their argument for the inefficiency of the public 
sector. The theory concentrates on political coalitions and 
their effect on input usage, rewards and product 
characteristic. These are largely directed by the theory of 
bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1971) . Since then, others (Breton 
and Wintrobe, 1982; Jackson, 1982; Mueller, 1989) have 
extended the Niskanen model.
In his book, Bureaucracy and Representative Government 
(1971) Niskanen provides an explanation of how the 
behaviour of bureaucrats increases public sector spending. 
Niskanen's theory suggests that the bureaucrat, like all 
other individuals has self interest and therefore utility 
maximisers. The bureaucrat's utility function include his 
"salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, 
power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making 
changes, and ease in managing the bureau."(Niskanen, 1971 
p.38). Since many of the items in the bureaucrat's utility 
function are directly related to the size of the budget his 
department, it follows that bureaucrats will also be budget 
maximisers. Therefore since bureaucrats may be primarily 
concerned with the maximisation of their own interest and 
use more labour or capital than is consistent with optimal 
production, this will lead to technical inefficiencies 
where production takes place below the production 
possibility curve (Orzechowski, 1977).
Mueller (1989) provides a model in explaining Niskanen's 
theory. In this model it is assumed that the sponsor 
provides a budget to produce output or services. The 
potential budget available to the bureau during a given
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period is shown by the budget- output function:
B = B(Q), B'>0, B"<0 (1)
The budget of the bureau is a function of the perceived 
output of the bureau service. This function may be thought 
of as public benefit or utility function which is assumed 
to increase, at a diminishing rate with increasing output.
The cost-output function is given as :
C = C(Q), C'>0, C">0 (2)
The cost function for producing the bureau's output 
increases at an increasing rate such as a competitive 
firm's cost schedule.
Given the scenario, the sponsor is faced with the problem 
of monitoring the bureau<s output. This arises because, (a) 
the cost schedule is known only to the bureau's members (b) 
the sponsor knows only the total benefit schedule in 
equation (1) but cannot determine whether output is being 
supplied Pareto Optimum. In other words the sponsor can 
only observe the total output of the bureau and its total 
budget. This provides the opportunity for the bureaucrats, 
as a self-maximising agent to maximise its budget subject 
to the constraint that the bureau's budget cover the cost 
of production.
If the bureau does not refund the money to the sponsor the 
bureau's objective function is shown as :
OB = B(Q) + X  [ B(Q) - C(Q) ] (3)
whose first-order conditions yield:
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B' (Q) = C' (Q) (4)
1 +A
Optimality from the sponsor point of view is achieved when
B' (Q) = C' (Q) (5)
that is when the marginal benefit of an extra unit of 
output to the sponsor equals its marginal cost to the 
bureau.
The Lagrangian multiplier represents the marginal utility 
of an expansion of the budget constraint to the bureau and 
is positive, therefore equation (4) implies that B'<C'. 
This means that the budget of the bureau is expanded beyond 
the point where marginal public benefits equal marginal 
costs.
If B and C are quadratic, B' and C' become straight lines 
we have a situation where expansion of the bureau budget as 
shown in Figure 3.1.
The diagram shows that instead of requesting a budget at 
output Qo where B'= C' which maximises the benefit of the 
sponsor, the bureau will request for a larger budget at Q*. 
At output Q* triangle E equals triangle F . This implies 
that all the consumer surplus gains at output Q are offset 
by the excess of marginal costs over marginal benefits on 
units between Qo and Q*. In the event that the sponsor's 
demand schedule shifts to B's or is inelastic, the marginal 
benefit of Q to the sponsor would fall to zero. When this 
happens the constraint where total budget equals total cost 
would not hold. At output Qs there will be no incentive for 
the bureau to be efficient. At this point it will attempt 
to expand its expenditure to exhaust its approved budget.
Figure : 3.1 The oversupplv of a bureau’s output
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Source: Mueller (1989), Figure 14. l,p.254
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Breton (1974) explains some of the techniques bureaucrats 
may employ to maximise the budget. This includes 
overestimating benefits and underestimating costs of 
projects; favouring a rate of discount which will make 
large projects appear more profitable than they really are 
when estimating the present value of benefits and costs of 
projects, and favouring the correction of "wrong" policies 
rather than abolishing them.
Criticisms
The criticisms on the Niskanen model lie in its two crucial 
assumptions - (a) that bureaucrats seek to maximise the
size of their budgets and (b) they are monopolists who are 
able to impose their objectives on the politicians. Breton 
and Wintrobe (1974) criticise Niskanen's model on three 
grounds. Firstly, they argue that politicians are unlikely 
to be passive. They suggest that the bargaining power of a 
department with respect to the politicians is greater 
because of its ability to distort and conceal information 
from the politicians rather than because of it is a 
monopolist. In respect to this, the politicians are likely 
to introduce controlling mechanisms which will exert some 
kind of control over the activities of the department. If 
the cost of the controlling mechanism is prohibitive, 
where the marginal cost of employing the control mechanism 
is greater than the marginal benefit from its use, then the 
outcome is consistent with Niskanen's model and the 
department could influence the budget for its benefit. 
Secondly, Breton and Wintrobe (1974) argued that 
bureaucrats are not a simple monopolist. There are other 
considerations which come into the utility function of the 
bureaucrat one of which is the career advancement prospects 
which depend on the evaluation of their performance by 
politicians. Thirdly, Breton and Wintrobe (19 82) also argue 
that the competition which exists between bureaucrats 
within an organisation is likely to prevent the oversupply
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of bureaucratic output.
Jackson (1982) sharing Breton and Wintrobe's argument, 
argued that the Bureaucrat's utility functions are much 
more complex than those proposed by Niskanen. Bureaucrats 
are also motivated by serving the public interest or 
fulfilling a public duty rather than just maximising their 
own utility through budget maximisation. Peacock (1979) 
contested Niskanen's model for two reasons. Firstly, a 
politician such as a Minister will trade off political 
ambition with the perceived benefits to him of party 
loyalty. He argues that in all probability a Minister will 
regard maximising his budget certainly as a sufficient, but 
not a necessary, condition for achieving his aims. In 
addition, there are alternative uses of budget for party 
aims which put a check on the pursuit of budget 
maximisation. Increases in departmental budget could 
produce a backlash effect which might weaken the long run 
support for the party. Secondly, he argues that bureaucrats 
cannot act as discriminating monopolists even if they 
wanted to. This is because Chancellor of the Exchequer 
through his Treasury officials will probe into their 
programmes.
However any attempt by the politicians to probe into the 
programmes of the bureaucrats is made difficult by the 
asymmetric information between the politicians and the 
bureaucrats. Mueller (1989) argues that middle-level 
bureaucrats do have a financial incentive to encourage the 
rapid expansion of their departments because it increases 
the likelihood of their promotion to higher ranks. As a 
result, middle level bureaucrats have a to tendency to 
deceive their superiors within the department about the 
true magnitude of the quantities of bureau output supplied 
and their unit costs, for their self interest. This leads 
to further difficulty in monitoring of public sector's 
programmes by the politicians.
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Niskanen's model draws attention to the potential 
allocative inefficiency of public bureaucracy. Critics of 
the model suggest that it might be overstated. However, 
this is not to deny the relevance of the theory of 
bureaucracy in explaining the behaviour of the bureaucrats 
in the budget decision making process. The extent to which 
the bureaucrat is able to trade off public output for 
economic rents in his budget depends on two issues. One, 
the degree of knowledge that the politician has with 
respect to the production function and two, the cost of 
production. While such knowledge is necessary, it is not by 
itself sufficient for the control of the department. One of 
the solutions is to institute check and balances as
controlling mechanism but this leads to the issue of who is 
to regulate or monitor the regulators.
3.2.2 Property rights theory
The property right theory puts ownership as the focus of 
their rationale for the inefficiency of the public
enterprises. The property rights or ownership rights are 
human rights to the use of economic goods (Davies and
Brucato, 1987) . The individual rights to the use of
resources are exclusive and voluntarily transferable and 
consist of a set of rights to acquire, dispose of and, 
whilst owning, and benefit from resources (Alessi, 1982/ 
Parker, 19 85). The theory suggests that ownership matters 
in determining how costs and rewards will be allocated 
among the parties in an organisation (Alchian 1965; 
Demesetz 1967; and Pejovich 1969). DeAlessi (1982,) 
suggests that the more carefully rights are defined, 
allocated and enforced the closer the correlation between 
welfare of the individuals and the benefits they receive. 
The property right theorists argue that public enterprises 
are less efficient than privately owned firms.
The difference in the property rights between private firms
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and public enterprises gives rise to differences in 
constraints, rewards, costs and incentives. One major 
difference in property rights between private and public 
firms is that ownership of public enterprises is not 
normally transferable.
The effects of the nontransferability of property rights 
are various; Firstly, when rights are transferable, the 
owners as residual claimant bear the risks and therefore 
goes for the profit maximising technique, reduce costs and 
use inputs to its highest value. Because rights cannot be 
transferred in public enterprises, public managers have no 
incentive to use inputs to their highest value. Secondly, 
nontransferability of rights does not allow public managers 
to reap full rewards in the future arising from outstanding 
current decision. In other words there is no way to express 
the present value of future benefits that result from 
current actions. This implies that public managers are 
insulated from consequences of future losses resulting from 
current unsound decisions. The theory argues that public 
enterprises do not operate in capital market where shares 
are traded and ownership transferred. Therefore public 
managers have less incentive to perform because they could 
neither be rewarded or punished as their counterparts in 
the private sector. Thirdly, nontransferability of 
ownership attenuates the property rights of taxpayer- 
owners. This makes rights more tenuous and weaker in public 
enterprises than in private enterprises. There is also less 
incentive for the taxpayers to monitor public managerial 
behaviour and enforce contracts because of (a) the high 
transaction costs^ and (b) little individual rewards for 
the taxpayers to engage in such monitoring activity. The 
high transaction costs provide the public managers with 
more discretionary and opportunistic behaviour because it 
is less costly for them to engage in such behaviour.
 ^ For example vote in new politician who promise to change the way public enterprises is run or leave the country.
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Fourthly, the nontransferablity of ownership has protected 
public managers from outside pressure to perform more 
effectively. Public enterprises do not meet the competition 
of a market place. Competition with respects to product 
quality and price provides managers with incentive to 
perform better and encourages the setting up of internal 
control mechanism. Ultimately competition eliminates high 
costs producers. Competition inhibit shirking-information^ 
problem of team production.
Many of the problems associated with the property rights 
theory can be viewed from the perspective of principal 
agent or agency relationship. The agency relationship 
exists when one party (the agent) agrees to act in the 
interest of another party (the principal) . In a firm the 
shareholders act as the principal while the managers 
appointed by the principal to run the firm as agents. In 
firms where there is a divorce between ownership and 
control, the principal agent relationship poses the 
problems of monitoring the agents behaviour and performance 
arising from asymmetric information and conflict of 
interest between the principle and the agents. The 
principal agent theory is therefore concern with the 
problem of information and incentives. It addresses the 
central question of what optimal incentive scheme would be 
required in order for the agent to act in the interest of 
the principal.
Criticisms
Parker (1985) highlighted three weaknesses in the Property 
right's argument. Firstly the theory is based on an over 
simplistic view of human motivation. While the utility
 ^ Shirking activity occurs when, in a team production, the output or marginal product attributable to each member of the team is costly to measure, each team member has the incentive to shirk. This is because each individual can enjoy the full benefit his own shirking while bearing only a pro-rata share of the resulting costs.
67
maximisation assumption is valid, the motivation factor 
which involve the public managers may well be much more 
complex than what the theory suggest. He argues that both 
public and private management may be motivated by the same 
professional pride to do a job well.
Secondly, Parker argues that the concept of attenuation of 
property rights has its weaknesses. This is because (a) the 
argument in which managers have direct incentive to be 
efficient is only applicable in an owner-manager situation 
for slacking behaviour will affect his income and (b) the 
attenuation of property rights is applicable to the private 
sector as well, where there exists a separation between 
ownership and control. Although managerial behaviour not 
conducive to maximum profit will be severely restricted by 
the shareholders who seek to maximise their return, with 
dispersed share ownership the effectiveness of share 
holding monitoring as a whole is limited. The activity of 
specifying and enforcing managerial contracts become 
difficult. This provides private managers with the 
discretion to pursue their own objectives.
Thirdly, Parker argues that efficiency needs to be related 
to achievement of specific goal and needs to be clearly 
defined. Profitability is a poor measure to use in 
comparing private and public enterprise because; firstly, 
public enterprises perform differently and have different 
objectives from private enterprises. Secondly, methods of 
accounting and financing policies could differ between 
public and private enterprises thus affecting 
profitability.
3.2.3 X-Efficiency theory
The X-efficiency theory, introduced by Harvey Leibenstein 
in 1966, provides insight into psychological ideas 
underlying the notion that economic agents may not achieve
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maximum efficiency in their productive decisions and 
behaviour. The theory explains how protection from 
competitive pressure produces not only allocative-market- 
inefficiency but another type of inefficiency which 
manifest as excess unit costs of production among firms 
sheltered from competition. Leibeinstein termed this type 
of efficiency as X-inefficiency.
The concept of X-efficiency (or X-inefficiency) could be 
explained by figure 3.2. In a perfectly competitive 
environment a firm would produce output Qc at price Pc. 
The long run average cost and the long run marginal cost 
curves are identical because the firms are cost minimisers, 
that is LRATCc = LRMCc. If a firm is a cost minimiser then 
product market competition will put pressure on the firm to 
lower his costs in order to stay competitive. However, a 
firm operating in a monopoly environment would produce 
output Qm at price Pm. Area ABC represents the deadweight 
welfare loss resulting from the firm producing less than 
the socially optimum output Qc. With market power the 
monopolists cost curves are shown in Figure 3.2 as LRATCm 
= LRMCm. This means that the monopolist will have a higher 
cost than a competitive firm for any rate of output. It 
also means that area PmABPc represents higher cost of 
production due to monopolisation of industry rather than 
monopoly profits (Frantz, 1988). The higher cost of 
production is seen as a cost of monopoly power, a form of 
inefficiency which Leibenstein called it X-efficiency. This 
type of efficiency does not involve the rate of output or 
priced charged by a monopolist but rather it involves a 
relative cost of production of a monopolist as compared to 
a competitive firm.
Leibenstein (1966, 1978) suggested that there are four
reasons for X-inefficiency. These are: (a) contracts for
labour are incomplete, (b) the production function is not 
completely specified or known, (c) not all inputs are
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Figure 3.2 : X- and Allocative inefficiency
$
LRATCm = LRMCmPm
LRATCc = LRMCcPc
0 Qm
Soui'ce : Frantz (1988), Figure 13, p.54
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marketed or, if marketed, are not available on equal terms 
to the buyers and (d) a non maximising behaviour due to 
lack of competitive pressure.
Leibenstein (197 8) identifies that non maximising behaviour 
to be the key to the concept of X-inef f iciency. This 
behaviour is a consequence of little pressure from the 
external environment on individual decision makers. Frantz
(1988) defines pressure as a condition whereby an 
individual feels relatively "driven" to realise some 
potential. The lower the environmental pressure on a 
decision maker the less is his concern with the constraints 
operating on the organisation and consequently the lower is 
the effort expanded. This reduced effort leads to higher 
cost.
The effect of pressure on costs could be illustrated by 
Figure 3.3. In this model it is assumed that the unit costs 
of an individual firm are influenced by the average costs 
for the industry. Therefore, when industry unit costs 
increase, any individual firm can allow its cost to rise 
while remaining competitive. Similarly, when industry unit 
costs fall, each individual firm has to lower its own unit 
costs so as to remain competitive. The model also assumes 
that industry costs in the previous period (t-1) will serve 
to formulate the expectation of the individual firm in the 
current period. The 45 line is the is the locus of all 
point where industry unit costs in period (t-1) are equal 
to the unit cost of individual firm.
The diagram explains the behaviour of two types of firms in 
relation to their reaction to market pressure. R1 is a 
"reaction curve" for firm X who is a cost minimiser, thus 
it dose not react to pressure - since it is at lowest end 
on the industry unit costs. R2 is a "reaction curve" for 
firm X' whose costs react to pressure. For example if X' 
expects industry unit costs to be Cl then its costs will be
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Figure 3.3: Pressure . Technological change . and Costs
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Source : Frantz (1988), Figure 15, p.57
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Cl. Reduction in costs could be attributable to (i) 
increases in X-efficiency and (ii) improvement in 
technology. Reduction in costs due to these two factors is 
shown by the reaction curve R3.
Assuming that firm X' is at operating at point (a) where 
the industry unit cost is at C2 and its unit cost at c2. If 
industry costs falls to C3 then X' costs would fall 
accordingly to c3 by moving along R2 to point (b) . If we 
assume there is an improvement in technology, then the 
entire curve R2 would move downward to R3. Then X cost 
would fall to c4 as it moves from point (b) to point (d). 
Similarly, if industry costs fell further, the X''s costs 
would fall moving along R3 to point (e) . These movements of 
costs are due to motivations for cost reduction and 
improvement in technology.
The individual effects of X-inefficiency and technological 
change is shown in Figure 3.4. ACTl denotes costs curve 
within which any level of output could produced which 
varies according to pressure and motivations. Output level 
Q1 could be produced within the cost range of C1C2, the 
exact unit cost is determined by the pressure or motivation 
to reduce cost. C1C2 range is similar to point (a) and (b) 
in Figure 3.3. Improvement in technology will shift ACTl 
downward to ACT2. Output is now produced within range of 
unit costs C3C4, again depending upon pressure for cost 
reduction. The movement of ATCl to ATC2 is similar to 
movement of R2 to R3 in Figure 3.3.
The X-efficiency theory suggests that performance strongly 
is affected by economic and institutional environment. 
Sources of X-inefficiency are many such as the degree of 
competitiveness in a firms's market, the principal-agent 
relationship, the nature of regulatory regime under which 
a firm operated and nature of the bureaucracy. It suggests 
that public enterprises are operating in an environment
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Figuie 3,4: The effects of X- inefficiency and technological change on costs
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Source Frantz (1988), Table 16, p.59
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which is little conducive to efficiency. Most of them are 
shielded from competition and operate with a settled 
routine which leaves them little inclination to innovate 
in production. The threat of bankruptcy as the ultimate 
sanction of bad results does not exist as public managers 
know that they can expect government subsidies to finance 
deficit. The takeover threat arising from management and 
financial failures is absence within public enterprises 
thus contributing to strong X-inefficiency.
Criticisms
Stigler (197 6) challenges the theory on two central issues 
of the theory. Firstly, he argues that the interpretation 
on output differences partly lies in the choice technology 
by firms. According to Stigler, the choice of technology is 
fundamentally a matter of investment in knowledge where the 
costs and returns of acquiring technological information 
depended on the size of the firm, the age of its capital 
assets, the experience of its managers and the prospects of 
the trade. Thus given the chosen technology all firms 
operate on the production frontier curve. Secondly, he 
argues that motivation is not an output and therefore 
denies motivation as a significance factor in decision 
making process that could affect efficiency. Leibenstein 
(1978) in defense to Stigler's criticisms centred on two 
issues. Firstly, Leibenstein argues if firms are operating 
at different level of production frontier, then those firms 
operating inside the outer most frontier exhibits 
inefficiency called X-inefficiency. As a result of this 
differences in cost between firms exist. These cost 
differences are due to different discretionary effort 
choices which are influenced by the motivational 
environment within the firms and between firms. Secondly, 
while acknowledging the limitation of motivation as an 
input in the neoclassical model, it does not imply that 
motivation is not a significant variable in real life
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situation. He pointed literature in industrial psychology 
and business organisation supports the view that motivation 
is an important factor in determining productivity.
3.3 ISSUES ON PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Criteria and performance indicators.
Studies on assessing the performance of the public and 
private enterprise have used different efficiency criteria 
such as cost efficiency and, productivity and profitability 
and technical efficiency.
The concept of efficiency in economics fundamentally 
distinguishes two different aspects of efficiency namely 
the productive efficiency (cost efficiency) and allocative 
efficiency. In order to achieve efficiency in the 
allocation of resources (Pareto optimality), two conditions 
needs to be fulfilled. That is the enterprise should, (a) 
choose the input combination that minimises its production 
costs which reflects the productive efficiency and (b) 
price its output at their marginal cost of production 
reflecting the attainment of allocative efficiency. If 
price is above marginal cost then there would be an 
efficiency loss and pareto optimality will not be achieved.
Using unit cost efficiency criteria as a means of comparing 
performance between enterprises is a better approach than 
using partial productivity and profitability criteria due 
to various reasons. Firstly, partial productivity analysis 
does not allow for changes in other inputs other than the 
measured variable and therefore could be misleading. For 
example a reduction in labour force while producing the 
same output, and at the same time using more of other 
inputs such as plant and equipment is not a fair reflection 
of improved labour productivity. Secondly, profitability 
provides a broad measure of management's operating ability
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and financial success if the enterprise is geared towards 
maximisation of profit. Differences in financial policy and 
accounting method used, such as the current cost accounting 
method or the historical cost accounting approach, provide 
different profitability outcome.
There is also a shortcoming in using technical efficiency 
criteria in relation to its technological frontier. 
Firstly, efficiency on the technological frontier curve is 
also determined by other factors such as economic, 
financial, environmental and other criteria. In addition 
differences in technological choices, vintage of capital 
stocks and maintenance standards adopted affect the 
technical efficiency which have significant impact on 
productive efficiency.
Problems of comparing public and private enterprises
There are two main problems in comparing performance of 
public and private enterprises. Firstly, they have 
different objectives. Therefore comparing performance using 
the performance criteria will not reflect a true comparison 
as performance varies with the objectives of the 
enterprise. Secondly, public enterprises usually operate in 
a different environment under different operating condition 
where public enterprises are subjected to government rules, 
regulation and procedures.
However, despite the differences in the objectives and 
operating conditions of the two enterprises, comparison 
could still be meaningful. That is any comparison should be 
made on the basis of explaining the underlying causes which 
contribute to different performance.
3.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The empirical evidence on the performance of the public
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versus private enterprise is inconclusive. While most of 
the studies done in the US used cost efficiency criteria as 
the performance indicator, studies done in the UK has 
incorporated a wider performance criteria which include 
profitability, productivity and technical efficiency.
3.4.1 International empirical evidence
American studies
There are two major studies which are frequently referred 
in the literature on the empirical evidence of public 
versus private enterprises performance. Both studies 
indicate inconclusive evidence on the superiority of one 
over the other. R. Milward (1982) surveying the North 
American literature on studies in the area of electricity, 
water utility and airline concluded that " there is no 
evidence that management in private firms is more 
efficient, rather the cost studies seem to be pointing the 
other way" (p.ii). However, in their widely quoted studies, 
Borcherding et.al (1982) concluded that " the findings in 
most studies . . . .are consistent with the notion that the 
public firms have higher unit costs structures" (p.134).
Surveys done by Milward suggest that public firms have 
lower cost of electricity generation and a lower tariff 
structures than their private firms competitors in the 
electricity industry. In contrast, result on studies in the 
garbage collection industry indicate that private firms 
have a lower cost of production. Millward argues that this 
could be due to two reasons. One is because public firms 
are under municipality control is subjected to local 
pressure therefore performed better. This proposition 
could imply that the validity of the principal agent theory 
comes into play. The municipality has better access 
pertaining to operational information matters and on the 
activity of the firms under their control. Being small as
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compared to a ministry, they are less bureaucratic and have 
better supervision, control and monitoring system. Second, 
the cost effectiveness of the public firms highly probable 
due to the existence of competition from their competitors. 
However, it is interesting to note that few questions are 
left unanswered in the study on two issues. One is whether 
the regulatory constraints on the private firms operating 
in the electricity sector in the study done has any bearing 
on their performance as compared to their public firms 
rival which operate free from regulatory limitations. 
Second whether the "self financing" feature of the 
electricity sector in the study provides the exposure to 
market discipline and better accessability to capital 
market contribute to the better performance by the public 
firms.
Borcheding et al (19 82) in their survey on the differential 
efficiency between the public and the private firms in the 
US, Germany and a few other selected countries concluded 
that most of the literature in their studies are consistent 
with the notion that public firms have higher unit costs. 
Out of more than 5 0 studies only 3 (that is by Pier, Vernon 
and Wicas (1974) on garbage collection, Mayer (1975) on 
electricity utilities and Lindsay (1975,1976) on veteran's 
hospitals) indicate that public firms are less costly than 
private firms. Borcheding et al suggest that given 
sufficient competition between public and private firms the 
unit cost could turn out to be insignificant. In 
summarising their findings they further concluded that it 
is the lack of competition and not differences in ownership 
which led to cost inefficiency in the public firms. Mueller
(1989) compares numerous studies^ on cost differences 
between publicly and privately provided services. His
Studies in diverse areas include airlines, banks, electric utilities, cleaning services, debt collection, fire protection, forestry, hospitals, housing, railroads, refuse collection and water utilities.
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survey shows that out of 50 studies, over 40 public firms 
were found to be less efficient than private firms 
supplying the same service.
One similarity in both studies done by Millward and 
Borcheding is that they point to the same conclusion that 
competition is important in achieving cost or productive 
efficiency of public and private firms.
UK studies
Studies done in the UK by Pryke (1982) and Hutchinson 
(1991) and Whitfield (1992) used a more wider concept of 
performance indicators which included productivity, 
profitability and technical efficiency. These studies
concur with the notion that privately-owned firms generally 
perform better than comparable government-owned firms.
Richard Pryke in his study examined the efficiency of the 
private and public enterprises in the same industry in the 
Civil Aviation, Short Seaship and hovercraft services, and 
the sale of gas and electric appliances. In the civil
aviation industry he compares the British Airways and
British Caledonian (B Cal), Sealink UK (SLUK) and BR
Hovercraft (BRH) on short sea ship and hovercraft services 
and British Gas Corp (BGC) and Electricity Board (EBs) with 
Comet and Curry. Pryke uses performance criteria such as 
competitive position, use of labour and capital and
profitability indicators / criteria to compare the two 
sectors. His results support the notion that private
enterprises perform better than the public enterprises.
In another study, Hutchinson (1991) compares the
performance of the public and private firms in five
selected industries namely aerospace, electronics and 
electrical, auto making, civil aviation and ground 
freights. He uses performance indicators of profitability.
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productivity and technology mix to compare the performance 
between the firms. The evidence suggests that privately- 
owned firms generally perform better than comparable 
government-owned firms. In addition, government-owned firms 
which underwent privatisation have not always outperformed 
their competitors in their respective industries.
Whitfield (1992) using profitability criteria assessed the 
performance of the privatised firms, British Airways, 
British Gas, British Telecommunications, and Rolls-Roys, 
before and after privatisation. He noted that there was an 
increased in profitability in the privatised firms as a 
result of reduction in items which are charge directly 
against the cost of the firms. However, he pointed out the 
significant increased in the profitability was due to the 
reduction in research and development, and capital 
expenditures, business tax and interest charges. He 
observed four other changes which had contributed to the 
increase in profitability of the privatised firms. Firstly, 
the advantage of lower taxation on profit because companies 
have used tax losses accumulated under public ownership. 
Secondly, rationalisation and restructuring costs 
concentrated under public ownership with financial benefits 
accruing after privatisation. Thirdly, capital 
restructuring and debt write off leading to lower interest 
charges. Fourthly, there was a surpluses from reduced 
pension fund contribution which contributed directly to 
increase in profits. He also pointed out these privatised 
companies are in the high growth sector such as the 
telecommunication and air industries.
3.4.2 Malaysian empirical evidence
There are few studies in comparing the efficiency of the 
public versus private enterprises in Malaysia. Salleh 
(1991) did a study using cost efficiency, profitability and 
productivity of labour and capital in few selected
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industries. Results of the studies are as shown in Tables 
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
Cost efficiency - Milling industries
In this study a comparison was between public enterprises 
consisting of Malaysian Rubber Development Authority 
(MARDEC), Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), 
National Rice Board (LPN) and the private enterprises in 
the milling sectors for rubber, palm oil and rice sectors.
Table 3.1 reveals the following observations ;
a) With the exception of rice milling, output per
establishment is higher in the private sector. One
plausible reason for this is that the public enterprises
were smaller than the private enterprises as reflected by 
the means and the standard deviation of the sample size. 
Most MARDEC mills are located in the rural areas with the 
purpose of serving widely dispersed concentration areas of 
the rural smallholder. In contrast, unlike MARDEC many 
private millers have their own rubber estates. These belong 
to big corporations such as Harrison and Crossfield Ltd, 
Dunlop Estates Ltd, Guthrie Berhad, and Highland and 
Lowland Ltd. Private millers without rubber estates on the 
other hand depended their supply of rubber latex from
smaller private estates. Similarly, output of FELDA was 
lower than the private palm oil millers because FELDA 
millers cater only for FELDA settlers and therefore have a 
smaller milling capacity.
However, the output of LPN is higher than the private 
millers for the following reasons. Firstly, LPN mills were 
larger than that of the private mills. Rice cultivation is 
concentrated in the small state of Kedah and hence LPN was 
able to reap the economies of scale through larger milling
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Table : 3.1 Some characteristics of public and private enterprises in Palm oil, rubber milling and rice milling in Malaysia (1982)
Rubber Milling Palm Oil Rice Milling
MARDEC Private FELDA Private LPN Private
Sample size 15 25 20 30 14 29
Output/esta lishment ($'000)
Mean 11,439 22,255 28,259 76,750 7,366 4,584
Std dev 3,115 15,138 27,794 71,598 2,199 2,364
Value added/ worker ($)
Mean 9,885 24,979 26,179 52,162 11,043 11,859
Std dev 5, 102 19,964 8,827 43,216 9,901 6,043
Fixed asset/ worker ($)
Mean 26,300 16,809 47,298 79,730 35,733 33,336
Std dev 748 1,900 636 1,912 12,710 53,878
Wage/worker ($)
Mean 4,631 5,412 6,086 7,675 4,913 4,471
Std dev 748 1,906 636 1,912 1,272 1,349
Gross profit/ output (%)
Mean 4.7 11.4 11.7 10.6 3 .1 4 . 9
Std dev 4.5 10.1 3.1 6.2 7.2 3.9
Source: I. Salleh and 0. Rani (1991), Table 4.14, p. 83 ,
capacity. Secondly, the Government commitment to increase 
the standard of living of the rural poor and eradicate 
poverty as spelt out in the New Economic Policy has led to 
the establishment of bigger mills to cater for the output 
of the padi farmers. One of the objectives of the setting
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up of the LPN was to break the oligopoly structure of the 
rice industry which led to low padi price for the farmers. 
The bigger capacity of LPN is reflected in its capital 
intensity as shown by the higher fixed asset per worker.
b) The public enterprises have a lower productivity of 
labour in terms of value added per worker in all the 
sectors under study. The public enterprises wages were also 
lower than that of the private enterprises wages.
c) The public mills, with the exception of the palm oil 
mills, tend to show a lower performance results in terms of 
gross profit per unit of output in all sectors. Salleh 
noted that in both palm oil and rubber production there has 
been no indication of the public enterprises selling their 
products at prices lower than the market price. He 
concluded that since both productions were geared mainly 
for international market, the difference in profitability 
could be explained by the difference on their cost 
effectiveness. That is public enterprise millers have 
higher production costs despite enjoying the financial 
grant from the Federal Government.
However, FELDA has a higher gross profit could be 
attributable to; firstly, it has a security of supply of 
oil palm (fruits) from its settlers (estates) which enables 
it to run at operating maximum capacity most times. 
Secondly, many private millers have to depend their supply 
from smallholder in a highly competitive market 
environment. One could therefore expect the oil palm price 
is higher for the private millers which contributes a high 
percentage of production costs to the private millers. A 
shortage of supply due to seasonal variation could lead to 
private millers operating at minimal or below operating 
capacity. Thirdly, FELDA receives a financial grant from 
Federal Government which provides lower cost of capital to 
FELDA. Fourth, FELDA is Operates in a competitive
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environment where it has the characteristics of monopoly 
power over its supplier. Although the land does not belong 
to FELDA mills under the agreement of the scheme the 
settlers are obliged to sell to FELDA millers.
The differences in the performance of the public and 
private enterprises could be attributable to the following 
factors : Firstly, MARDEC, FELDA and LPN were set up to
achieve the conflicting socio-economic objectives in line 
with the NEP. Secondly, there were fewer incentives where 
for example wage is lower, for the public enterprises to 
perform. Thirdly, the centralised nature of bureaucratic 
process provides monitoring problems by the headquarters 
office. One would expect performance within MARDEC, FELDA 
and LPN themselves to vary to great extent. Fourthly, 
although MARDEC and LPN operate in a competitive
environment, they have a better security of job as they
come under Public service employment contract and therefore 
less pressure to perform.
Cost efficiency : Cement and steel industries
Table 3.2 shows the result of the cost efficiency
comparison between the public enterprises and the private
enterprises in the cement and steel industries.
It shows that public enterprises were less cost efficient 
than the private enterprises in both industries. The main 
reason for this difference is that public enterprise firms 
have a bigger capacity than most private firms in the 
cement and steel sectors. One of the characteristics of 
these industries is that they have a high degree of 
uncertainty about the demand by the construction sector. 
With bigger capacity, the public enterprise firms have 
higher overhead costs and during low demand for cement and 
steel they have high overcapacity costs. Likewise, during
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Table 3.2 : Cost per unit metric ton of cement (in M$ current
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 198
Cement
Public 121 134 136 132 196 192
Private 135 131 129 124 136 157
Public / Private 0.90 1 . 02 1.05 1.06 1.44 1.22
Steel
Public 1,020 861 784 785 989 1,012
Private 916 804 708 784 964 912
Public / Private 1.11 1 . 07 1.11 100 1.03 1.11
Source : Salleh and Rani (1991), Table 4 .15, p .84 .
increase in demand for cement and steel it has to operate 
at under-capacity level of production. The shortage of raw 
materials is more acute in the public enterprise than in 
the private enterprises which have a stronger union and 
affiliation to the supplier of the raw materials.
Profitability comparison : Mining, Manufacturing,
Construction and Finance Industries.
In terms of profitability, with the exception of the 
construction sector, the public sector has been lower than 
that of the private sector as shown in Table 3.3. The 
comparison is made during the recessionary period in
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Table 3.3: Profitability between public and private enterprises bysector 1981-1985
Sector 1981 1983 1985
Extractive
Public 0.19 0.17 0.17
Private 0.29 0.28 0.23
Manufacturing
Public 0.01 < 0.01 0 .02
Private 0.09 0.07 0.05
Construction
Public 0.05 0. 04 0.02
Private 0.02 0.06 0 . 01
Finance
Public 0 . 01 -0.01 0 . 01
Private 0 . 04 0.01 0.01
Source: Salleh and Rani (1991), Table 4.15, p.84 .
especially in 1983 and 1985.4 This is reflected in the 
declining trend of profitability both in the public and
Despite the recession, extractive and construction sectors retained itshigh profitability trend. The study did not provide detail information on thetypes of extractive activity involves. However it could be safely assume that thehigh profitability trend was partly due to the highly profitable petroleumactivities.
Profitability in the finance sector was very low during the three years. This was partly due to three reasons. One, there were lots of bad debts from house buyers as a result of increase interest rates in Malaysia. Secondly, end financing (finance for construction of houses) given by the banks to the housing developers were difficult to recover because high increase in housing prices have resulted developers holding unsold units. Thirdly, some big financial institutions public and private (such as Bank Bumiputra Bhd, Perwira Habib Bank Bhd, Koperasi Serbaguna) were incurring huge losses of about M$3 billion due to mismanagement by their Board of Directors and Management team (PEER 4/87; INSAN, 1989; Salleh, 1992). This has affected the profitability of the financial sector as a whole.
87
private sectors in all the four sectors. The higher 
profitability trend of the public sector in the 
construction sector could be attributable three factors. 
Firstly, public enterprises have significant cost advantage 
over the private enterprises. Being state owned companies, 
public enterprises obtain their land through a process of 
delineation of state land to the state-owned companies with 
a premium rate of M$1.00 a square foot.® The private 
enterprises pay a much higher premium rate for the purchase 
of their land for development. Land cost constitutes a high 
proportion of total costs.® Secondly, there is a 
flexibility for the public enterprises to pay the premium 
on a staggering basis for payment of premium thus providing 
some capital costs (interest) saving to the public 
enterprises. Thirdly, planning and development approvals 
are normally shorter for the public enterprises. This is 
because most public enterprises in the construction sector 
are subsidiary of SEDCs the Chairman of which is the Chief 
Minister. The early approvals from the relevant authorities 
provides substantial saving in capital cost (interest).
3.5 PROBLEMS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN MALAYSIA
Utility maximising behaviour and the coalition between politician and bureaucrats
One of the main features of Malaysian politics is that 
there has never been a clear distinction between the 
political and administrative spheres (Bruce, 1985). Civil 
servants tend to form affiliations with particular leaders
 ^ An example is the SAP, state-owned company which gets its land bank of about 1500 acres in the early eighties at a premium rate of M$0.99 a square foot. SAP has been privatised in 1993.
 ^ The cost advantage of the public enterprises can be seen through the following example. A development of 3 00 acres of land (which could be considered the smallest size of a development project) provide a cost advantage of about M$13 million in land cost. This is on the assumption that the private enterprises cost of land at M$2.00 a square foot which is a very conservative estimates by any standard in Malaysia. Based on the 3 00 acres, land cost incurred by the public enterprises would be M$13.2 million. The same land would cost the private enterprise M$26.4 million.
p.22
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which provides them considerable influence within the 
public sector (Putucheary, 1978). There was a high 
dependency of politicians on the bureaucrats to run the 
country after independence (Tilman, 1964). This dependency 
had a variety of reasons. Firstly, as claimed by some, the 
system of appointing the Cabinet Minister as a reward for 
loyalty to party chiefs has led to the appointment of 
incapable leaders (Mohamad, 1970). Secondly, most 
politicians were inexperienced and therefore had to rely 
heavily on the civil service.? Thirdly, most of the 
politicians and the bureaucrats shared a common political 
ideology having come from the same background and attended 
the same school (Tilman, 1964)® The close relationship 
between the politicians and the bureaucrats endangers not 
only the political process but also affects the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the public administration (Kothari, 
1969).
The dependency of the politicians on the bureaucrats had 
given the civil servants a special place in the running the 
public sector and they command high respect and are treated 
with the greatest politeness.® This relationship developed 
into an interdependency between both parties with the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1970. The 
situation has led to the coalition of mutual interest to 
both parties. The interdependency between the politicians 
and the bureaucrats has created an opportunity for the 
maximisation of self-interest utility function by both 
parties which has two serious implications for the public 
enterprises. Firstly, it has resulted in the public 
enterprises being used as political tools by the
Ahmad Nordin, an ex Auditor General. Malaysian Business, May 1 1985,
® Most of the politicians and senior bureaucrats especially in the pre­independence period and early years of post-independence period came from Malay College, a school for the elite group. The first three Prime Minister of Malaysia attended the college.
® Far Eastern Economic Review, April 9, 1982.
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politicians to achieve their political aims (Gale, 1985). 
The politician's interest partly lies in the expansion of 
his power and authority through expansion of his Ministry 
and public enterprises under him. This enables him to use 
public enterprises to reach the public, gain more support 
and ensure his popularity to be re-elected. This self­
maximisation utility interest could be used to explain the 
growth of the public sector with duplications of 
responsibilities among some of the public enterprises as 
reflected in the activities of PERNAS, UDA, SEDCs, MARA, 
FELDA and FELCRA. Sometimes this has also led to the 
setting up of enterprises undertaking uneconomic and 
political activities. For example, during the run up of the 
UMNO^° party general party election in 1993 it was alleged 
that KEMAS and RISDA participated in a political activities 
where meetings with the Deputy Prime Minister"^ were held 
and issues related to UMNO elections were discussed.It 
was claimed that RISDA spent more than M$100,000 for 3 
meetings with the Deputy Prime Minister.^
The second implication of the political-bureaucratic 
coalition is that it provides an opportunity for the 
bureaucrats to maximise their self interest utility 
function. This has resulted in increased operational 
budgets for the public sector which was not consistent with 
optimal management practices. According to an estimates by 
one of the Secretary-Generals of a Ministry in 1985,^ 
there was 3 0 percent over-staffing in most Federal
UMNO is the dominant party in the coalition ruling party of Barisan Nasional. It consists of Bumiputra party members.
New Straits Times, 09.09.1993
New Straits Times, 19.08.1994.
Utusan Malaysia, 19.08.1993.
4^ Although this is a personal estimate, it is done by one of the highest authorities in public service. Secretary General of a Ministry is the highest public service office in a Ministry and is answerable to the Chief Secretary to the Government, the highest ranking public service.
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Ministries and 40 percent of under-utilisation of office 
equipment in 1985.^® Similar observations on inefficient 
practices were also highlighted by the Auditor General in 
1992 reporting that many Government Departments were 
wasting money buying sophisticated and expensive equipment 
but not using it.^ ® Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that 
the preference for advanced technology and the purchasing 
of equipment way beyond the needs in the Third World 
provides over-invoicing opportunities or corruption which 
benefits certain people in the society. The self 
maximisation interest of the bureaucrats is also reflected 
in some government agencies which were using fund to 
renovate or decorate their offices with expensive items or 
buying official cars for their own used.^ "^  The Auditor 
General in 1991 highlighted that Kuala Lumpur City Hall 
spent about M$600,000^® on expensive crockery and M$2.5^® 
million on 23 Volvos GLTs for its officers although some 
were not entitled to car privileges under their scheme of 
service.^ In another case, a Chairman of a pubic agency 
which owned a hotel chain has the privilege of enjoying 
luxury suites reserved for him at each of the groups hotels 
even though he was not using them.
Although the dependency of the politicians on the 
bureaucrats has declined to some extent this has not 
provide much positive effect on the efficiency of the 
Government. Some claimed that now Ministers tend to make 
decisions without consulting civil servants resulting in
18
19
Malaysian Business, May 1985 p.19 .
New Straits Times, 30.05.1992.
Revealed by the Minister of Finance in New Straits Times, 09.05.1994.
Equivalent to £150,000 with current exchange rate of M$4.00 = £1. 
Equivalent to about £600,000 based on current exchange rates.
New Straits Times, 29.04.1994.
Revealed by the Minister of Finance in New Straits Times, 29.4.1994.
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wastage because plans were conceived and implemented 
hurriedly.
Political patronism and interference
Political interference in the public enterprises came 
through the appointment by the government of those running 
the public enterprises. Many of the public enterprises are 
created by the states through the setting up of the SEDCs 
and their subsidiaries. Thus, the responsibility of 
overseeing the implementation of the NEP rest with the 
respective Chief Minister of the respective states. To 
facilitate this, the Chairmanship of the SEDCs is reserved 
for the Chief Minister. Similarly, the Chairmanship of the 
Statutory Bodies^® is normally either given to political 
figures or retired top government o f f i c i a l s ^ ^  Further down 
the hierarchy, the appointment of the Board and the Chief 
Executives of public enterprises was also based on 
political connections. In some special cases, where 
subsidiary companies are big and deal in activities 
considered strategic or sensitive by the Government, the 
choice of the Chief Executives needs to be referred to top 
political leaders of the Government.
The view of the Auditor General during an interview with the Far eastern Economic Review in 1985.{Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1 1985). An example of this new trend is when the Finance Minister in 1985 cautioned the civil service that their role is to provide advice and not to resist Government decision to implement changes in policies. This came in the wake of resistance from civil servants on the Government's proposal to pension off the inefficient Government servant and introduced lateral position through the appointment of senior positions on contract basis. Malaysian Business, Jan 1 1985.
There are two plausible reasons to explain the changing relationship between the politicians and the bureaucrats. Firstly, the implementation of the NEP has provided the politicians with the opportunity to maximise their self interest. Bureaucrats could therefore be regarded as an obstacle towards the exploitation of the opportunity. Secondly, the performance of the public sector does not command due respect from the politicians. In a nationwide survey conducted by the Government in 1985 only 46 percent of the civil servants came on time to office. Malaysian Business, Jan 1 1985.
Member of Parliament or State Assemblyman.
4^ Some of the examples are Chairman of Petronas in 1985 was the former Secretary to the Government, the Chairman Kompleks Kewangan Berhad at one time was a former Minister and the Chairman of the Malaysian Industrial Finance Ltd was the former Governor of the Central Bank.
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The appointment of the Chief Minister as the Chairman of 
the SEDC has three implications for the public enterprises. 
Firstly, it provides the Chief Minister with direct access 
to additional sources of patronage {Gale, 1985) for his 
political aims and therefore subject public enterprises to 
political manipulation. Public enterprises were used as a 
vehicle for politicians to popularise themselves within the 
Malay community, the majority of which were living in the 
rural areas. The importance of political connections in the 
rural community could be summed up by Zawawi Ibrahim as,
"In the rural communities the NEP has provided new basis of legitimacy in strengthening the patronage system. Support is given to those who can deliver the new economic goods. They are not necessarily men of knowledge or ideals, but they have the right bureaucratic and political connections which link them from the periphery to the centre"^®
The second implication is that, the system of political 
appointment and patronism has breed inefficiency and 
mismanagement in the running of the public enterprises as 
action would unlikely be taken against those appointed by 
the politicians. The seriousness of this issue has given 
concern to the Prime Minister in 1994 when he acknowledges 
the problem by saying:
".... There are those who are lazy to act against indiscipline and this perpetuates the problem.^® This happens most of the time. When the Government takes action against these people, there will be others who want to protect them" .
Thirdly, the system of political appointment described 
above led to the multiple directorship in public
Zawawi Ibrahim as quoted in New Straits Times 03.07.1994, p.12 
Problem of inefficiency.
New Straits Times 02.09.1994, p.2.
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enterprises,^® lack of professionalism and business 
oriented managers.^® Cost efficiency was not given top 
consideration and projects were awarded on the basis of 
political connection. These symptoms can be accurately 
described by a prominent banker as,
" There is a feeling that many tenders, awards,licences and approvals for share allocations are made on the basis of connection rather than the lowest, most efficient or on some other merit-related 
basis.
The Minister of Finance in 1988 revealed that there were 
cases where a minister approved projects freely without 
giving any consideration for financial criteria in order to 
gain popularity. He reveals:
"Upon request he used to approve no questionsasked. He became popular using public money but not through his service of his efforts in safeguarding a good economic system.
The phenomena of using political connections for 
maximisation of self interest among politicians is 
widespread. This is clearly evident from the statement made 
by the Minister of Finance in 1988.
IIThere were those who asked me to award contracts to their friends. When I refused, they started to go for me. What do people want? Bank licence, finance company licence, discount house licence....(Eventually) there is nothing left to give away any more. In fact, given
This presumably because of, (a) it is safer for the politicians to depend on a limited number of associates or (b) the politicians has limitednumber of those could be trusted and loyal to them in running the publicenterprises. One could argue that the resulting multiple directorship in publicenterprises (that is Directors who sit on numerous Boards raised higher
possibility of conflict of interest.
This problem has been acknowledged by the Government. Malaysian Business, October 1982.
Datuk Malik Merican as quoted by the Malaysian Business, May 16, 1987.
New Straits Times, 30.05.1994, p.2. Reference made on his predecessor.
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half a chance - and it cant be done - I would revoke
some of the licences given.
The use of political connection for the self-maximisation 
interest of both the politicians and the bureaucrats has 
also led to the formation of what Olson (1982) described as 
"distributional coalition". In the Malaysian context, these 
are individuals®® with political connection having cartel- 
like networks seeking rewards through coalition, 
transaction cost and other privileged bargains. A 
distributional coalition also exists among the bureaucrats 
and public managers who are involved in the exchange of 
vital information about contracts or investment 
opportunities which are confidential and closely guarded 
secrets monopolised by the bureaucrats. In some instances 
this has resulted in mismanagement and fraud as 
demonstrated by the Bank Bumiputra Finance and the Bank 
Rakyat financial scandals. In 1975 Bank Rakyat incurred 
accumulated losses of M$65.3 million where "millions of 
dollars had also been lost through disbursement of loans 
and other transactions in ways which clearly benefited 
politicians, senior officers of the bank and their 
relatives" (Gale, 1985)
Politics, rent seeking and corruptions
The heavy government intervention and involvement in the 
economy due to the NEP has given rise to a mercantilist 
economic order®® (Kasper, 198 7) characterised by three main
The Minister of Finance in an exclusive interview with the Far Eastern 
economic review in 1988. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1 1988, p. 55.
These individuals could be party members of someone who are not partymembers.
Gale quoting a report of the investigation by Price Waterhouse.
Kasper defines merchantilist economic order is an economic system where the ruler grants licences to selected merchants which in turn creates monopolies and facilitate rent seeking behaviour, a search for productivity and innovation. This system is inward looking and bureaucratic.
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features (Salleh and Salim 1989) a) , increasing rent- 
seeking activities among the society b) , the suppressing of 
private entrepreneurs initiative to undertake risk and c) , 
politicising of economic and business decision-making 
process and the commercialisation of the political and 
governing process. Politicising of economic decision and 
rent seeking®® lead to bribery and corruption. Corruption 
is detrimental to achieving low cost production as the 
money paid involving corruption is built into the cost of 
production.
The phenomena described above has led to an increase in 
bribery and corruption cases. Between 1981 and 1987 there 
were 47,000 allegations of corruption received by the 
ACA.®7 Three thousands investigations were conducted where 
1,500 were convicted.®® The majority of those convicted 
were government servants. The seriousness of corruptions is 
reflected by the statistic Table 3.4.
Mahmet (1990, p. 160) noted that the NEP has 
institutionalised a post-colonial upper class living off 
quasi-rents, speculation and corruption.
"These quasi-rents are derived as unearned bonuses for multiple company directorship, "consultation fee" and numerous kinds of personal gains through influence- peddling by privileged persons with access to confidential information about government contracts and spending plans."
36 Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) describes rent-seeking as redistributive activity between private parties that takes up resources which is costly to growth . In the context of the discussion here, the redistribution involve in the rent-seeking activity from the private sector to the politicians or the
bureaucrats. It takes the form of lobbying or corruption.
Malaysian Business, May 16, 1987.
That is a monthly average of 21 convictions.
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Table 3.4 : Arrests and convictions of civil servants by-group Members of the public and politicians from 1984 to February 1987
1984 1985 1986(Feb) 1987
Arrest
Civil servants
Group A 36 13 19 8
Group B 24 20 9 1
Group C 66 52 52 8
Group D 81 97 94 11
207 182 174 28
Public (including politicians) 91 79 96 25
Convictions
Civil servants 64 63 62 10
General public 43 44 39 9
107 107 101 19
Source: Malaysian Business, May 16, 1987.
A former Director of ACA revealed that from 1967 to 1972 it 
was estimated that less than 0.1 percent of the civil 
service was corrupt.®®This figure decline to 0.04 percent 
in 1994.4° Although the trend is declining, however in 
absolute terms it is increasingly alarming. In real figures 
the number of people involved in corruption has increased 
from 7,000 to 36,000 in 1994.
The reason as to why politicians struggle for power could
Malaysian Business, May 16 1987. It is not revealed how the estimates were reached.
4° Revealed by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Ministers
Department during Parliamentary session. New Straits Times, 26.10. 1994.
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be summed up by a politicians^:
"Merdeka brought power and wealth to the new Malay elite.... Politics was found to be the panacea. It provided the short cut to everything...."
The NEP provided opportunity for accumulation of wealth 
through political power and patronage system. The money 
involve to run a party election could be exorbitant.^ Some 
claimed that a minor posts at branch level could cost a 
candidate a few thousand ringgit while the key positions 
could cost a few million ringgit.^ Charges of vote buying, 
sponsored overseas trips, use of government machinery and 
the issue of pink formers for shares were not uncommon in 
the run up to UMNO party election.The issue of pink 
forms for shares was confirmed by an ex-Minister saying 
" There is an unhealthy pink form culture^^ which is 
spreading very fast in UMNO. . . . "4?
The extent of the use of political power to buy votes by 
politicians to gain popularity could be demonstrated by the 
Prime Minister statement who in 1994 said,
" There were lot of debts....he even promise to give Selangor UMNO RM 3,000 million and a licence to the state Government to operate a bank before and UMNO
4'- Mahathir Mohamad (1970), the present Malaysian Prime Minister.
4^  Money politics was so widespread in UMNO, a major ruling party in theCabinet, that it warrant an extraordinary party convention in 19 93 to curb moneypolitics among its members.
4^ The Star, 15.08.1993.
44 Shares control by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Trade for allocation to the Bumiputra investors during listings of firms on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
4^  The Star, 15.08.1993.
4^  Could be interpreted as the practise of giving shares, through the using of the pink form, to individuals through political connections during listing of 
company on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
4"' Ex Minister of Federal Territory. The Star, 15.08.1993.
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election. Why was he doing t h a t ? "4®
The seriousness of the corruption in the political system 
is highlighted in 1993 when the Deputy Prime Minister in 
the run up of the UMNO party general election claimed that 
there were politicians in the UMNO who were involved in 
corrupt practices.49 The same concern was echoed by his 
predecessor when in it was reported in 1986 that the Deputy 
Prime Minister wanted to retire because he was tired of 
"money politics" and the abuse of power among 
politicians.
Conflicting objectives of politicians
The Cabinet wants Government agencies to give priority to 
national interest in planning and making decisions. The 
Government cautioned that priority should be given to 
national interest even though the move would affect the 
performances of agencies and corporation in the short 
term. However, the Government had cautioned Statutory 
bodies not to use social responsibility as an excuse for 
being extravagant, wasteful, and inefficient in running 
their organisations.®®
When Perwaja was not performing well financially the 
General Manager argued that it is common for Governments to 
heavily subsidise steel-making and pointed that it would be
4° New Straits Times, 07.11.1994. The Prime Minister was referring to Tengku Razali Hamzah the ex Finance Minister when the later was commenting on money politics in the UMNO party of which he was once among one of the three Vice President for a couple of terms. The alleged promise was made when Tengku Razali was contending for the seat of Deputy President of UMNO which in the past comes along with the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia. Tengku Razali, however lost the 
election.
44 Utusan Malaysia, 08.09.1993.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 March 1986.
Minister of Public Enterprise. New Straits Times, 21.02.1992.
Finance Minister. New Straits Times, 06.10.1993.
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unfair to compare Perwaja to any private firms.®® This is 
because profitability is not the single most important 
criteria for the company as it also has the task of spear­
heading the country's industrialisation programme. The 
Government showed its displeasure over the excuses by NFPEs 
management for their poor performance by replacing some top 
management of some public companies.®^ The Finance Minister 
said that,
" A good management team is able to adapt the company to changes in the economy and look for alternatives, and not make excuses one after another....If you fail, you must have the courage to resign. If you don't you may be sacked."®®
The special committee set up to look into the overall 
performance of the SEDCs concluded that :
" WE cannot give the excuse that the poor profits of some SEDCs is largely due to the need to meet a certain degree of social obligations....There are many SEDCs which enjoy good profits, notably in Johor and Sarawak" . ®®
Monitoring problems
The problems of monitoring are reflected in the failure of 
the monitoring agencies to check the expansion of the 
organisation and subsidiaries to undertake investment 
activities. The findings of a special committee which looks 
into the overall performance of SEDCs was " Some SEDCs just 
get carried away and move into all sort of areas....".®’
44 Malaysia Business, May 16, 1987.
44 Included in this action was the General Manager of Perwaja, Deputy Chairman of Hicom and Protons executive director. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1, 1988.
44 Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1 1988, p.56.
44 Deputy Minister of Public Enterprise. New Straits Times, 13.08.1993.
4’ Statement by Deputy Minister of Public Enterprise who was the head ofthe Committee. New Straits Times, 13.08.1994.
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This is not a new thing. In 1985, the Minister of Public 
Enterprises suggested that SEDCs to concentrate on 
activities in selected areas they are best suited for.®® 
The difficulty in monitoring government agencies was 
highlighted as early as in 1974 when the Deputy Prime 
Minister says,
" Some SEDCs have unconsciously gone into conflict with their objectives and their projects have taken away opportunities from the Bumiputras. Some are more ambitious. They want to build their own empires and fortunes and seem to forget team work."®® (Gale, 1985, p 183)
The Government has acknowledged that part of the problem of 
poor performance by the public enterprise lies in the 
failure to monitor their progress. The Finance Minister 
says :
"We just provided the money and didn't care what happened afterwards. So year in year out, these companies posted losses, yet they paid themselves bonuses and increased their salaries yearly without fail. They expanded became big and powerful and nobody dared to touch them for fear of becoming unpopular".®®
Government effort to improve monitoring the problem still 
inhibits the public sector. In 1983, the Government set up 
a monitoring unit at the Land Ministry to monitor the 
performance of companies under Dara and Kejora.®^ This 
includes the minimisation of red tape, open and fast
4® Malaysian Business, August 1, 1985.
49 The problem of public enterprises deviating from its original objectives due to weak monitoring still continues. For example it was revealed in 19 94, Felda has been developing 11,000 ha of land without the involvement of the settlers. The Chief Minister of Johor claimed that the land was approved for the cultivation of eight schemes for oil palm cultivation by the Felda settlers. 
Instead Felda has developed the land for its own benefit.
4° Malaysian Business, August 1-15, 1990, p.18.
44 Dara and Kejora had 28 companies at that time.
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decision making. ®®The Minister believed that the 
bureaucracy was so steeped in that Ministry and there were 
some of the agencies which were not receptive to Federal 
Government control. ®®
One of the factors which contributed to the massive losses 
suffered by the BMF due to financial scandal was the 
ineffectiveness of monitoring by the central Bank. The 
Committee pointed out that loans were given without 
security or documentation , without supervision from the 
Central Bank and with "inconceivable" disregard for 
Carrian's deteriorating capacity to make repayments.®^ The 
report went on to say that, " ....We are of the view that
some who were directly involved in approving and disbursing 
the loans acted dishonestly and accepted bribes at the 
expense of BBMB®® and the public....".®®
Monitoring has been one of the major problems in managing 
public sector. Despite the launching of the National 
Project Monitoring system (Setia) in 1984 which is to 
detect, plan and monitor all government development 
programme the system was under-used.®’ In 1985 the Finance 
Ministry set up the Central Information Collection Unit 
(CICU) to collect data and monitor public enterprises. 
However, it is not revealed how the Government is using 
this data and how the process of monitoring of all the
4® Business Times, June 1983.
44 He directed that those companies that have been in the red for up to 5 years and more must face closure unless they were profitable.
4^ Far Eastern Economic Review, 131/12.
44 Bank Buramiputra Malaysia Berhad.
44 Far Eastern Economic Review, 131/12 March 1986, pl51.
49 In 1993, the Chief Secretary to the Government expressed his concern the usage of the system was unsatisfactory. Setia which is launched in 1984 is an integrated project monitoring and detecting system which collects information particularly on financial data from all central government agencies to develop a complete information system. The information is to help various ministries in monitoring and planning their development projects. New Straits Times, 28.07.1993.
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public enterprises could be successful given the huge size 
of the public enterprises and the limited strength of the 
department. ®®
The problems of monitoring were reflected for example in 
1992 when the Auditor General highlighted that there were 
Government Agencies which failed to submit their financial 
statements on time.®® In 1993, the Chief Secretary to the 
Government expressed his dissatisfaction over the delay of 
ministries in submitting their report and again cautioned 
heads of department to monitoring their departments and 
increase efficiency.’® Similar problems have been 
highlighted by the Deputy Prime Minister who said that 
hundreds of Government agencies, corporations and companies 
failed to submit their annual report since 1990 resulting 
difficulties in taking remedial actions.’^ To overcome the 
problem, some had suggested that the assessment of agencies 
set up in the 60s and 70s be given to independent body on 
a year to year basis’®.
The Official Secrets Act and the Sedition Act limit the 
power of the Auditor General to investigate or report upon 
controversial matters. The Official Secrets Acts provide 
power to Ministers and Chief Ministers to classify any 
official document, information or material as "Top Secret", 
"Confidential" or "Restricted". Similarly, the Sedition Act 
are laws can restrict classified information from being 
used other than for the reason directed by the Minister or
4® One of the distinct feature of the CICU data is that it is highly confidential. It could only be released with the written permission from the Ministry of Finance. Malaysian Business, May 16, 1987.
49 New Straits Times, 05.03.1992.
’9 New Straits Times, 28.07.1993.
’4 New Straits Times, 01.08.1993.
’® As suggested by Engku Aziz former Vice Chancellor, University of Malayaduring the Third Bumiputra Congress in Kuala Lumpur. New Straits Times, 11. 01.1992.
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Head of Department.
3 . 6 GOVERNMENT REMEDY 
Less political intervention
The efforts by the Ministry of Public Enterprise to limit 
the involvement of the Chief Minister in the running of the 
SEDCs could be construed as step to disentangle business 
and politics in the system by the Government. In 1992 the 
Minister of public enterprises made a statement that the 
Chairmanship of the SEDCs would not go automatically to the 
Chief Ministers. This has met strong resistance from Chief 
Ministers where the Ministry later announced that " As the 
restructuring is a question of "fundamental" p o l i c y , the 
decision should ultimately be made by the Cabinet" .
In some cases the power of the Chief Minister has 
increased. The replacement of the State Secretary 
Incorporation Act with the Selangor Chief Minister 
(Incorporation) Enactment Bill 1994 can be seen in this 
light. The Bill transfers the powers pertaining to the 
administration of the State's finances and investment from 
the State Secretary to the Chief Minister.
In explaining the rationale of such move, the Chief 
Minister clarified that:
" The Menteri Besar is answerable to everything that goes on in the State especially when it involved huge sum of money and I want to make sure that every move
It is regarded as "fundamental policy" because SEDCs come under the jurisdiction of the State. In terms of property right approach, the State (Chief Minister) has every right chose its Chairman as the residual claimant.
The Minister of Public Enterprise in 1992, had said that the SEDCs would not be automatically chaired by the Chief Minister under a restructuring exercise by the Ministry. New Straits Times, 31.07.1993.
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is done with my knowledge.
Better accountability by politicians
In 1994, the Prime Minister directed that all Ministers, 
Assistant Ministers and government officers in the state of 
Sabah to declare their properties to him and all licences 
issued and business activities of the state to be 
audited.7G The rationale and motive for such a move is 
clearly demonstrated by his statement:
" We do not want events like those before to recur where those who are in government take it as an opportunity to become rich. Past governments, be they from Alliance, Barisan Nasional or the opposition all acted the same. They did not understand the concept of government too well. Many regarded it as an opportunity to become rich and neglect the people."^
The issue of mixing politics, business and self interest is 
not a new development. Although restrictions are placed on 
Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Parliamentary and Political 
Secretaries from getting involve into business to avoid 
abuse of power, politicians at state level could still 
engaged in part-time business activities.^ However, one 
could argue that there is still a potential abuse of power 
by the State Assemblymen who participate in the financial 
decision making process of the state. In addition they are
As reported in the press, the power given to the Menteri Besar under the Bill was to enter into contracts, acquire, purchase, take, hold and enjoy movable and immovable property. It also allows him to convey, assign, surrender and yield up, charge, mortgage, reassign, transfer or dispose of, or deal with, any movable or immovable property vested with the corporation which would be established under the Bill. The Menteri Besar will head a holding company for all the 72 State Government subsidiary companies and agencies, which would study all proposed projects and programmes submitted to the subsidiary companies and agencies and decide whether projects are viable. New Straits Times, 02.08.1994.
New Straits Times, 03.04.1994.
New Straits Times, 03.04.1994, p . 1. He also claimed there were cases of government officers who became millionaires on retirement.
The Prime Minister said that the State Assemblymen can engage in business because do not get "handsome" pay. New Straits Times, 06.11.1994.
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also involved in the running of the SEDCs and its 
subsidiaries through various capacity such as Chairmanship 
and Directorship appointees. The accountability of 
politicians is also not adequately addressed by the laws in 
cases of offenses committed by politicians. Section 2(1) of 
the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 1970 provides a 
maximum jail term of 14 years or a fine of MR20,000 or 
both. Federal and State Constitutions provide that anyone 
fined MR2,000 or imprisonment a year automatically losses 
his eligibility to hold both elected positions.^ In 1994, 
a Chief Minister was convicted of corruption charges^ with 
a fine of M$l,800 and continued to stay in office.*^
Better accountability on performance
The Government has changed its attitude towards 
accommodating substandard performance by public managers as 
reflected in the statement made by the Finance Minister,
"...We have to replace people who don't perform because it is public money that's being spent. But we find it difficult to sack people because of their service agreements. These people are highlypaid..... Those who fail to perform should have thedecency to resign. Once appointed they think they are God's gift. They stay and die or the companies die while they move on. That's the height of irresponsibility"^
The special committee set up to look into the overall 
performance of the SEDCs concluded that :
New Straits Times, 20,01,1994.
New Straits Times, 25.02.1994.
After the case, the Public Prosecutor was considering recommending to the Government to amend the law to provide for mandatory minimum sentences for corruption and related offenses. According to the spokesman, this is necessary for a review because some judges were reluctant to impose appropriate deterrent sentences. He said that the Attorney General's office considered the sentence imposed in this particular case as grossly inadequate and did not reflect the 
seriousness of the offence. New Straits Times 25.02.1994.
The Finance Minister (Daim Zainuddin) in an interview with Malaysian Business. Malaysian Business, August 1-15, 1990, pl8.
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" WE cannot give the excuse that the poor profits of some SEDCs is largely due to the need to meet a certain degree of social obligations....There are many SEDCs which enjoy good profits, notably in Johor and 
Sarawak" .
The Cabinet Committee on Malpractice
The committee is headed by the Deputy Prime Minister was 
set up in 1988 with six Cabinet Ministers and two senior 
officers in the civil service’.®^ The Committee deals with 
issues affecting the abuse of procedure, financial 
management and public administration in government 
agencies. However, given the huge number of public 
enterprises one could not expect very much from the 
Committee.
Intensifying Anti Corruption Agency (ACA) campaign
The ACA has intensifying its activities to curb 
corruption.®® However, the opposition question the 
integrity, and effectiveness of ACA's in discharging its 
responsibilities since ACA is placed under the Prime 
Minister Department. The Government has rejected a call by 
the opposition party to place ACA under the jurisdiction of 
the Parliament to improve its effectiveness and image.®® 
The Opposition also claimed that the Government was not 
serious in its campaign against corruption and that the ACA 
was just the Barisan Nasional's tool, following the 
withdrawal of case against a politician from an opposition
Deputy Minister of Public Enterprise, New Straits Times, 13.08.1993.
The Ministers consist of Minister of Works, Primary Industries, Human Resources, Ministers in the Prime Minister Department and the civil service represented by the Chief Secretary to the Government and the Director General of the Public Service Department. New Straits Times, 11.11.1994.
The word is used by the ACA could be regarded as an agent or a spy.
The opposition MP claimed that corruption is rampant in the country and that ACA was weak in handling corruption cases. New Straits Times, 26.10.1994.
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party after he joined Barisan Nasional, the ruling party.
The Government®® explained that the case was withdrawn 
because ACA failed to procure key witnesses and the 
original documents from Hong Kong. Later, the politician 
was made a Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's 
department.
Problems of corruption in the public sector is aggravated 
by the fact that Heads of Department are often unwilling to 
take disciplinary action. The ACA has warned Head of 
Departments to take disciplinary action against their staff 
who were found to have abused their power.®® Boards chaired 
by Department Heads were either very slow or reluctant to 
take disciplinary action.®® The Chief Secretary to the 
Government stated that Heads of Departments must take 
disciplinary action against their subordinates who were 
suspected of being involved in corrupt practises.
Sometimes the punishments were not commensurate with the 
offenses committed. Some judges were reluctant to impose 
appropriate sentences. Sometimes, the punishment for 
corruption decided by the court was deemed too soft by the 
public especially with the involvement of high ranking 
politicians. The Public Prosecutor was considering 
recommending to the Government to amend the law and to 
provide for mandatory minimum sentences for corruption and j
related offenses instead of court discretion.®^ i
New Straits Times, 05.07.1994.
Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister's Department. New Straits Times, 05.07.1994 .
New Straits Times, 16.11.1994.
As clarified by the Chief Secretary to the State in New Strait Times, 05 . 02 .1994.
New Straits Times, 25.02.1994.
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3.7 PRIVATISATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 
Privatisation
As discussed in Section 2.2, one of the objectives of the 
privatisation programme in Malaysia is to increase the 
efficiency and productivity of the public enterprises 
through the promotion of competition and entrepreneurship 
in the public sector. Privatisation, the transfer of 
ownership from the public sector to the private sector 
(Jackson and Price, 1994; Hanke, 1987; Ramanadham, 1989; 
Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988; Gromley, 1991), is associated 
with the issue of ownership as advocated by the Property 
right theorists. Beesely and Littlechild (1983) define 
privatisation as the formation of a company under the U.K 
Companies Act and the subsequent sale of at least 5 0 
percent of the shares to private shareholders. As pointed 
out by Beesely and Littlechild (1983), the underlying idea 
of privatisation is to improve industry performance by 
increasing the role of market forces through freeing entry 
to an industry, encouraging competition, and restructuring 
of nationalised industry (Chapter 7 and 8) . There are three 
strands of policy by which these objectives could be 
achieved with; denationalisation - the sale of public 
sector assets to the private sector; deregulation - the 
opening of the market to private sector competition; and 
tendering - the contracting-out of public provision to 
private firms (Kay, Mayer and Thompson, 1986).
Privatisation and public sector reform will benefit the 
consumers in the form of lower prices of currently 
available goods and services, better quality of goods and 
services and an increase in rate of innovation. To improve 
industry performance and benefit consumers the whole set of 
measures above need to be implemented for each industry 
where privatisation is a key element.
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Corporatisation
The means of transferring the ownership of a public 
enterprise to the private sector depends largely on the 
type of public enterprise involved. In cases where public 
enterprises are incorporated under the Companies Act, the 
transfer can be easily done by way of the sale of the 
shares to the new shareholders. However, the questions of 
the mode of transfer to be adopted in the in a 
privatisation exercise becomes more complicated when the 
transfer is involving a public enterprise, such as a 
statutory body or a government department, which is not 
incorporated under the Companies Act. The transfer of the 
ownership of such enterprise cannot be effected by means of 
transfer of shares, as there are no shares to be 
transferred. Privatisation of such enterprises would 
normally have to be effected by way of corporatisation - 
converting them into a normal company under the Companies 
Act®^. Corporatisation could be followed by privatisation 
with sale of its shares to a new shareholders from the 
private sector.
However, it should be noted that since corporatisation of 
public enterprises does not involve the transfer of 
ownership to the private sector, and seen in the light of 
the Theory of bureaucracy. Property rights theory and the 
X-inefficiency theory discussed in Section 3.2, a 
corporatised public enterprise would still exhibit the 
inefficiency characteristics of a public enterprise. As 
pointed out earlier, privatisation and competition are two 
essential criteria to be met to improve efficiency and 
performance of the public enterprises.
In the case of Malaysia, it is the Companies Act 1965.
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Competition
Competition is the most important mechanism for increasing 
industry performance and efficiency, maximising consumer 
benefits and limiting monopoly power. Underlying the 
principle is that competition provides rivalry and freedom 
for firms to enter a market providing competitive threats 
from potential as well as existing competitors. As 
discussed in Section 3.2, these external pressures provide 
motivation for firms to adopt lowest cost production 
techniques to stay in business.
The role of competition in improving industry performance 
has been discussed by Stigler (1975) and Baumol et.al
(1982) . Stigler (1975) argues that unregulated natural 
monopolies will not be harmful to consumers in the long run 
because competitors will enter the industry. Similarly, 
contestable market theory (Baumol et al. 1982) suggests 
that potential competition could act as a threat for an 
incumbent firm to be efficient. If the incumbent is not 
operating with maximum efficiency or if it is abusing its 
monopoly power by overcharging customers new entrants will 
be attracted to come into the industry. New entrants which 
will be more efficient and charge a lower price will then 
take the incumbent business away. The main problems with 
Stigler's view is that it relies on the efficiency of 
market mechanisms in solving almost all problems. As we 
have discussed in Chapter 3, the basic problem of achieving 
pareto optimal efficiency is asymmetric information between 
all the relevant parties - the producers, the consumers and 
the policy makers. In a decreasing industry i.e natural 
monopoly, the largest firm has the greater advantage over 
its competitors in terms of information and costs. The 
incumbent firm can practice predatory pricing to drive out 
a competitor or an entrant, or set low prices to mislead 
entrants about its efficiency where the predator has 
access to either internal or external funds to finance its
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activities. By setting prices below the competitors costs, 
the dominant firm stands to win its competitors' customers 
and push them out of industry.®® On the other hand 
contestable market theory cannot be taken seriously in the 
case of natural monopoly or an industry with very high sunk 
costs. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) define a contestable 
market as one in which existing firms are vulnerable to 
hit-and-run entry. It is assumed that the cost functions 
are identical for all firms - actual and potential because 
they have access to the same methods of production. Vickers 
and Yarrow (1988) point out that it is perfectly possible 
to have a contestable market with high fixed costs as long 
as there are no sunk costs. They argue that a natural 
monopoly market can in principle be contestable and 
vulnerable to hit-and-run entry. If equilibrium exists in 
a contestable market then there is no inefficiency in 
production and output is produced at minimum cost. However, 
they further argue that equilibrium need not exist in the 
contestable market. Stiglitz (1985) argues that the 
assumption of zero sunk cost in the contestable market 
theory is nonrobust and unrealistic. In capital intensive 
industries such as the utilities sunk costs constitutes a 
high proportion of total costs.
Therefore, in order for privatisation to achieve its 
efficiency objectives and benefit the consumers, two 
central issues to be addressed. One is how to introduce 
effective competition into the utility industries and two, 
how privatised utilities should be regulated so as to 
protect customers without at the same time creating 
offsetting inefficiencies and distortions. Some of the 
policy measures to introduce competition in the 
nationalised industries include the liberalisation and 
deregulation of the industry whereby market forces replace
The larger the firm the greater is its advantage over its competitors. Even if the firms can survive the competition in the market consumers will be worst off because cost per unit for many firms would be higher than for one.
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government regulation. Another policy measure for greater 
efficiency is through the de-integration of the industry.
De-integration.
In certain exceptional cases, monopoly power may be 
desirable in industries which exhibits natural monopoly 
characteristics (Price, 1994) . Consumers could benefit from 
natural monopoly industries where reduced costs of 
producing products or a variety of products are achieved by 
economies of scale and economies of scope. In other words 
monopoly, such as in the transmission activity in the 
electricity industry, may be desirable so long as it 
produces output more cheaply than duplicating the network.
Most utilities exhibit natural monopoly characteristics 
where the provision of services is through a fixed network. 
For these activities competition is neither feasible or 
desirable. However, competitive supply could coexist with 
such monopoly. The co-existence between potentially 
competitive activities and monopolised services is 
reflected in the electricity industry where national 
transmission and local distribution system exhibits natural 
monopoly characteristics while the electricity generation 
is a potentially competitive activities. Given this form of 
relationship, the restructuring of the industry through 
vertical and horizontal de-integration of the activities, 
provides a scope for improving industry performance and 
efficiency. In the case of the generation activity in the 
electricity sector, its liberalisation can be carried out 
firstly, by vertical separation between generation and 
transmission activities and secondly, by the horizontal 
breakup of the utility with the liberalisation of the 
generating activity.
However there are two arguments against the adoption of 
vertical separation between generation and transmission
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activities. One is that separation raises problem of 
externalities. These arise because there is a strong 
interdependence between electricity generation and 
transmission activities. Thus there is a need for a very 
close coordination between generation and transmission in 
order to have a balance between supply and demand 
maintained throughout the system, the failure of which will 
result in power outages (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 
1994) . Secondly, the interdependency between the two has 
strong implications for each branch's revenue and
investment plan (Bishop, Kay and Mayer, 1994) . An
integrated generation and transmission company would 
operate those of its power stations that met demand at 
minimum cost at each point in time taking into account 
transmission constraints and losses. In the long run the 
vertically integrated firm ensures that generation and 
transmission investment is planned to give optimal mix and 
capacity to meet potential demand with security of supply.
Therefore, in the event of disintegration there is
potentially a significant economic externality created as 
a consequence of the separation of the two. It is then 
argued that the separation of generation and distribution 
rests on the view that there must be some source of 
substantial offsetting benefits to be reaped from the 
separation. However, since the market power in the 
electricity supply system lies in transmission and 
distribution, the reduction in benefit by separation will 
be relatively minimal.
The answer to the market power is to regulate transmission 
so that it does not use its monopoly power to overcharge 
customers. In an unregulated electricity supply system the 
vertical separation would be highly damaging - for two 
reasons. One the monopolistic transmission entity would 
have as much market power as an integrated utility and two, 
the inefficiencies from loss of coordination could be 
significant. Therefore, there is a strong argument in
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favour of regulating both the generation and the 
transmission activities.
Independent regulation
Regulation is necessary in the presence of a market power 
(monopoly power) where a profit maximising monopolist has 
the tendency to raise price above its most efficient level 
and restricts output. This relates to another central 
issue, as discussed above, on how the privatised utilities 
should be regulated so as to protect the consumers without 
at the same time creating offsetting inefficiencies and 
distortion. The problems of market power exist when a 
market suffers from ineffective competition thus creating 
a monopoly market condition. Intervention in the form of 
regulation is therefore required to ensure that the pursuit 
of profit does not conflict with social welfare and 
efficiency (Train,1991) and this provide rationale for 
various kinds of economic regulations. However, Littlechild
(1983) argues that competitive markets by themselves are 
the best regulators. They serve the interest of consumers 
through the operation of market forces. He argues that 
competition is indisputably the most effective means - 
perhaps ultimately the only effective means - of protecting 
consumers against monopoly power. Regulation is therefore 
essentially a means of preventing the worst excesses of 
monopoly; it is not a substitute for competition. This view 
places consumer interest as a primary concern and the 
reliance on competition to achieve efficiency which will 
benefit the consumers. To achieve the desired efficiency 
results appropriate regulation is necessary. Appropriate 
regulation means maximising the benefits from removing 
market failures in relation to the costs of government 
intervention (Jones, 1993). The costs of regulation include 
the opportunity cost of the private and public resources 
devoted to the regulatory process. Vickers and Yarrow point 
out that there is a need for regulatory policy to influence
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the behaviour of the regulated firms by establishing an 
appropriate incentive system to guide or constrain economic 
decisions.
However the effectiveness of the regulation and the 
regulators is a function of the freedom or the autonomy in 
which they can exercise their power to regulate the 
industry. One of the problems is the capture of the 
regulator by the industry and the politicians. The 
probability of the industry not providing the true 
information as requested by the regulator, to protect their 
own interest, could be detrimental for the regulator to 
regulate effectively. The second problem is, regulators 
could have their own agendas which include career 
advancement, self-aggrandizement, political support (Train, 
1991). The capture theory suggests that over time regulated 
firms gain control over the process by which they are 
regulated (Posner, 1974). Stigler (1975) on the same issue 
comments that " as a rule, regulation is acquired by the 
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit" (p.115). Willig (1993) argues that government 
proved to be incapable of abiding by its own rules where 
political reality is inevitably injected into regulation. 
He pointed out that regulators are often political actors 
themselves or serve at the pleasure of those in political 
power. He further argues that regulators of private 
enterprises are less able to act contrary to public 
interest than high-ranking officials in public enterprises. 
When the individual agenda or political agendas of public 
officials are important the regulated private firms may be 
better insulated from these pressures. Thus an independent 
regulator is a prerequisite for effective implementation of 
competition policy and regulating the behaviour of the 
firms in the industry.
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Public sector industry efficiency model
The Theory of Bureaucracy, Property Right Theory and the X- 
Efficiency Theory all attempt to explain why inefficiency 
exists in the public sector. Based on the above theories a 
model could be developed as to how to improve the 
efficiency of the public enterprises, which is associated 
with public sector reform; (1) privatisation of the public 
enterprises which will address the issue of ownership, 
incentive and principle agent problems (Property right 
theory) and the maximising behaviour of the politicians and 
the bureaucrats (Theory of Bureaucracy); (2) the
introduction of competition to eliminate the non maximising 
behaviour of the public enterprises due to (a) lack of 
competitive pressure (b), the absence of take over threat 
and market discipline in the public sector (X-Inefficiency 
Theory); (3) less government (ministerial) and political 
intervention in the running of the public enterprises which 
will minimise the coalition between the politicians and the 
public managers (Theory of Bureaucracy) ; (4) An independent 
regulator to implement positive regulation in the industry.
3.8 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter discusses the theoretical perspective of 
public versus private sector performance. The theory of 
bureaucracy. Property rights theory and the X-inefficiency 
theory attempt to explain why public sector is not as 
efficient as the private sector. Although these theories 
are built on different approaches, they arrived at the same 
conclusion - that inefficiency exists in public 
enterprises. From these theories it could be concluded that 
the inefficiency of the public enterprises is directly or 
indirectly attributable to ownership. Based on these 
theories it is possible to postulate the characteristics 
and behaviour of public enterprises (managers): Firstly,
direct government and political intervention in the running
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of the public enterprise is an on going phenomena.
Politicians as self maximising agents, given the
opportunity, will use public enterprises as a tool to 
achieve political and personal aims. Secondly, bureaucrats 
will try to maximise their utility functions which could 
lead to decisions in consistent with optimal management 
practices. Thus monitoring of public enterprises would be 
a difficult task given the asymmetric information between 
the politicians, bureaucrats and the public. Thirdly,
public enterprises will not strive for maximum possible 
efficiency and therefore has to depend on government
budget. The lack of financial incentives and the lack of 
stockholders, and the immunity from competition and from 
takeover stimulate inefficiency in public enterprises.
Empirical evidence from studies done internationally have 
not provided any conclusive evidence of superiority of one 
over the other. However, the Malaysian experience shows 
that the behaviour of the public enterprises was consistent 
with those described by the above theories resulting 
inefficiencies in the running of the public enterprises. 
The study shows that public enterprises in Malaysia were 
less efficient than the private enterprises in terms of 
cost efficiency and profitability.
As pointed out, there were evidence which is detrimental to 
the efficient running of the public enterprises in 
Malaysia; public enterprises being used as a political tool 
to achieve political aims by politicians; political 
patronism which led to financial and investment decision 
inconsistent with financial criteria; the existence of rent 
seeking activities and corruption among politicians and 
bureaucrats; the maximising of bureaucrat's utility 
function through the expansion of departmental budgets; and 
the increase dependency of public enterprises on government 
budget to service.
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Based on the above constraints and limitations face by the 
public enterprises, one can therefore argue that in order 
to improve their performance, there is a need to undertake 
three remedial actions; (a) to adopt privatisation policy, 
(b) introducing competition in the market place, and (c) 
less government and political interference in the industry 
and (d) independent regulator to regulate the industry. 
These criterion will be used to assess the achievement of 
the electricity privatisation programme and the electricity 
sector reform which will be examined in Chapter Seven and 
Chapter Eight.
Chapter Four provides an overview of the electricity 
industry in Malaysia and the energy policy which shapes the 
future development of the electricity sector in the future. 
Attempt is made in the remaining chapters to evaluate the 
efficiency of the National Electricity Board (NEB) and 
examine whether it inhibits the inefficiency 
characteristics of the public character. We will also look 
at the issue whether privatisation could improve existing 
performance and efficiency of the electricity sector and 
examine its feasibility and practical problems in 
implementing the policy.
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CHAPTER 4 : THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN MALAYSIA
The object of this chapter is twofold; firstly to look at 
the energy policy in Malaysia and how it affects the 
electricity sector and secondly to give an overview of the 
electricity sector until its corporatisation in 1990. This 
Chapter consists of 7 Sections. Section 2 looks at the 
functions of the National Electricity Board. Section 3 
explains the Malaysian Energy Policy in terms of the 
institutional set up, policy objectives and its 
implications on the electricity sector. Section 4 focuses 
on the development of the electricity sector in terms of 
generation activity and Section 5 focusses on the 
transmission and distribution systems in line with the 
growth of the electricity demand. Sector 6 looks at the 
social objectives of the National Electricity in providing 
electricity to the rural areas in the rural electrification 
programme. Section 7 summarises the discussion in the 
previous section.
4.2 THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY BOARD (NEB)
Electricity was introduced in Malaysia in 1894 in a tin 
mine. In 1895 the Railways Department was installed with 
generator.1 The first power station in Peninsular Malaysia 
was operated in 1900 by the Sempam Hydro Power Station in 
the state of Pahang by a private company® while the 
residents of Kuala Lumpur received their electricity supply 
in 1905.®
Initially electricity development was placed under the 
Electricity Department, a section of the Public Works 
Department. It became a separate department on 1.1.1927
TNB (1992)
Raub-Australian Gold Mining Co Ltd 
Salleh M.Z (1990)
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with the formation of Federal Electricity Department with 
the responsibility of controlling electricity supply in the 
Federated Malay States.* However, due to the rapid demand 
for electricity there was a need for a central body to 
build an integrated electricity scheme. The Central 
Electricity Board (CEB), was established on 1 September 
1949 under the Electricity Ordinance 1949 to replace the 
Electricity Development with the responsibility of 
generating and distributing electricity to the public.® In 
June 1965 CEB was renamed National Electricity Board of the 
States of Malaya (NEB) . By 1982 NEB became the sole 
supplier of generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity in Peninsular Malaysia when it took over 
private electricity companies.®
The NEB was established with the following functions:^
1) To promote the generation of electrical energy
for the economic development of Malaya (later 
known as Malaysia);
2) To secure the supply of such energy at a 
reasonable price;
3) To advise the Minister responsible for 
electricity on all matters relating to its 
generation and use;
4) To manage and operate electrical installations
transferred to, acquired, or established by it;
5) To construct and operate supply lines and
stations to generate and sell energy; and
 ^ A Federation of states under British rule before Malaya becameindependent in 1957.
® The 4 0MW Connaught Bridge Power Station was the first power stationcommissioned by CEB.
® Some of the private companies taken over by NEB was the Perak RiverHydro Electric Power CO Ltd and Kinta Electric Distribution Co Ltd. State-owned entities taken over by NEB includes the Electricity Supply Department of Penang Municipal Council.
’ National Electricity Board of the States of Malaya, p 10.
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6) To acquire electrical plant and property.
4.3 MALAYSIA'S ENERGY POLICY 
Institutions
Prior to the formation of the Cabinet Committee (CCE) on 
Energy in 1975 there was no department or agency dealing 
solely with energy matters . The energy decision was widely 
dispersed in the Government. Decisions pertaining to energy 
issues, policies and guidelines are now made by the
Committee chairs by the Prime Minister. The Committee (see 
Figure 4.1)® is supported by the Implementation and
Coordination Committee (ICCE) on Energy comprising of the 
heads of various departments and institutions. The ICCE is 
entrusted with the evaluation and recommendations of energy 
plans besides coordinating and monitoring the
implementation of plans and projects approved by the CCE.
Three important units come directly under the purview of 
the Prime Minister's Department - the Economic Planning 
Unit (EPU), the Petroleum Development Unit (PDU), and the 
Nuclear Energy Unit (NEU) . The EPU is responsible for the 
coordination of all national economic planning, the PDU for 
monitoring the functions and activities of Petronas and 
other agencies in the petroleum and gas industry and the
NEU monitoring the functions and activities of the nuclear
sub-sector.At the Ministry level, energy policies are under 
the portfolio of five ministries - the Ministry of Energy, 
Telecommunications and Posts, Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Ministry of Science Technology and Environment, 
Ministry of Primary Industry and the Ministry of National 
and Rural Development. Under the structure all the 
Electricity Boards come under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts.
® In Figure 1, the National Electricity Board (NEB) is designated as LLN under the heading of "Electricity Board".
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Figure 4.1: Structure of Malaysia Energy Planning and Development
Ministry Petronas
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Source; Wan Leong Fee (1991), p 101.
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Policy Objectives
The objective of the Malaysia's energy supply was to ensure 
both reliability and security of supply. The Government^ 
defines reliability of supply as the continuity and absence 
of supply disruptions or shortages whereas security of 
supplies implies self-reliance, independence and
accessibility to and control over supplies. To achieve this 
the Government adopted a strategy called the " Four fuel 
energy strategies" based on oil, hydro, gas and coal, with 
the aim to reduce dependence on a single fuel and 
establish an active program to developing indigenous 
resources where available. The availability of adequate 
energy is considered as one of the most important factors 
required to achieve the aspirations of Vision 2020.^°
The goals of the energy policy are :
1) To achieve energy self sufficiency by maximising
development and utilisation of the indigenous energy 
resources
2) To reduce over dependence on oil
3) To increase diversity in the energy supply system
4) To ensure that energy is used efficiently through the
reduction of waste and by using appropriate energy 
types.
5) To ensure that energy resource development and
 ^ Ministry of Energy (1984)
Vision 2 02 0 is the government mission towards achieving the status of a developed country by the year 2020. The interpretation of a fully developed country in the Malaysian context as defined by the Government encompasses various complex dimensions: economically, politically, socially, spiritually,psychologically and culturally. In terms of economic the Government has set a target of doubling the GDP of Malaysia every ten years between 1990 and 2020. If this is achieved, the Government argue that the GDP of Malaysia would be eight times larger by the year 2020 than in 1990. Based on the GDP of M$115 billion in 1990, the Malaysian GDP should therefore M$920 billion in real term in 2020. Detail of the Vision 2 02 0 is elaborated in a paper presented by the Prime Minister at the inaugural meeting of the Malaysian Business Council on 28.02.1991 .
“ The energy policy instruments consists of the National PetroleumPolicy, National Depletion Policy and Energy Conservation Policy.
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utilisation in the country is accompanied with as
minimal ill effect as possible on the environment.
The implementation of the "four fuel energy strategies" has 
various implications on the operations of NEB and the 
electricity sector. Firstly, with the use of more natural 
gas, which Malaysia has abundance supply, more CCGT 
technology will be used. Use of CCGT technology will reduce 
production costs of electricity achieved through better 
efficiency^^ and cheaper cost of natural gas. If saving in 
costs is passed on to the consumers public would be able to 
enjoy lower electricity rates. Secondly, the usage of more 
natural gas is a threat to the electricity market for NEB 
because natural gas is a substitute product for 
electricity. Natural gas and gas products are expected to 
replace substantially petroleum products in power, 
commercial, industrial and transport sectors. By 1995, gas 
is expected to account for about 3 9 per cent of primary 
commercial energy supply compared with 27 per cent in 
1990.^^ Centrally piped LPG is now being incorporated into 
new apartments construction allowing for future conversion 
to natural gas. Thirdly, the prospect of using hydro-power 
for generating electricity is tremendous. Malaysia has 
abundant hydro-power resources assessed at some 29,000 MW, 
with potential energy of 123,000 million kWh per annum. 
It is anticipated that Malaysia will have to invest more
Gas turbine technology has a higher thermal efficiency ( i.e ratio of energy available for useful work to input energy) than the thermal plant (steam) technology. According to Cassedy and Grossman (1990, p 45/46) combined-cycle operation yields thermal efficiencies approaching 50 percent as compared to 35 percent that of thermal plant (steam). However, plant efficiencies may be increased up to 40 percent through energy conservation and technical efficiency improvements, such as regeneration, reheating, and preheating.
The Peninsular Gas Utilisation II (PGU II) is a crucial instrument in achieving this target. The PGU II gas transmission network provides gas to meet gas requirements of electric power plants while the gas reticulation network will serve the industrial, commercial and residential sectors. The PGU project, completed in 1991, comprises of 73 0 km of natural gas pipeline cost PETRONAS M$2.4 billion. A preliminary study has also been made on the construction of PGU III which will supply natural gas to the northern peninsular states and Southern 
Thailand.
Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1990
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than $100 billion to generate the 25,000 megawatts of 
electricity required by year 2020.^^ Although hydro is a 
cheaper source of energy option, the electricity sector is 
faced with several problems pertaining to its usage in 
Malaysia. One, the hydropower potential exists in Sarawak 
and is unevenly distributed with bulk of the potential 
hydropower supply far away from the major load centres. 
This will require inter-regional transmission facilities 
which is very costly. Second, while large-scale 
hydroelectric power development promises economies of 
scale, its development with long gestation period faces 
critical issues of timing, finance and environmental 
impact. Since development of such resources is 
characterised by high capital and major load requirements, 
it can only be justified with considerable electricity 
demand which at the moment exists only in Peninsular 
Malaysia. The Bakun electricity project in Sarawak, which 
was being shelved in the mid 1980's due to economic 
recession in the Malaysian economy and worldwide, is now 
being constructed. The project involves the sending of 
electricity to Peninsular Malaysia through HVDC 
transmission and is estimated to cost $8.2 billion in 1983 
prices and M$17 billion current prices (1995)
4.4 Electricity Generation
Most of Malaysia's electricity is generated by public 
utilities namely the National Electricity Board (NEB) in 
Peninsular Malaysia, the Sarawak Electricity Supply 
Corporation (SESCO) in Sarawak, and the Sabah Electricity 
Board (SEB). Among other things, these authorities are 
entrusted with a task of promoting the development of 
electricity generation with the view of facilitating the
statement made by the Deputy Minister of Energy in New Straits Times, 5.8.1992.
In terms of energy the Bakun hydro project has the potential to displace about 85, 000 barrels of oil per day representing a savings of M$33 million a year at 1983 prices after taking into account the amortisation of the project.
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economic development of the country. However, some private 
companies were licensed to generate and sell electricity at 
the local level especially in those areas not covered by 
the three public electric supply authorities.
Approximately 97 percent of total electricity supply in 
Peninsular Malaysia comes from TNB.^ The balance is 
supplied by private generators in certain isolated areas, 
factories and estates with their own facilities.^ There are 
five types of electricity generation stations operated by 
NEB namely thermal, hydro, turbine gas, combined cycle and 
diesel. The turbine gas and combine-cycle stations were 
introduced in 1979 and 1985 respectively^. The thermal 
stations burn fuel oil, coal and gas, the open cycle gas 
turbine operate on gas, dieseline and medium fuel oil and 
combine cycle plant uses natural gas.constraints on 
government public expenditure.
Table 4.1 shows the installed generating capacity of NEB 
and the types of from 1970 to 1990.
Table 4.1 NEB : Installed Generating Capacity(in Megawatts)
Year SteamTurbines Hydro Diesel GasTur­bines
Comb-binedCycles
Coal Rural 12-hour supply
Total GrowthIndex
1970 360 265 38- - - - - 663 100
1975 540 265 51 - - - - 855 129
1980 1218 613 118 180 - 6 2135 322
1985 1570 1147 284 260 600 - 18 3879 585
1986 2090 1250 190 280 900 - 18 4721 712
1987 1930 1250 169 280 900 - 11 4540 685
1988 1930 1250 169 280 900 300 11 4840 730
1989 1960 1990 169 280 900 300 11 4870 734
1990 1960 1250 169 280 900 300 11 4870 734
Source: NEB'S Annual Reports, 1970-1990 issues.
Electricity generation in Malaysia showed a rapid growth
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during the Second Malaysia Plan (1975-1979) and the Third 
Malaysia Plan (1980-1984) paralleling the expansion in the 
Malaysian economy. The Second Malaysia Plan recorded the 
highest average annual growth in electricity generation at 
30 per cent followed by 15 percent during the Third 
Malaysia Plan. The underlying factors which contributed to 
the high growth of electricity generation during the Second 
and Third Malaysia Plan were (a) , the high growth in the 
demand of the industrial sector especially in the 
manufacturing outputs as the government implemented its 
Industrial Development Master Plan and (b) as pointed out 
in Chapter two there was high growth rates in the Malaysian 
economy due to expansionary budget policies of the 
Government which increase demand for electricity among the 
public. However the average annual growth in electricity 
generation started to drop to 6 percent from 1986 to 1988. 
As can be seen from the Table 4.1 there was virtually no 
capacity expansion in the electricity sector from 1988 to 
1990. There were various explanation for this. Firstly, 
there was a delay in project completion of various hydro 
electricity projects undertaken by the NEB (Chapter 6) . 
Secondly, the Government and political intervention on 
investment and financial decisions such as the award of 
tenders to the contractors had delayed decision making 
process and project implementation (Chapter 7),
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Electricity Demand (Consumption)
Table 4.2 shows the demand pattern of electricity by 
consumer type from 1975 to 1990.
Table 4 .2 NEB : Consumption pattern by consumer type : 1975-1990
Year Industrial Commercial Domestic Mining PublicLighting Total GrowthIndex
(1975=100)
1975 2,640.60 1,212.80 580.00 218 .50 . 4,651 .90 100.0
1976 3,065 .30 1,413.50 702.40 210 .20 - 5,391.40 115 . 9
1977 2,991.80 1,657.40 847 . 60 294 .40 - 5,791.20 124 . 5
1978 3,221.10 1,979.10 986.70 284 .80 59 .10 6,530.80 140 .4
1979 3,606.80 2,151.30 1,147.90 285 .26 65 .10 7,256.36 156 . 0
1980 3,814.50 2,333.10 1,301.60 212.39 68 .80 7,730.39 166 . 2
1981 4,033.09 2,517 . 64 1,457.01 183.23 74 . 95 8,265.92 177 . 7
1982 3,472.25 2,819.86 1,721.57 420.16 82 .16 8,516.00 183 .1
1983 3,797.24 3,094 . 91 1,897.24 329.15 90 .45 9,208 .99 198 . 0
1984 4,419.33 3,590.72 2,249.17 343.57 100.91 10,703.70 230 .1
1985 4,608.09 3,890.97 2,480.35 357 .28 112.27 11,448.96 246 .1
1986 5,196.29 4,108 .96 2,673.70 401 . 69 115.50 12,496 .14 268 . 6
1987 5,865.23 4,417.26 2,876.57 388.00 121.41 13,668.47 293 . 2
1988 7,015 .29 4,481.65 3,020.78 301.00 134 . 02 14,952 .72 321 .4
1989 8,357.00 5,153 .00 3,350.00 388 .00 146.00 17,394.00 373 . 9
1990 9,825.00 5,592.00 3,662 .00 301.00 158 .00 19,538 .00 420 . 0
_
Source: NEB Annual Reports various 1975-1990 issues
Table 4.2 shows that the demand for electricity has 
increased 4 folds from 1975 to 1990, With the exception of 
mining and public lighting, domestic, commercial and 
industrial demand was increasing very rapidly. Industrial 
demand constituted about 5 0 percent of the total demand by 
1990 reflecting the growth of the economy in the 
manufacturing and industrial sector.
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Electricity consumers
Table 4.3 shows the number of electricity consumer by
region from 1975 to 1990. Between 1978 and 1988, the number
of electricity consumers more than doubled from 1.0 million 
to 2.6 million. Domestic users account for as much as
three-quarters of the total number, followed by commercial 
consumers. The mining sector is the least user of
electricity.
Table 4.3: Number of electricity consumer by region 1975--1988
Year Northern Eastern Central Southern Total
1975 273,456 117,602 266,982 221,469 838,909
1980 427,594 240,744 370,709 351,081 1390,128
1981 460,419 278,223 414,364 384,641 1537,647
1982 494,105 318,415 457,196 425,232 1694.948
1983 519,780 356,532 496,302 459,344 1831,958
1984 557,660 390,783 539,667 492,315 1980,425
1985 754,841 419,092 584,438 531,003 2289,374
1986 792,095 447,492 623,522 561,023 2424,132
1987 832,332 484,293 664,522 595,667 2576,814
1988 885,895 486,225 701,188 632,263 2704,571
Source: NEB's Annual Reports, 1975-1988
Concentration of consumers was in the northern, central and 
southern due to rapid economic development in these region. 
Demand from the northern region constituted about 30 
percent of the total demand due to the highest population 
growth through urban migration and rapid economic 
development especially in the capital city.
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4.5 TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Transmi s s i on
Table 4.4 shows the growth of NEB's transmission system 
from 1975 to 1990.
The NEB's transmission system operates voltages of 275kV, 
132kV and 66kV . The National Grid consists of the 275kV 
and 132kV systems and connects the major load centres to 
the power station throughout Peninsular Malaysia. It is 
interconnected with Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand in the north via 132kV Single Circuit Line with a 
117 MVA rating. In the south it is interconnected with the 
Public Utilities Board of Singapore through two 230kV 
submarine cables each with a rating of 240 MVA. The 66kV 
system located mainly in the south is being phase out.^
As at 31 August 1992, the transmission lines (in circuit 
km) as follows:
275 kv - 3,747 km 
132 kV - 6,849 km 
66 kV - 894 km
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Table 4.4: Transmission Lines 0/H and U/G (Circuit
275kV 132kV 66kV
1975 98.00 693.53 333.47
1976 137.00 894.65 338.97
1977 371.76 1578.38 545.52
1978 371.76 1595.44 539.84
1979 371.76 1878.59 572.41
1980 487.75 1922.25 580.61
1981 733.17 2120.30 618.11
1982 813.17 2176 .30 618.11
1983 813.17 2342.67 618.11
1984 2321.65 3891.06 990.06
1985 2788.15 4173.06 1012.10
1986 3100.15 4514.76 1012.10
1987 3100.15 4864.00 913.40
1988 3526.00 5310.00 871.80
1989 3596.00 6106.90 891.40
1990 3596.00 6176.90 891.40
Note : In circuit mile for year 1975 and 1976 
Source: NEB's Annual Reports 1975-1990 issues
Distribution
The distribution system covers voltages of 33kV and below. 
These voltages 33kV, 22kV and llkV are stepped down from 
the transmission voltages. Low voltage consumers are 
supplied at 240V single phase or 415V three phase. Major 
customers are supplied directly by the higher voltages of 
33kV, 22kV or llkV. The distribution lines as at 1994 
totalled 33, 129 circuit kilometres.
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The distribution network is divided into six regions namely 
North, Perak, Federal Territory, South and East. Each 
region is responsible for the operation and planning of its 
distribution system. According to TNB this is to ensure the 
smooth operation of existing distribution network as well 
as connection of new customers. The current practise of TNB 
calls for a maximum voltage drop of 5 percent regulation on 
low voltage to ensure that even the remote customers 
receive supply within the declared voltage. The 
distribution network is protected against overload and 
short circuit. TNB installed fuses at the overhead mains 
while relays are installed at substations for protection 
against short-circuit, earth fault and over-current.
4.6 RURAL ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMME
Rural electrification is part of the Government socio­
economic objectives of providing basic amenities to the 
rural areas. It is a component of rural development to 
raise the living standard of the rural poor. Rural 
electrification programme is fully funded by the federal 
and the various state governments with the NEB as the 
implementing agency.
The number of rural households receiving electricity 
increased is as shown in Table 4.5.During the last decade, 
3621 rural electricity projects costing about $280 million 
were implemented in Peninsular Malaysia, thus increasing 
the number of households provided with electricity from
345,000 in 1970 to 790,000 in 1986 an increased of 128.6 
per cent. By the end of 1995 all rural areas is expected to 
be supplied with electricity.
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Table 4.5 Development of the Rural Electrif
Year No.. of Households No. of Villages
1970 114,672 1,223
1975 205,123 2,451
1976 223,686 2,667
1977 246,178 2,938
1978 292,644 3 , 583
1979 351,181 4,344
1980 410,453 5,088
1981 423,147 5,330
1982 475,842 6,157
1983 549,250 7,395
1984 601,475 8,181
1985 649,679 8,865
1986 697,825 9,649
Source : NEB's Annual Reports , 1975-1988issues
4.7 CONCLUSIONS
There was a rapid increase in demand growth for electricity 
from 1975 to 1990. In line with the energy policy NEB has 
diversified its generating capacity by using gas turbines 
and combined cycles plants besides thermal and hydro­
electricity plants. There was pressure for NEB to expand in 
order to meet the rapid increase in demand which will be 
discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. The next chapter will 
look into the technical performance of NEB from 1975 to 
1990 period.
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CHAPTER 5: EFFICIENCY OF THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY BOARD 
IN MALAYSIA-INTERCOUNTRY COMPARISON
The previous chapter looks at the theoretical perspectives 
and empirical evidence of the relative performance of 
public enterprises and private enterprises. We have noted 
that American, U.K and European studies suggest that there 
is no conclusive evidence to support the clear-cut 
superiority of private ownership in respect of productivity 
and cost efficiency. Similarly in Malaysia, studies done on 
this subject point to the same conclusion. Private 
enterprises in cement and steel industries have lower unit 
cost during 1982-1986 period while the reverse takes place 
in the palm oil milling industry.
As discussed in Chapter Two one of the arguments for 
privatisation programme in Malaysia is that public 
enterprises were not efficient. Accordingly, the Government 
stipulates that one of the objectives of the privatisation 
is to increase the efficiency and productivity of the 
public enterprises in order to enhance economic development 
of the country.
Significance of Productivity
Productivity advancement has been a major contributing 
factor to economic growth. The measurement and analysis of 
productivity aggregate growth has been a major topic since 
World War 2 (Cowing and Stevenson, 1981) . In contrast, the 
measurement of productivity level advancement at the firm 
level is a relatively new area of interest, especially in 
the case of public enterprises and regulated industries. 
Following the privatisation programmes in many countries 
productivity measurement has become essential requirement 
for the privatised firms. Privatised firms have to 
calculate and publish measures of efficiency and 
productivity development as required by the regulator. The
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RPI-X+Y regulation places efficiency and productivity 
growth at the core of operational concern.
Efficiency Measurement (Technical / Productive Efficiency)
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the 
performance of the electricity sector in Malaysia using the 
intercountry comparison of productivity growth. It focuses 
on the performance comparison of the public utility firm 
(NEB) in Malaysia with that in Thailand (EGAT) and United 
Kingdom (CEGB) using the total productivity factor based on 
the Data Envelopment Analysis method. This method looks 
into efficiency measurement of the electricity sector in 
Malaysia employing the non parametric method known as Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) developed by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978,1981) which builds on the efficiency 
evaluation of individual firm used by Pareil (1957) using 
the frontier estimation model.
The measurement of efficiency is related to the performance 
of the technical efficiency also known as productive 
efficiency of the firm. It is concerned with the estimation 
of the efficient frontier or production function in a 
production process of a firm. The concept of production 
function forms the basis for the description of input- 
output relationships in a firm. It shows the maximum amount 
of outputs that can be achieved by combining various 
quantities of inputs. Considering from an input 
orientation, it describes the minimum amount of input 
required to achieve the given output levels. Using the 
approach of Fare et.al(1990, 1994), the DEA could be used 
to decompose productivity growth over time into two 
components namely technical change and efficiency change by 
using the Malmquist productivity index. Technical change is 
associated with the shifts in technology or innovation 
while efficiency change is related to the catching up of 
the frontier over time.
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This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2 
discusses the Data Envelopment Analysis model based on 
Pareil's technical and allocative efficiency concept. 
Section 3 discusses the Malmquist productivity index using 
Linear programming approach. Section 4 examines the 
technical or productive efficiency of NEB relative to 27 
other electricity utilities in other countries employing 
DEA method using cross section data. It also examines NEB's 
efficiency in relation to EGAT and CEGB using time series 
data from 1975 to 1990. Section 5 measures the productivity 
growth of NEB over time using the Malmquist Productivity 
Index approach. Section 6 concludes the result of the 
findings.
5.2 DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
DEA model uses mathematical programming technique as 
compared to the parametric model which employs econometric 
technique in efficient frontier estimation. The DEA 
approach has many advantages over the conventional 
econometric method. As noted by Seiford and Thrall (1990) 
the econometric approach has a number of weaknesses. It 
only gives residuals and it does not readily yield a 
summary judgement on efficiency. The ability of the 
econometric model to identify sources of inefficiency is 
weak and is influenced by outlier. In addition it fits a 
function on the basis of average behaviour and it requires 
the functional form to be pre-specified. In contrast DEA is 
an extremal process, analyses each firm separately and 
measures its relative efficiency with respect to the entire 
set being evaluated. It does not require a priori 
assumption on the analytic form of production function. A 
DEA-based production model can also accommodate a variable 
that is neither an economic resource nor a product such as 
attributable of the environment or the production process 
(Charnes et.al, 1985). DEA provides solutions using
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standards techniques of linear programming thus providing 
the benefits of computation, dual variables and clear 
interpretations. The empirical orientation and absence of 
a priori assumptions has made it possible to measure 
efficiency involving efficient frontier estimation in the 
nonprofit sector, in the regulated sector and in the 
private sector.^
5.2.1 Theoretical perspective - Pareil's technical andallocative efficiency concept
The Pareil methodology dichotomises overall efficiency into 
two multiplicative components namely technical efficiency 
and allocative efficiency and provides definitions and a 
computational framework for both. The technical efficiency 
and allocative efficiency are defined in terms of a 
production frontier as the ratio of potential and actual 
performance. Pigure 5.1 illustrates the concept introduced 
by Pareil. Suppose a firm produces an output of, Y , using 
two inputs Xi and X^  with production function of Y= f (X^ ,X^ ) . 
It is assumed that the production function exhibits 
constant returns to scale. This means that only one locus, 
the unit isoquant for Y=1 needs be drawn. Thus the 
production function may be written Y = f (X^ /Y, X^/Y) = 1 so 
that the frontier technology can be characterised by the 
unit isoquant UU in figure 5.1.
As shown in the diagram point A represents (X^  /Y,X^/Y) . The 
ratio OB/OA measures technical inefficiency of the firm. 
OB/OA is the ratio of inputs required to produce Y to the 
inputs actually consumed to produce Y, given the input mix 
used. The firm would be technically efficient if it 
produces one unit of output Y, using input mix represented 
by B on the isoquant. That is the technical or productive 
efficiency of the firm is given by the ratio OB/OA <1. If 
PP represents the ratio of input prices i,e the isocost 
line then the ratio OD/OB measures allocative efficiency. 
The firm would be allocatively or price efficient if it
Figure5.1 : Technical and AJlocative Efficiency
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uses input mix represented by C, The firm's 
allocativeefficiency is OD/OB < 1. By operating at C, the 
firm would be on the isocost line that represents a 
fraction OD/OB, of total cost represented by isocost line 
through B. The overall efficiency of the firm which is the 
product of its price and technical efficiency ratios is 
measured by OD/OA = (OD/OB) x (OB/OA).
Pareil extended the concept of the technical efficiency in 
evaluating the relative performance of firms based on 
efficiency frontier estimation. Pareil suggested that the 
comparison of efficiency performance is made with the best 
actually achieved in the industry i.e the observed industry 
standard.2 Using the methodology the efficiency frontier 
which is the best practise linear approximation to the 
isoquant is constructed from empirically observed input- 
output combinations of the firms in the industry. In other 
words the efficiency frontier is made of those firms which 
are efficient relative to other firms under evaluation. 
Efficiency computations are made relative to this frontier.
The frontier is convex to the origin and has a negative 
slope. The construction of the efficient frontier 
approximation using the Pareil methodology is illustrated 
in Pigure 5.2 for the case of two inputs and one output. 
The efficient frontier is formed by connecting points 
relating to efficient firms in the industry. A firm is 
efficient if no other firm or convex combination of firms 
lies on a ray between it and the origin. Pirms on the 
frontier have an efficiency rating of unity while firms off 
the frontier which are inefficient have an efficiency 
rating of less than one. In terms of figure 5.2, firms at 
PI, P2 and P3 are efficient while firms at P4 and P7 are 
inefficient. Using Pareil methodology technical efficiency 
is measured by weighting of two adjacent points PI and P2 
which give P4 = X^Pl + Xi s 0. Thus P4 is inefficient
in Pigure 2 since X^  + X2 > 1 and its efficiency rating is
Figure 5.2: Isoquant Frontier
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5.2.2 Data Envelopment Analysis Model
Farells approach of computing the efficient frontier as a 
convex hull in the input coefficient space was generalised 
to multiple outputs by Charnes et.al (1978). It was 
reformulated into calculating the individual input-saving 
efficiency measures by solving an LP problem for each unit 
under constant to scale assumptions and known as Data 
Envelopment analysis. Fare et.al (1983), Banker et.al 
(1984), Brynes et.al (1984) and Bjurek, Hjalmarsson and 
Forsund (1990) extended this approach to the case of 
variable returns to scale and developed corresponding 
efficiency measures.
DEA evaluates and identifies technical inefficiencies of 
firms or decision making units (DMUs) and provide targets 
for improvement for inefficient DMUs and therefore serves 
as a planning aid to management. Technical inefficiencies 
are identified with failures to achieve best possible 
output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs. 
Technical inefficiency of a DMU is determined relative to 
other similar units and can focus on either resource 
conservation or output augmentation. In the context of 
resource conservation where the objective is to minimise 
the usage of resources, given a particular output level a 
firm is not efficient if it is possible to augment any 
output without increasing any input and without decreasing 
any other output. From an input orientation a firm is not 
efficient if it is possible to decrease any input without 
decreasing any output (Charnes, Coopers and Rhodes, 1981).
The DEA approach in a multi-inputs and multi-outputs model 
assumes that there are n firms and each firm (j = 1, . . . . ,n) 
consumes varying amounts of m inputs (X^ j, i = l,....,m) to 
produce s different outputs (Y^ j, r = 1, . . . . ,s) . The model
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also assumes that Xji>0 and Yj^>0. Charnes et.al (1978) use 
the ratio of weighted outputs to inputs, with output 
weights and input weights as a measure of efficiency 
where the ratio for the particular firm being evaluated is 
maximised. This is subject to constraints that the 
corresponding ratio for each unit including the one under 
evaluation does not exceed than 1. This ratio forms the 
objective function for the j^th unit being evaluated. 
Technical efficiency can be calculated by solving a 
fractional programming problem and symbolically can be 
expressed as:
max h„(U,V) = r.i / 4.1 (1)
subject to
E sr=ÆY^ .j / ViXij â 1 (j=l, . . . . jo, . . . .n)
Ur > 0 (r=l,..... . s)
Vi > 0 (i=l,..... .m)
The above fractional linear program is both non-linear and 
non-convex and therefore is not used for actual computation 
of the DEA efficiency score (Charnes, Coopers and Rhodes, 
1978) . However CCR showed that it can be solved by two 
linear programming methods. The first method is the output 
augmentation approach which constraints the weighted sum of 
inputs to be unity and maximises the outputs that can then 
be produced. The second is the input conservation method 
that constraints the sum of the weighted output at unity 
and minimises the inputs required.
The output maximisation approach can be determined as 
follows :
Max (2)
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subject to
0 £ r^siUj-Yrj + i^=i V^ i^ ij (j—1/ • • • / jo* • • • / ^)
E l.Ii.i ViXi,]0
Vi , Ur > 0 (1=1,.....,m)
(r=l,.....  s)
The input conservation approach where the objective is to 
produce the observed outputs with a minimum resource level 
be presented as follows;
Min Li.i ViXi,j, (3)
subject to
0 g Er i^UrYrj + Ei^ i ViXij (j=l,......,jO,..... Tl]
1  -  ^ r = l U z - Y r ,  j o
Vi s 0 (i = l,......,m)
Ur  ^ 0 (r=l,.......   s)
Each of the linear programs (2) and (3) has two components 
namely the primal and the dual. Computation of the DEA 
efficiency is based on the dual (Charnes and Cooper, 1984) 
of (2) and (3). This is because the interpretation of the 
dual is simpler than the primal (Ganley and Cubin, 1992).
The linear programming problem in model (2) can be 
presented as a dual problem as follows;
Min h_ = 0
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Subject to
Ej_iYrjXj S Yro
(4)
that is,
s. t
Min d
e , X
YX s Y^
0Xo - XX s 0 
X a 0.
The dual problem of linear programming (3) can be presented 
as follows:
Max {Er=iUrYr,jo} (5)
subject to
Er=l^ r^ rj i^=l i^^ ij  ^  ^ (j—l/'**/jo****/^)
rimi^=i V^Xijjo = 1
Vi , Ur > 0 (i=l,.... ,m)
(r=l,.....  s)
The linear programming dual problems to be solved is 
Max 6,e,x
S,t. XX £ Xo,
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- YX £ 0,
X s 0 .
Bjurek and Hjalmarsson and Forsund, (1990) showed that 
depending on the assumption about the scale properties of 
the production set three different input-saving measures 
may be derived. The first measure DEAC, is calculated under 
the assumption of constant return to scale. As shown in
Figuie 5.3 DEA- LP Model
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Figure 5.3, A, B, C and D are different units in the 
industry. The frontier technology is represented by the ray 
001 from the origin. Using Pareil methodology only B is 
efficient since it is on the frontier where X^ /Xj, = 1. 
Correspondingly the efficiency of firm A is calculated as 
Xh/X^<l. The adjacent LP problem which must be solved for 
different units under constant return to scale is
max (6)
subject to
= 1,
£ 0,
U,, s 0, (r=l,.....  s)
Vi s 0, (i=l,..... ,m)
where represents output Xi represents input, and U,_ and 
Vi are weights obtained in the LP solution. For each micro 
unit an LP problem is solved by maximisation of the 
weighted sum of outputs for micro unit k. This is done with 
regard to the restriction that the weighted sum of inputs 
equal 1 for this micro unit and the restriction that for 
all micro units (j = 1,....,k,....,n) the weighted sum of 
outputs minus the weighted sum of inputs are less than or 
equal to 0. The last restrictions a 0 and V^  s 0 mean 
that all micro units are on or below the frontier.
The second efficiency measure, DEAV, is calculated under 
the assumption of variable returns to scale. As shown in 
Figure 5.3 it is derived from reference technology X^ABC. 
In this case units A, B and C are all fully efficient as 
they all lie on the reference technology. However 
efficiency of D is measured by X„/X<j<l and accordingly below 
the frontier. The corresponding LP problem is
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max = J^r=iU,,Y,,o + (7)
S.t = 1,
Sr=ÆY,. - Ei^ .ViXij + U* s 0 (j = 1, . . . ,n)
U,-,Vi s 0,
Uo  ^ 0,
In comparison with (5) a new variable Uo is introduced 
corresponding to an intercept.
On the basis of these LP problems in (5) and (6) Bjurek and 
Hjalmarsson (1990) showed that it is possible to derive a 
measure of scale efficiency. For unit B both E^  (5) and E,, 
(6) coincides and equal 1, i.e B is on the frontier X^ABC 
and off the optimal scale 001. In the case of units A and 
C, E^  (5) < 1 but E^  (6) = 1. This means that the size of 
these units deviates from optimal scale 001, and a measure 
of scale efficiency is obtained as E^ /E^ . For unit D where 
Ec<l and Ey<l, the measure of scale efficiency is also 
obtained as E^ /E^ .
The third measure, DEAN is obtained under the assumption of 
non -increasing return to scale. It is calculated by a 
slight reformulation of LP problem in (6) where the only 
difference is that the variable is limited to non
positive vales. The limitation of Uq to a non positive 
values implies that the reference technology only permits 
constant or decreasing returns to scale. As shown in Figure
5.3 the reference technology is represented by OBC and the 
horizontal line to the right of C. In this case if the 
value of the objective function E^  and if E^  = E^  z E^  then
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the unit under evaluation operates at decreasing return to 
scale. If Ev = Ec production takes place at constant return 
to scale as B, while if Ey E^  production takes place at 
increasing return to scale as in the case of A and D.
5.3 MALMQUIST INDEX AND THE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH ANALYSIS
The DEA method can be used to compute a Malmquist index for 
measuring total productivity growth. A Malmquist index 
allows for the decomposition of productivity growth into 
two components namely technical change and efficiency 
change. This provides evidence concerning patterns of total 
productivity growth and indicates whether productivity 
growth is due to the catching up of the frontier or due to 
technical change (shifts in the frontier) over time. 
Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) define the Malmquist 
index as the ratio between Pareil measures for a production 
unit which for technical efficiency at two different points 
in time is measured relative to two different frontiers. 
Fare et.al (1994) use the Malmquist index to measure total 
productivity change which is calculated as the geometric 
mean of two Malmquist indexes and decompose it into its two 
components the technical change and efficiency change.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the construction and the 
decomposition of the Malmquist index based on Fare et.al 
(1994) and Hjalmarsson and Veiderpasss (1992) . The 
objective is to measure the productivity growth between two 
time periods t and t + 1 and to decompose it into its two 
components, efficiency change and technical change. The 
production function is characterised by constant return to 
scale and input-saving technical efficiency coincides with 
the output increasing technical efficiency.
As shown in the diagram P is a production unit operating at 
year t and year t+1 producing and Y^ +^  outputs
respectively. Between time period t and t+1 the production
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Figure 5.4 Construction of Malmquist Index
Y
Ft + 1
Pt + 1
Y t + 1
Yt
A CB D FE0
Souice: Hjalmarssoii and Veideipass (1992)
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frontier has shifted from Ft to Ft+i. Using the Farell 
efficiency approach the technical efficiency of P in year 
t measured against Ft is OC/OD. When efficiency of unit P at 
time t is measured against Ft+i its technical efficiency 
becomes OA/OD. Correspondingly in year t+1 the technical 
efficiency of P relative to Ft+i is OB/OE and when measured 
against Ft its technical efficiency is OF/OE.
The Malmquist index at time t, Mt, with frontier Ft as a 
reference base is defined as
= {o f/o e }/{o c/o d }
where
Et, t+1 is the technical efficiency of P at time t
relative to Ft
Et,t is the technical efficiency of P at time t
relative to frontier Ft
The Malmquist index at time t+1, Mt+i, with frontier Ft+i as
a reference base is defined as
t^+i ~ ®t+i, t+i/®t+i, t
{OB/OE} / (OF/OE)
where
]2t+i,e+i is the technical efficiency of P in year t+1 
relative to Ft+i
Et+i,t is the technical efficiency of P in year t + 1 
measured against F^
The Malmquist productivity change index defined as the 
geometric mean of two Malmquist indexes can be expressed as
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MG = {Mt X Mt+J^
= [ { t} {®t+i,t+i/®t+i,t} ] ^
Following Fare et.al (1989,1992) and Hjalmarsson and 
Veiderpass(1992) an equivalent way of writing this index 
is :
MG = X [ { E t , ,}]■•«
where the ratio Et,t+i/Et,t measures the change in relative 
efficiency between year t and year t+1. The [ {Et,t+i/Et+i,t+i} 
{Et,t/Efc+i,t} 3 ^ represents the shift in technology due to 
technical change or innovation.
In terms of Figure 5.4, the Malmquist productivity index 
can be measured as :
MG = 1 {OF/OE}/{OC/OD}) x ( [ {OF/OE}/{OB/OE}] [{OC/OD}/ 
{OA/OD}]) ^
= [ {OF/OE}{OD/OC}] X [ {OF/OB}{OC/OA}]^
The ratios OF/OE and OD/OC in the first bracket measures 
the relative technical efficiency of P at time t and t+1 
reflecting changes in relative efficiency over time. The 
ratios in the second bracket OF/OB and OC/OA measures 
shifts in frontier technology at output levels Yj. and Yt+i 
respectively. Malmquist index greater than one indicates 
improvement in productivity while Malmquist index less than 
one is associated with declining performance over time. 
Although the product of the of the efficiency change and 
technical change is equal to the Malmquist productivity 
index, the two components may be moving in the opposite 
directions.
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5.3.1 Estimation of Malmquist Productivity Index usinglinear programming approach
The above Malmquist productivity indexes can be developed 
by using mathematical programming model of the frontier 
production function using the Seiford and Thrall (1990) and 
Price and Weyman-Jones (1993).
The model can be describes as follows: Each of the firms 
(j=l,...n) uses m inputs (x^ j, i=l,...,m to make s outputs 
(y^=l, . . . . ,s) . The observations on all the firms together 
make up the matrices X and Y. The observations for one 
firm, taking each in turn , are represented by the vectors 
X and y with subscript suppressed. The columns X and Y are 
combined into a reference technology for the industry using 
the weights , Xj
X =
^ 1 1  • ........ Xln"1 '1 t 11
1
1
^ral •
t ' 
1 1 
. j . . .
X 11
y  11 " • • • • ♦ • Yin Yi(
Y = 1 ‘ y  =
(1
1
3^ 1...'----Yen ÿn
X.
X.
The observations are split into 2 periods, t and t+1. A 
third observations represents comparison of an t+1 
reference technology. Using the DEA method the Farell
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efficiency indices to be computed are as follows:
the relative efficiency of a firm in period
frontier
6t+i the relative efficiency of a firm in period Ft+i 
compared to period F^  frontier
0t,t+i the relative efficiency of a firm in period F^  
compared to period F^ +i frontier
To compute the above efficiency indices the following 
linear programming problems are solved (for the choice of 
variables 6, for each firm taken in turn:
The relative efficiency of the firm at time t is :
Min
s.t Xt Xt - Xt g 0
Xt a 0
The relative efficiency of a firm in period Ft+i compared to 
period F^  frontier,
Min 6 1+1
s.t ~  ^ ^
Yt+iXt+i  ^Yt+i 
t^+i  ^ ^
The relative efficiency of a firm in period F^  compared to 
period F^ +i frontier is :
Min gt,k+i
s.t Xt+i Xt,t+1 “ t^,t+i  ^ ^
Yt+i t^,t+i  ^Yt 
t^,t+i  ^ 0
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The Malmquist index of productivity change after year t can 
then be decomposed into the catching up effect, MC and a 
frontier shift effect MF ,
M G  = t+1t+1
t^/^ t+i X 0/#t
where 0t/^ t+i is the productivity growth due to catching up 
effect and is the productive growth due to
technological change or frontier change.
Many authors (Charnes and Coopers 1985, Nunamaker 1985, 
Johnson and Lewin 1984, Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1981) 
have regarded a DMU efficient as Pareto efficient. As 
pointed out by Ganley and Cubin (1992) this is not the 
case. The "best practice" DMUs may themselves be expected 
to be capable of improvement relative to a maximal 
production boundary. This view is valid for two obvious 
reasons. One as pointed out by Leibenstien (1966) inputs 
especially labour services may yield a variable performance 
and thus technical inefficiency is both possible and 
widespread. Second estimated efficient function is not a 
production frontier. DEA model uses Farell methodology in 
estimating efficient frontier estimation which is based on 
empirical function of the best results observed in 
practice. Farell pointed out that a theoretical engineering 
production function specified by engineers represents the 
best measure of efficiency. However Farell also argued that 
theoretical efficient function is very difficult to 
estimate in a very complex production process. Thus by 
using empirically designed efficient frontier one can argue 
that the best practice frontier can still shift closer to 
the origin. All the DMUs which lie on the frontier are 
capable of improving efficiency unless the efficient 
frontier estimation coincides with the theoretical 
production function specified by engineers which is most
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unlikely due to the labour factor argument . As pointed out 
by Danilen et.al (1985) that enterprises may still be 
inefficient to some unknown degree because the best 
practice standard use to measure the production frontier 
may understate true engineering production.^
Accordingly, DEA efficiency should be interpreted with 
caution. It should be interpreted along with the 
categorical variables associated with the production 
process. One also needs to look at the underlying 
differences between the firms in evaluation. For example as 
pointed out by Ganley and dubbin (1992) the best practise 
frontier is constructed on the basis that the cross section 
is of a homogenous set of DMUs using (presumably the 
latest) vintage of technology. DEA efficiency is ambiguous 
in this case where a relatively inefficient DMU could be 
utilising a technology with maximal result but be 
constrained by the possibilities inherent in this 
technology such that it cannot perform as efficiently as 
some other DMU or linear combination of DMUs which are 
using a later improved technology.
Measures of technical efficiency derived in DEA should 
therefore be thought of as approximate guide to 
performance. It can be regarded as pareto improvement vis- 
a-vis technically inefficient production within an 
estimated boundary.
5.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
This section employs the DEA methodology based on the input 
maximisation approach to calculate the technical or 
productive efficiencies of the National Electricity Board 
by using two approaches. One, using cross section data 
NEB'S efficiency is calculated in comparison to the 
relative efficiency of 27 other electricity producers in 
different countries in 1987. This approach is adopted due
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to the difficulties in getting time series data for 
variables selected from the different countries. Data used 
are from World Bank Report (1990)^.The second approach is 
using a time series data from 1975 to 1990 comparing the 
relative technical efficiency of the NEB with that of EGAT 
in Thailand and CEGB in United Kingdom. Data for NEB and 
CEGB are gathered from annual financial reports and 
statistical bulletin while data for EGAT are provided by 
COPED discussion paper series (1990 and 1991)®.
5.4.1 Efficiency comparisons using cross-sectional data
1987
The data used comprises information on 27 electricity 
utilities of developing countries. These countries are 
selected based on GDP per capita in the region of US$1500- 
$2800. The model adopted the input minimisation approach 
and assumes four input (X) variables and one output 
variable as below:
Inputs :
XI = Installed capacity (MW)
X2 = Labour
X3 = Total system losses (%)
X4 = Generation capacity factor (%)
Output ;
Yl = Gross electricity produced (GWh)
As pointed by Weyman-Jones (1991) the advantage of keeping 
the number of inputs (X) and outputs (Y) small relative to 
the number of firms (N) is that as the ratio of Y+S/N rises 
the ability of the DEA to discriminate amongst firm falls 
significantly, since it becomes more likely that any given 
firm will find some set of output and input weights which 
will make it appear efficient.
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Using the data as provided from Appendix 1, the matrices X 
and Y are shown as :
X
—
Xii . . . . Xi27 Xi
X21 . . . . X227 1
....... X 3^27 X = 1
^^ 41 • • • ^  ♦ ^ 4^27 X27
Yii
Xx1II
X27
yi2.] y =
Ylr
2^1
where
Xj_3_ . . . .Xj_27
X"2X.... 2^27
X31 ..... X327 
X41 ..... X427 
Yii ..... Y]_27
Installed capacity of Country 1
(Cl:Algeria)...... installed capacity
Country 27 (C27 : Zimbabwe)
Labour of Cl C27
Total system losses of Cl..... C27
Generation capacity factor Cl C2 7
Gross electricity produced by C1....C27
Using the DEA approach, the LP problems to be solved are as 
below :
Min :
1 X  28
2, 7 9 7 X 11 + 1 6 , 5 1 3 X i 2  +  + 2,071Xi27 -
1 8 , 8 0 0 X 2 1  + 3 4 , 4 8 0 X 2 2  + ................. + 4 , 3 2 5 X 2 2 7
2, 7 9 7 X128 < 0
- 18 , 8 0 0 X228 ■
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15X., + 17X. + ..... + 10X327 “ 15X328 < 0
40X^1 + 37 X42 +  + 39 X427 - 40Xi2s < 0
13,400Yii + 52,165Yi2 +  + 7,008Y^,7 > 13,400
Table 5.1 sets out the efficiency measures computed from 
the LP solution.
Tab 5.1; Electricity• sector efficiency of selected LDCs by using DEA method - 1987
Country Obj ective(DMUs) Function (C9) (Cll) (C13) (C14) (CIS) (C16) (C17)
1. Chile (C14) 1.0000 - - 1.0000 - - — —
2 . Columbia (C16) 1.0000 - - - - 1.0000
3 . Egypt (C17) 1.0000 - - - - 1.0000
4 . Korea (Cll) 1.0000 - 1 .0000 - - -
5. China (CIS) 1.0000 - - - - -
6 . Brazil (C13) 1.0000 - - 1.0000 - -
7. Yugoslavia (C9) 0.9951 0.9951 - - - -
8 . Mexico (Cl9) 0.9212 0.3651 0.1193 0.3446 -
9. Hungary (C3) 0.8797 0.0911 - - - 0.6873
10 . Venezula (C25) 0.8244 - 0.5786 0 . 0185 - -
11 . Ghana (Cl8) 0.7926 0.0391 - - 0.0435 -
12 . Peru (C21) 0.7681 0.1662 - - - 0.0238
13 . Romania (C23) 0.7654 0.4553 - 0.1066 - 0.0297
14 . Thailand (C7) 0.7600 0.2090 - - - 0.4035
15 . Argentina (C2) 0.7515 0.1798 0.3414 0.0507 - - -
16 . Z imbabwe (C2 7) 0.7451 - - - 0.0991 0.0846 -
17 . Turkey (C24) 0.7165 0.5057 - 0.0059 - 0.0047
18 . Malaysia (C4) 0.7042 0.0531 - - - 0.3664
19 . Algeria (Cl) 0.6777 0.0289 - - - 0.4049
20. Indonesia (CIO) 0.6720 0.4093 - - - 0.0035
21. Panama (C5) 0.6246 - - - - 0.6246
22 . Portugal (C22) 0.6237 0.0989 0 . 0461 - - 0.2376
23 . Uruguay (C8) 0.6231 - - - - - 0.1385
24 . Bangladesh (C12) 0.6019 - - - - 0.1815
25. Nigeria (C20) 0.4863 0.0486 - - - 0.1839
26 . Zaire (C26) 0.4850 - 0.0094 0 .0991 0.0846
27. Syria (C6) 0.4813 - - - 0.2215
It can be seen that the technical efficiency of the
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electricity sector in different countries differs 
significantly with relative ratings running from 48 percent 
to 100 percent. Electricity sector in Chile, Columbia, 
Egypt, Korea, China and Brazil were 100 percent efficient 
and form as the reference frontier or the reference 
technology. Malaysia ranked 18th operating at about 70 
percent efficiency. Technologically, Malaysia is closer to 
Yugoslavia and Egypt. Theoretically, in order for Malaysia 
to move onto the efficiency frontier, that is 100 percent 
efficient, it has to consume 5 percent of inputs used in 
Yugoslavia and 37 percent that of Egypt. In comparison to 
Thailand, Malaysia is relatively less efficient than 
Thailand which was operating at 76 percent efficient.
Diagrammatically, the efficiency of the Malaysian 
electricity sector relative to efficiency of some of the 
other electricity utilities can be illustrated in a two 
dimension graph as shown in Figure 5.5. There are two 
characteristics common among the utilities which form the 
reference frontier. One, all the six utilities have a high 
capacity factor ranging from 44 percent to 59 percent. The 
capacity factor of Yugoslavia and Mexico which were 
operating at 99.5 percent and 92.1 percent respectively 
were also within the same region of those on the reference 
frontier. Second, all utilities which formed the reference 
frontier, with the exception of Korea and China, have a 
high percentage of hydro power capacity which is in the 
region of 42.6 percent to 84.9 percent. In the case of 
Korea, although it has a low hydro power capacity this is 
compensated by the usage of nuclear power which constituted 
27 percent of the installed capacity.
Figuie 5.5: DEA Reference Frontier
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5.4.2
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Efficiency comparisons using DEA method between NEB EGAT and CEGB from 1975-1990
The input minimisation model assumes 4 input variables (X) 
and 1 output (Y) as follows :
Inputs :
Installed capacity (MW) / Capital 
Labour
Electricity losses (%)
Thermal efficiency (%)
Output
Y. Electricity generated (GWh)
Based on data on the capital, labour, electricity losses, 
thermal efficiency and electricity generated as provided in 
Appendix 2-4 , similar approach was adopted to solve the LP 
problems by using DEA method. The efficiency measures are 
given as below;
Tab 5.2: Results of efficiency comparisons using DEA method 1975-1990
YEAR Cl NEB (Cl)C2 C3 EGAT (C2) C2 Cl C3 CEGBC3 (C3)Cl c
1975 1.0000 - 0.8918 0.7567 0.0218 1.0000 - -
1976 1.0000 - 0.9938 0.9146 0.0216 1 . 0000 - -
1977 1.0000 - 0.9331 0.7324 0.0265 1.0000 - -
1978 0 . 9254 0.4036 0.0083 1.0000 - - 1.0000 - -
1979 0.9731 0.4350 0.0106 1.0000 - - 1.0000 - -
1980 1.0000 - 1.0000 - 1.0000 - -
1981 1.0000 - 0.9548 0 . 9388 0.0267 1.0000 - -
1982 1.0000 - 1.0000 - - 1.0000 - -
1983 1.0000 ■ 0.9395 0.8949 0.0430 1.0000 - -
1984 0.9176 0.0607 0.9234 - 0.0981 1.0000 - -
1985 0.7630 0.0614 0.8793 - 0.1009 1.0000 - -
1986 0.8596 0.0658 0.9481 - 0.1097 1.0000 - -
1987 0.8488 0.2457 0.0378 1.0000 - - 1.0000 - -
1988 0.8552 0.2500 0.0431 1.0000 - - 1.0000 - -
1989 1.0000 - 1.0000 - - 1.0000 - -
1990 1.0000 - 1.0000 - - 1.0000 - -
The results confirm the assumption used in the introduction 
of this thesis that EGAT is more efficient than NEB and
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EGAT. Throughout the 1975-1990 CEGB was relatively 
efficient operating at 100 percent efficiency forming the 
reference frontier curve.
The following observations can be made on the efficiency 
trend of NEB and EGAT.
1) With the exception of 197 8 and 1979, NEB was relatively 
more efficient than EGAT in the early years from 1975 until 
1983. During these years NEB was on operating at 100 
percent efficiency and therefore was on the reference 
frontier curve. Its efficiency dropped in 1978 and 1979 to 
93 percent and 97 percent respectively during which EGAT 
improved its efficiency reaching the frontier. This could 
be attributable to three factors. Firstly, there was rapid 
expansion of the installed capacity as compared to lower 
growth of demand. Installed capacity grew by 24.3 percent 
and 14.0 percent in 1978 and 1979 respectively, against 8.1 
percent and 11.0 percent of demand growth (Appendix 2). 
This has resulted in NEB's high excess capacity as 
reflected by the high reserve capacity during this period. 
Secondly, the thermal efficiency of EGAT has increase to
34.1 in 1978 from 33.8 the previous year while thermal 
efficiency of NEB remained unchanged at 29.6 percent 
(Appendix 4a) . The thermal efficiency of NEB decline the 
following year by 2.7 percent to 28.8 as compared to a 
decline by 1.5 percent to 33.6 percent of EGAT.
2) EGAT was more efficient than NEB, but did not lie on 
the reference frontier curve, from 1984 to 1986. There was 
a high excess capacity during this period due to NEB's high 
reserved capacity (Appendix 2), between 42 to 52 percent. 
In 1985 installed capacity grew by about 24 percent 
increasing reserved capacity to 52 percent. This was due to 
the completion of combined cycle plants in Paka Trengganu 
which contributed to about 25 percent of the total 
installed capacity. During the same period EGAT has
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improved its thermal efficiency from 37.5 percent in 1984 
to 38.3 percent by 38.3 percent. As noted by Dang (1991), 
the increase in thermal plant efficiency since 1981 was due 
to use of lignite in generation of electricity and the 
introduction of more efficient combined-cycle plants. As 
pointed out by Dang, the use of lignite for the generation 
of electricity has significantly improved thermal 
efficiency from 34 percent in 1978 to about 40 percent in 
1989 while the efficiency of fuel oil and natural gas 
plants has remained between 35 percent to 38 percent.
3) NEB managed to improve its efficiency by 1989 and both 
NEB and EGAT were on the reference frontier in 19 89 and 
1990. This is attributable to few factors. Firstly, there 
was less reserve capacity for NEB as a result of very 
little growth in capacity expansion. Secondly, NEB has 
diversified its energy mix plant type that came into stream 
with the completion of the gas pipe line and the completion 
of combined cycle plant since 1987. Its thermal efficiency 
reached its highest level to 36.4 percent in 1990. By 
1990/1991 financial year, generation capacity comprised 43 
percent of steam, 22.2 percent of hydro, 15.5 percent of 
combined cycle, 18.6 percent of open cycle gas turbine and 
0.7 percent diesel engine. In addition most of the oil 
fired stations have been converted to dual firing 
capability of gas and oil.^
On the average, during the 1975-1990 period, NEB was less 
efficient than EGAT operating at an average efficiency of
88.9 percent (Coefficient of 0.8886) as compared to 96.7 
percent (Coefficient of 0.9696) achieved by EGAT. EGAT was 
operating at a higher thermal plant efficiency of an 
average level of 36 percent as compared to 31.3 percent 
that of NEB. In addition EGAT has a lower system losses 
during the period understudy. On the average, NEB's system
1 IIPrivatisation of Tenaga Nasional Berhad" . A seminar paper on Malaysian securities Market in Tokyo on 2 9.11.1991.
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losses amounting to 15.3 percent compared to EGAT's 13.9 
percent. The main problem with NEB was that it has higher 
losses due to auxiliary use at plant level while. Its 
average auxiliary use was 4.7 percent of total system 
losses, which is 21 percent higher than that of EGAT 
(Appendix 3) . In terms of transmission and distribution 
losses on the average NEB was also slightly less efficient 
operating at an average transmission loss of 10.5 percent 
as compared to 10.0 percent that of EGAT.
5.5 NEB'S PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH (MALMQUIST PRODUCTIVITY 
INDEX)
Table 5.3 shows the Malmquist productivity index of NEB 
from 197 6-1990. The objective of this measurement is to 
trace NEB's productivity growth over a time period. To
recall, if the value of the Malmquist index or any of its 
components is less than 1, it denotes regress or regression 
in performance. Values greater than 1 denote improvements 
in relevance performance. On average, the productivity due 
to catching up (1.0208) is higher than productivity due to 
technological shift (0.9826). However the productivity 
growth due technological shift is not accompanied by
catching up effect productivity growth. Thus on average 
there is no overall productivity growth as shown by the
value of the mean which is 1. This shows that in order for
NEB to achieve productivity growth, besides investing in 
new technology, it must improve its operational efficency. 
This includes increase productivity of labour which is a 
central issue on the privatisation programme of the NEB.
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Table 5.3: NEB's Malmquist Productivity Index(1975-1990)
Year MF MC MPI
1976 0.9469 1. 0561 1.0000
1977 0.9999 1.0001 0.9999
1978 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1979 1. 0000 1.0000 1.0000
1980 1.0001 0.9999 0.9999
1981 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1982 0.9999 1.0001 1.0000
1983 1.0001 1.0000 1.0001
1984 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000
1985 0.9297 1.0758 1.0001
1986 0.9999 1.0001 1.0000
1987 0.9669 1.0343 1.0003
1988 0.9669 1.0343 1.0001
1989 0.8987 1.1128 1.0001
1990 0.9999 0.9992 0.9991
Mean 0.9826 1.0208 1.0000
Note: MPI - Malmquist Productivity Index
MF - Frontier shift effect 
MC - Catching up effect
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter looks at the efficiency of NEB relative to 2 7 
other electricity utilities in other countries in 1987 
using the DEA approach. Results show that NEB's rating was 
18, operating at a relative efficiency of 70 percent.
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Comparisons based on time series data from 1975-1990 
between NEB, EGAT and CEGB also confirm that on the average 
NEB was relatively less efficient to EGAT and CEGB. As was 
discussed above, the reasons for the relatively less 
efficient of NEB was due to high excess capacity and low 
thermal efficiency as compared to EGAT. Changes in capacity 
at various time during certain period understudy was due to 
inability of NEB to complete power projects as planned 
(Chapter 6 and 7). However, the high growth in demand for 
electricity and the increase in thermal efficiency both in 
1989 and 1990 have increase NEB's efficiency catching up 
with EGAT on the frontier curve. At firm level, using the 
Malmquist Productivity Index, it shows that there was no 
overall productivity growth from 1975 to 1990.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from the result of 
the above study. Firstly, it shows that there is always a 
scope for further improvement in the efficiency of NEB 
looking in a dynamic setting point of view. NEB was less 
efficient than most countries used as comparisons and the 
Malmquist Productivity Index indicates the existence of 
operational inefficiencies in NEB. Secondly, in order to 
improve its efficiency, there is a need to address the 
issue of what went wrong in order to achieve lower cost of 
production. This issue will be examined in Chapter and 
Chapter 8 where factors that limit and constrain NEB's 
eficiency will be identified. The next chapter attempts to 
evaluate NEB's financial performance in terms of achieving 
its financial goals and targets in order to undertake 
future capacity expansion programme.
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CHAPTER 6 : FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF NEB
In the previous chapter we have examined the performance of 
the NEB in terms of relative productive efficiency using 
the DEA method. As discussed in Chapter 2, part of the 
rationale of the privatisation programme in Malaysia as 
claimed by the Government is that public enterprises have 
been generally loss making and were highly dependent on 
government subsidy to support their operation. This view is 
in line with the X-ef f iciency theory as discussed in 
Chapter 3, which suggests that one of the reasons for 
public enterprises inefficiency is that they are shielded 
from competition resulting in technical inefficiencies and 
increased costs in production. Increased cost in production 
will lead to an eroding of revenue surplus thus causing 
losses to the enterprises. As a result public enterprises 
expect government subsidies to finance deficits in order to 
continue operation. In addition most government in 
developing countries put more stress on poverty and equity 
objectives relative to economic efficiency (Pearson and 
Stevens, 1992). Price are not set to maintain financial 
viability (Hill, 1992) and this results in a deterioration 
in financial performance. Consequently not only has the 
dependency of utilities on government subsidies and 
allocations of budgets increased but also the expansion
programme of the utilities to meet the expanding demand for
the services has been hampered.
This chapter looks at the financial performance of NEB, its 
financial problems, the extent of government interference 
and its ability to achieve its power development plan in 
the context of the high rate of demand growth of the 
electricity in a rapidly expanding economy. It is divided
into five sections. Section 2 briefly explains the
significance of using financial ratios in evaluating 
financial performance of an enterprise. Section 3 looks at 
the financial objectives of NEB in relation to its role in
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the economy and its tariffs policy in meeting the financial 
objectives. Section 3 examines NEB's tariff structure in 
relation to the Government's industrialisation programme. 
Section 4 looks at the rate of return on investment of NEB 
using the Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) criteria and 
this is followed by Section 6 on assessing NEB's strategy 
to undertake capacity expansion programme by looking its 
self financing ratio trend. Section 7 examines NEB's 
capacity to borrow in order to undertake development plan 
by assessing its debt equity ratio which is of paramount 
importance to lenders. Section 8 evaluates NEB's billing 
effectiveness which is important for its cashflows 
operation. Finally, section 9 concludes the discussions of 
various sections of the chapter.
A comparison is made of the profitability ratio of Return 
on Capital Employed (ROCE) and operating ratios such as the 
self-financing ratio, the debt equity ratio and the debt 
service ratio between NEB, EGAT and CEGB. These ratios are 
used by the lenders such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development to monitor financial performance of NEB. As in 
the previous Chapter, comparison with CEGB is used as a 
yard stick on the assumption that CEGB is a more efficient 
utility operating in a developed world.
6.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FINANCIAL RATIOS
The financial performance of National Electricity Board 
(NEB) is examined through the analysis of financial 
statements based on time series data 1975 to 1990. The 
analysis will provide an important basis for appraising 
managerial performance of the NEB in meeting financial 
objectives over a period of time. In addition, it will also 
assesses the soundness of the financial position of the 
company based on profitability and operating financial 
ratios. The advantage of using a financial ratio, as 
pointed by Eilon (1992), is that it provides managers with
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an analytical framework for making judgements about 
progress by tracking the changes of the ratio over time or 
by comparing ratios between inter-company or inter-industry 
studies. This could be used for determining the underlying 
factors which have led to changes in performance in order 
to assist the task of company planning.
However, although financial ratios have been used to assess 
financial performance there is no unanimous view among 
accountants and business analyst on the issue of which 
ratios should be used in monitoring and analyzing financial 
performance. The selection of ratios, as discussed by Eilon 
and Laitenen (1992) , depends on the purpose of the ratio 
usage. Nevertheless, managers and analyst tend to 
concentrate on a relatively small number of criteria. Some 
of the prominent ratios found in the literature are Return 
on Capital Employed (ROCE), Net Profit Margin (NPM) and 
Asset Turnover.
Absolute measures to describe corporate performance such as 
profit, volume, or revenue costs have to be treated 
carefully. A comparison of the performance of a given 
company over different time periods, or different companies 
for the same period has to be assessed against the 
background of the economy as a whole. A small profit in a 
good year for the economy does not reflect better 
managerial efficiency as much as a small loss in a bad year 
for the economy in general. Further, in light of the 
comparison between the performances of public enterprises 
and private enterprises, the accounting system used has to 
be also taken into account as it has a significant impact 
on the financial indicators used.
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6.3 FINANCIAL POLICY^
6.3.1 Financial Objectives
Under the Electricity Act 1949, NEB is under a statuary 
duty to promote the generation of electricity with the 
objectives of enhancing economic development of Peninsular 
Malaysia and of securing a supply of electricity at
reasonable prices. In discharging these responsibilities, 
NEB was empowered to secure sufficient revenue to meet its 
total expenses properly chargeable to revenue accounts 
including interest and depreciation.  ^ To achieve this 
objective, NEB initially formulated its general policy, the 
first two based on the covenants agreed with the World Bank 
in the course of raising its funds from the Bank as
follows :
i) NEB will fix its tariffs so that rate of return 
is not less than 8 percent per annum on the
average value of its net fixed assets in
operation in any financial year after meeting all
operating expenses including depreciation based 
on historical costs.
ii) The net revenue (profit) will be used to meet 
interest charges on ordinary stocks (dividend) 
and to make contributions to Capital Development 
Account (CDA) and General Reserves (GR). The CDA
and GR, together with depreciation provision and
other internally generated funds will finance 
between 40 to 50 percent of capital expenditure 
expenses.
iii) An amount, approximately equal to 10 percent of
Guan, L.T , TNB Internal seminar paper.
This policy is stated in all NEB's Annual Reports.
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annual income from sales of electricity, will be 
allocated to the GR from the net profit and the 
balance goes to CDA.
However, the above covenants have been revised and expanded 
since 1985. This is to accommodate the requirements of the 
World Bank as the Bank changes its policy on lending 
procedure. The covenants stipulated that NEB is obligated 
to ;
i) Generate sufficient revenue to achieve a rate of 
return of not less than 8 percent per annum on 
the average of the net revalued fixed assets in 
any financial year after meeting all operating 
expenses including taxation and depreciation 
based on revalued cost but before interest 
charges.
ii) Secure internally generated fund of not less than 
3 0 percent of its capital expenditure calculated 
on the basis of a three year moving average of 
capital expenditure of previous, current and the 
following year.
iii) Maintain debt not more than 60 percent of its 
equity plus its total debt i.e debt-equity ratio 
of not exceeding 60 percent.
iv) Ensure that the net revenue for each financial
year is at least 1.3 times the debt service 
requirement, i.e debt-service ratio of minimum
1.3 .
The above covenants reflect the World Bank lending policy 
of not only concern with the viability of the project but
also with the viability of the utility as a whole in
providing a loan (Barnett, 1993) for the project. The Asian
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Development Bank has also imposed similar covenants for its 
fund.
6.3.2 Tariff Formulation
Throughout its existence NEB has undertaken four major 
revisions on its tariff structure. From 1949-1958 NEB's 
tariff structure comprised of four rates consisting of 
lighting rate, power rate, public lighting rate and mining 
rate. It was then reviewed in 1958 and a completely new 
tariff structure consisting of fourteen tariffs was adopted 
until 1980. In 1980 a third revision was implemented to 
bring tariff the structure in line with the increase in oil 
price due to the global oil crisis in 1974 and 1979. 
Finally a comprehensive review of the tariff was undertaken 
in-house with the assistance of World Bank consultants 
advisers and approved by the Cabinet in 1985.^ The last 
revision came into effect on 1st September, 1985 where the 
long run marginal cost basis method was adopted for the 
first time in NEB's tariff setting. Prior to 1985, tariffs 
were determined on the basis of the sunk cost method.
Financial or Sunk Cost Pricing Method
Traditionally, electricity tariffs have been set well in 
advance of usage (Berrie, 1992; Munashinghe, 1990; Turvey 
and Anderson 1977). Electricity prices are based on the 
averaged historic accounting utility cost using the 
financial accounting basis, known as the sunk cost method. 
Electricity tariffs consisted of two components, the kWh 
energy charges i.e actual kilowatt-hour (kWh) consumed and 
the kilowatt (kW) capacity charges. All cost components are 
classified into variable costs representing kWh supplied; 
and fixed costs representing the kW ability to supply 
electricity at any point of time. These costs such as
NEB Annual Report 1984/1985, p 21.
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salaries and wages, repair and maintenance, depreciation, 
interest etc are apportioned at the Generation, 
Transmission and Distribution levels. Figure 6.1 explains 
the two-part costing approach. Fixed capacity costs are 
represented by F while variable costs are represented by V 
which are directly proportional to kWh supplied. 
Accordingly, total costs are represented by AB and are not 
directly proportional to kWh supplied. Average cost per 
kWh = C/U = tan# and variable cost per kWh is given by = 
V/U = tana . It is necessary to find the demand and units 
at various HV, MV and LV voltage levels by using the demand 
and energy balance approach after taking into consideration 
the station use and losses. Fixed cost in terms of 
$/kW/month and energy cost in terms of sen/kWh is 
calculated at each voltage levels. The average cost of 
supply by tariff category is obtained by taking into 
consideration the diversity factor and load factor of each 
voltage levels. A margin is added on the average price to 
provide the financial return based on the financial policy 
of the utility.
One of the shortcomings of the sunk cost approach is that 
price is structured in a static setting. It does not take 
account of the future investment requirements of the 
utility. Using historical costs of assets and embedded 
costs implies that future economic resources will be as 
cheap or as expensive as in the past. As a result it does 
not enable the utility to raise sufficient revenue from 
electricity sales to replace old capital and finance power 
sector development.
Figme 6.1: Two part costing
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Source: Benie (1992), Figure 6.1, p. 153
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Marginal Cost Pricing
From a theoretical point of view, the utility should price 
at social marginal cost. Social efficiency will be 
maximised where for an activity the marginal benefit to the 
society (MSB) is equal to the marginal (opportunity) cost 
to the society (MSC) and when MSB = MSC, Pareto optimality 
is achieved. Marginal cost pricing could also be used in 
determining wheeling rates by transmission network company 
(Li and David, 1994; Kovacs and Leverett, 1994)) . Wheeling 
is the transmission of electricity from a seller to a buyer 
through a transmission network owned by a third party. The 
wheeling rates are the prices the wheeling company gets for 
the use of its network by the buyer and seller of the 
electricity to compensate for the transmission and network 
costs incurred.
Peak load pricing system
A problem with using the marginal cost pricing in 
electricity tariff setting is that charging a single price 
for all users at all times will lead to inefficient 
allocation of resources as marginal cost varies at 
different times and different parts of the industry. That 
is, electricity users impose very different marginal costs 
on society. The supplier faces high production cost during 
peak period which requires extra capacity to meet demand 
while remain idle during off peak period when demand is 
low. However this problem could be remedied through the 
peak load pricing system where peak time users pay more 
than off peak consumers. The peak load pricing system using 
a price discrimination strategy is designed to charge peak 
users according to the higher marginal costs they impose. 
Charging different prices to customers whose demand curves 
are effectively distinct would provide higher profit to the 
producer. Although problems could arise where low price 
consumers resell the product to higher-price customers thus
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tending to equalise the prices customers actually pay, this 
does not arise in the case of electricity as it is consumed 
as soon as it is purchased. The peak load pricing system 
has important consequences. One, peak users are paying for 
the high marginal cost they impose on the system. Second, 
as an incentive is created for users to switch to consuming 
at off-peak times, daily consumption is spread more evenly. 
This reduces peak demand and less resources are needed for 
building more power station.
Long-run marginal cost pricing
However, there is a controversy as to whether efficiency 
pricing should be based on the short run marginal cost 
(SRMC) or the long run marginal cost (LRMC) (Sembitzky, 
1990) . LRMC can be defined as the incremental cost of 
optimal adjustments in the system expansion plan and in 
system operations attributable to a small increment of 
demand which is sustained in the future (Munashinge, 1992 
p 109). Obviously, in a static scenario, first-best 
optimality calls for prices that are in line with SRMC 
pricing. However, in a long run equilibrium in an inter­
temporal setting the anuitisation of capital costs, will 
lead to SRMC = LRMC and short run average cost equals long 
run average cost (SRAC = LRAC). Nevertheless, the LRMC = 
LRAC will not hold unless there are constant return to 
scale. If P = LRMC, there is a likelihood that there will 
be a financial surplus. This is because marginal costs tend 
to be higher than average costs when units of supply are 
increasing. On the other hand if there are increasing 
returns to scale where LRMC < LRAC, as a result of 
economies of scale i.e decreasing average costs, LRMC 
pricing will result in financial deficit.
The LRMC approach can be adapted to allow the flexibility 
of incorporating various objectives of the utility which 
could include an efficient allocation of resources, a fair
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allocation of costs among users according to the burdens 
they impose on the system, raising sufficient revenues to 
meet the financial requirements of the utility and other 
economic and political objectives without affecting the 
marginal costs pricing principle (Munashinghe, 1990) . The 
LRMC method allows the structuring of prices so that they 
vary according to the marginal costs of meeting the demands 
by different consumer categories, different seasons, 
different hours of the day, by different voltage levels 
etc. LRMC approach deals with future costs over a long 
period of time: resulting in prices in constant terms which 
tend to be quite stable over time. It provides the 
possibility of tariff revision on a consistent and ongoing 
basis thereby approaching the optimal price over a period 
of several years. As such it can absorb large abrupt price 
changes without subjecting users to the experience of a 
price shock.
NEB'S tariff formulation
NEB'S formulation of pricing is based on the LRMC pricing 
approach.4 The LRMC approached categorised marginal costs 
into three broad categories namely capacity costs, energy 
costs and consumer costs. Marginal capacity costs are 
basically the investment costs of generation, transmission 
and distribution facilities associated with supplying 
additional kilowatts. Marginal energy costs are the fuel 
and operating costs of providing additional kilowatt- 
hours. Marginal customer costs are the incremental costs 
directly attributable to consumers including metering and 
billing. Relevant operation and maintenance costs as well 
as administrative and general costs are also allocated to 
these basic cost categories. Using this method, the 
marginal capacity cost for the generation is given by 
(Munashighe 1990):
NEB is using a software developed by Munashinghe specifically for NEB
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LRMCgen = (Annuitised cost/KW) . (1 + RM %) + O&M ... (1)
( 1 - Lau%)
where,
RM = Reserved margin
O&M = Operations and maintenance
Lgu = Loss due to station use
The marginal capacity cost for transmission and 
distribution is given by :
component LRMC^ vc = (Annuitised cost/KW) hv +
O&M...(2)
A simple way to calculate the cost/KW is to use the Annual 
Incremental Cost (AIC) method which for HV is given by:
i=T ii i=T+Ij A M W i  .
AlChv = E ----  / E ....   (3)(l+r)i (l+r)i
where
r = the discount rate
I = Investment in year i
T = Planning horizon in years
L = Time lag between investment and
commissioning of facilities 
MWi = Incremental demand in year i
Thus, substituting equation (3) into (2),
HV component LKMC^ c^ = Annuitised AIC^v + O&M. . . (4) 
MV component LRMC^ c^ = Annuitised AIC^^ + O&M. . . (5) 
LV component LRMC^ c^ = Annuitised AICi^+ O&M. . . (6)
The LRMC at various voltage levels are given by :
LRMChv = LRMC^e, / (1 - + LRMC^vc ..(7)
LRMC^, = LRMCh^ / (1 - L„,%) + LRMC«,^  ^ ..(8)
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LRMCi, = LRMC_ /  (1 - Li^%) + LRMCi ,^ ..(9)
where
= VC voltage losses 
= MV voltage losses 
= LV voltage losses
As discussed earlier, the marginal energy costs (MEC) are 
different for the two discrete periods, on peak and off 
peak. During the peak period, marginal energy cost
constitutes the running cost of the machines to be used 
last in the merit order to meet the incremental kWh while 
the MEC during the off peak is represented by the running 
cost of the least efficient base load plant. These are 
adjusted for various voltage levels as follows:
Peak period
MEChv = MCEp /  (SCF) (1 - L,^%) . ( 1 - L^ )
MEC_ = MEChv / (1 - L^J ......(11)
MECi, = MEC_ /  (1 - L iJ  .................. (12)
where
MECp = Marginal energy costs at peak period
SCF = Standard conversion factor
Lgu -  Station use losses
L^  ^ = MV losses
Liv = LV losses
Similar treatment of equation is applicable in determining 
costs of the off peak period.
In allocating the cost to a particular consumer group, NEB 
obtained detailed information on characteristics such as 
diversity factor (DF), load factor (LF) and peak to total
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consumption ratio (TNB, 1989) / Using the above data the 
NEB'S average cost (AC) of supply is given by:
AC = (EC X 100/DF) / (730 X LF) + Energy cost. . . (Sun Cost)
where
FC = Fixed cost
DF = Diversity Factor
LF = Load Factor
AC = [ (MCC X  100/DF) / (730 x LF) ] + (PR x Peak Energy
Cost) + [ (1 - PR) X  Off peak Energy
Cost]....(Marginal Cost basis)
where
MCC = Marginal capacity cost 
DF = Diversity factor
LF = Load factor
PR = Peak ratio
As discussed above, using the LRMC approach could result in 
a return higher than the financial cost basis leading to 
financial surplus. In the financial cost basis the element 
of surplus is not included to meet financial requirements 
and therefore average cost has to be marked up a margin p.
The average price of a particular tariff is thus given by :
AP = Cost + margin p (Sunk Cost Basis)
AP = Cost X SDF (Marginal Cost Basis)
where SDF is a constant factor which scale down average 
price to the same level as determined by the sunk cost 
method. From the AP, NEB structured its tariffs into three 
categories :
1) Flat rate
"Electricity Tariff", a seminar paper by NEB,
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2) 2 part rate (MD charge $/kW/month) and energy
charge in sen/kWh) using
MD X 100 / (730 X LF) + Energy rate
3) a peak and off peak rate ( MD charge in
$/kW/Month, peak and off peak energy charge in 
sen / kWh) using
(MD X  100 / (730 X  LF) + (PR x PER) + (1 - -PR)
X  OPER
where
MD = Maximum demand 
PR = Peak ratio
PER = Peak energy rate
OPER = Off peak energy rate
NEB'S tariffs since its revision in 1985 is tabulated in
Appendix 5. .
Problems in estimating LRMC
However, although LRMC pricing is the most efficient
pricing system, estimating LRMC and electricity demand 
remains a difficult exercise. Costs estimates of power 
stations could be higher than estimated due to delays in 
construction time, unanticipated increase in construction 
materials or labour and unforseen expenditures. Demand for 
electricity fluctuates and depends on the rate of growth of 
the economy and is difficult to forecast in the long run. 
Similarly, the relative price of fuels used which has to be 
incorporated in the LRMC equation is also difficult to 
predict. Difficulties in demand forecasting and power
sector planning led NEB to maintain high reserved capacity 
of between 42 percent to 52 percent and a high reserved 
margin between 72 percent to 108 percent during the 1984 to 
1987 period. However, such high levels could not be
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sustained and renewal capacity and reserved margin fell to 
almost 19 percent and 37 percent respectively. By 1992 the 
situation was so acute that a black out on the national 
scale occurred.
6.4 TARIFF STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIALISATION 
PROGRAMME
NEB'S tariffs structure remained largely unchanged from 
1958 to 1980. The Government adopted a low tariffs 
structure to promote economic development in the country. 
A study by TNB (NEB)* published in 1992 shows that its 
electricity tariff rates were among the lowest in eight 
Asian countries (Appendix 6). To support its 
industrialisation programme the Government designed a low 
tariff structure in favour of the industrial users. The 
Government commitment to keep low electricity rates is 
reflected in its decision not to increase electricity 
prices inspite of the increased in oil prices during the 
first and the second oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 
respectively. Instead of revising the electricity tariff to 
alleviate the financial problems faced by NEB the 
Government announced in 1976 that it will help NEB by 
increasing its equity in the company. In addition it 
undertook to act as a guarantor for any loan obtained by 
NEB in the future. Similarly, after the second oil shock 
in 1979 the Government approved a request by the industrial 
users to reduce its tariffs. Tariffs for industrial users 
were temporarily reduced ; 10 percent to hotel consumers, 
2 0 percent industrial users and 25 percent mining 
consumers. The discount was then withdrawn in 1993 after 
the privatisation of the NEB.
* NEB changed its name to Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) upon itscorporatisation in 1991. The name TNB will be used whenever reference is made to 
NEB from year 1991 onwards .
’ Tate (1991), p 217.
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The discount given to industrial consumers reflects the 
roles required of NEB in the socio-economic development 
context of the country. Since 1985 to 1991 this policy had 
cost NEB (TNB) in forgone revenue M$2.8 billion or on 
average M$400 million annually. Between 1991 and 1993 the 
discount had cost TNB another M$1.5 billion with an average 
of M$500 annually. Hoare Govett estimated that with the 
withdrawal of the discount TNB's revenue will be increased 
by M$537 million in the 1993/94 financial year.®
During the 1975-1990 period, industrial customers have been 
subsidised by other users (Table 6.1) . The commercial rates 
were the highest among the four groups of electricity 
consumers. There are a few plausible explanations for this 
policy. Firstly, it could be intended to charge consumers 
based on their affordability to pay on consumption of goods 
and services. Secondly, it could be seen as a way to 
promote efficient use of electricity by the commercial 
consumers. Thirdly, this policy is politically desirable. 
As noted by Tate (1991, p 318),
"The question of the Boards tariffs structure has always been the most sensitive issue for the Government, both politically from the vote-catching angle, and also economically, from the point of view of encouraging industrial development."
Charging a higher rate of electricity for domestic users 
would be politically unpopular as the issue could be used 
against the ruling party by the opposition. Fourthly, a 
lower domestic rate will benefit the rural population who 
are the lowest income group in the country. While this 
reflects the fulfilment of NEB's social objectives of 
providing electricity to the rural areas, one could argue 
that it is the urban domestic consumers who benefited more 
from this policy. This is because most of the rural
Hoare Govett is an international security company operating in Malaysia. Estimated figures as quoted in its article of 16.03.1992.
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population are low income group and therefore have less 
access to electrical appliances.
Price trends
Three trends can be observed on the major changes in
average electricity prices from the period of 1975 to 1990. 
The first is from 1975 to 1978, second from 1980 to 1984 
and the third period from 1985 to 1990.
As seen from Figure 6.2, the average price started to
increase from 1977 to 1981, as a result of increase in oil
price. During this period cost of fuel per unit
Table 6.1: NEB's Tariffs per kwh (M sen) 1975-1990
Year Domes­tic Commer­cial Industrial PublicLighting ArmedForces Average Cost Margin ofProduction
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) h (f-g)
1975 14 .25 13.33 8 .61 17.28 13.12 13.31 8 .28 5.03
1976 13 .91 13 .32 8 .58 16.87 13 . 08 13.15 8 .71 4 .44
1977 13 . 66 13.41 8 . 67 17. 08 13.30 13.22 8.47 4.75
1978 14.33 14 . 99 10.59 18 . 68 15.24 14.77 10.68 4 .09
1979 16.08 17.76 13.08 21.00 - 16 . 98 14.63 2 .35
1980 19.88 22.98 18 .70 27.01 - 22 .14 18.26 3 .88
1981 21.40 24 .88 20 .43 29.04 - 23 . 93 19 . 09 4 . 84
1982 21.42 24 . 91 20.72 29.29 - 24 . 09 18.11 5 . 98
1983 21.38 24.89 20 . 68 29.45 - 24.10 15 . 93 8 .17
1984 21.41 24.86 20.66 29 .55 - 24 .12 16.60 7 .58
1985 21.42 23 .47 17 . 00 27.54 - 22 .36 14.31 8 . 05
1986 21.38 23.27 14.36 23 . 00 - 20.50 13.58 6.92
1987 21.33 23 . 07 14 . 00 21.72 - 20.03 13 . 09 6 . 94
1988 21.34 23 . 05 14 . 08 16.41 - 18.72 13 . 06 5.66
1989 21.25 23 . 05 14 . 08 16.40 - 18.70 14.41 4 . 29
1990 21.22 22 . 91 13 . 85 16.40 - 18.60 15.33 3 .27
-
Note : Armed Forces comes under the same as Public Lighting since 197 9.
Source; Calculated from NEB Annual and Statistical Reports 1975-1990
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Figure 6.2: NEB's Tariffs per kwh (M sen) 1975-1990
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of electricity produced increase from 4.7 sen to 13.8 sen 
(Appendix 12) Electricity price stabilised from 1981-85 and 
then declined from 1986 to 1990. There are various reasons 
for this trend during this period. Firstly, due to the 17 
percent special discount given to industrial users 
described above. Secondly, there was a decline in oil 
prices. Fuel cost declined from 11.0 sen a unit in 1984 to
4.7 sen a unit in 1988 (Appendix 12) . Thirdly, the 
diversification policy of shifting to gas from oil has 
resulted in fuel efficiency gain (or saving) and lower 
operating costs. Fourthly, the rehabilitation programme of 
old plants has increased thermal efficiency and thus 
reducing costs on fuel. In real terms electricity prices 
have been on a declining trend as compared inflation rate 
shown by the Consumer Price Index and the GDP deflator 
which have been on an increasing trend (Appendix 12).
6.5 RATE OF RETURN
As pointed out, one of the financial objectives set by the 
Board is to achieve a financial return of Return on Capital 
Employed (ROCE) of not less than 8 percent per annum. Table
6.2 shows the ROCE of NEB in comparison to EGAT and CEGB 
from 1975 to 1990.
With the exception of 1978, 1979 and 1980 NEB has managed 
to achieve and exceeded its target. Since 1981 ROCE has 
been more than 10 percent. NEB was also registering a 
better rate of return than EGAT. The average ROCE by NEB 
of 9 percent is within the average ROCE of 9.2* percent 
achieved by utilities in most developing countries, while 
EGAT achieved a slightly lower average rate of return of 6 
percent per annum . However, it can be seen that the 
average ROCE of NEB and EGAT was about the same from 1981 
to 1989, with an average of 12 percent per annum. This is
Beasant Jones (1993)
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much higher than the average ROCE for most utilities in 
developing countries which only achieved an average return 
of 5.8 percent between 1980-1984 and 6.4 percent between 
1985-1989.1° NEB's rate of return could not be compared to 
CEGB after 1980 because the later changed its accounting 
approach from historic cost accounting to current cost 
accounting.il However, prior to that both NEB and CEGB had 
comparable average rate of return, from 1975-1978, of 9.4 
percent and 9.1 percent respectively.
The high average rate of return achieved by NEB was due to 
high profits made from 1981 to 1988 (Appendix 9) . Operating 
profit were increasing at a higher rate than increase in 
operating costs (Figure 6.4). At per unit level operating 
cost has been declining from 19.09 sen a unit to 11.68 a 
unit (Appendix 12) . In addition there was also a high 
demand growth of electricity during the period.
Beasant Jones (1993) .
“ The changing of historic cost accounting to current cost accounting increase the value of the assets of CEGB .
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Table 6.2: Rate of Return CEGB. (ROCE) : NEB, EGAT,
NEB EGAT CEGB
1975 11.1 4.9 9.4
1976 8.9 6.4 11. 0
1977 9 . 9 4.2 8.0
1978 7.8 5.1 8.8
1979 2.9 4.9 6.7
1980 7 . 9 0.4 0.5
1981 10.3 12.1 1.7
1982 11.9 12.9 2.9
1983 16.0 12 .1 2.4
1984 12 .8 11.9 (5.7)
1985 11.6 9.8 2.4
1986 12 .8 11.5 2 . 9
1987 13 . 0 13 . 0 2.9
1988 13 .1 13 .1 1.8
1989 9.6 NA NA
1990 7.7 NA NA
Note : ROCE is calculated as a percentage of Net Profit/Capital Employed
Source: Calculated from NEB Annual Reports 1975-1990
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Figure 6.3: Rate of Return (ROCE) : NEB,EGAT, CEGB
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Figure 6.4: NEB: Operating Profit (M$'000) 1975-1990
3500000
3000000
o 2500000
2000000 f
1500000 '
1000000
500000
O) O)CD O§ ioo
— ♦ —  Operating  
R even ue  
— B — Operating 
E x p en ses  
—^ —  Operating Profit
Year
X — o th er  Incom e
Source: Appendix 7Profit Before  
Interest
192
6.6 TRANSFER TO CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT AND GENERAL 
RESERVE
As the general financial policy discussed in Section 1, NEB 
has to channel profits to (a) General Reserve Account 
equivalent to 10 percent on sales, and (b) to Current 
Development Account after paying dividend. Table 6.3 shows 
the appropriations of Profit after tax (PAT)from 1975-1990.
Table 6.3: NEB - Appropriations of Profit After Tax(M$'000) 1975-1990
Profit After Tax
(a):(b+c+d)
DividendPaid
(b)
Transfer to General Reserve
(c)
Transfer to Current Development Account (d)
1975 84,112 5,032 13,600 65,480
1976 67,260 6,377 7,800 53,083
1977 99,989 7,102 7,700 85,187
1978 89,593 8,700 17,800 63,093
1979 (7,822) - (7,822) -
1980 125,755 - 83,522 142,233
1981 255,146 - 26,200 228,946
1982 390,438 44,921 1,800 343,717
1983 661,287 39,921 16,700 6 04,666
1984 569,779 42,421 19,500 534,858
1985 606,313 44,539 - 561,774
1986 544,504 32,497 - 512,008
1987 725,832 35,205 12,529 678,098
1988 791,802 35,205 25,533 731,064
1989 597,950 35,205 34,300 528,445
1990 495,897 35,205 - 460,692
Source NEB Annual Reports 1975-1990
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Figure 6.5 : NEB : Appropriations of Profit After Tax (M$'000)
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With the exception of 1978-19 81 when NEB was facing 
financial difficulty due to increase in oil prices, it has 
managed to declare a dividend of an average 7 percent per 
annum. However, NEB was unable to transfer an amount 
equivalent to 10 percent on sales of electricity to its 
General Reserves as required. Although a high percentage of 
PAT was allocated to General Reserve in 1978, 1980 and 1981 
it was below the 10 percent on sales target. The high 
allocation was to raise cash for cashflow purposes as NEB 
needed more cash to cope with the increase in oil prices. 
The high allocation of PAT to Current Development Account 
reflects NEB's commitment in undertaking capacity expansion 
programme to meet rapid demand growth.
6.7 SELF FINANCING RATE
Table 6.4 shows that NEB has been able to achieve its self 
financing rate above the minimum target of 3 0 percent set 
by its major lenders, the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank. Increase profits due to higher tariff and 
high demand growth provided NEB with higher profit to be 
channelled to Current Development Account. This enables NEB 
to obtain external loans and grants with a high self 
financing rate to finance its power sector expansion 
programme which was enormous.
Comparatively, NEB has a higher self-financing ratio than 
EGAT reflecting the heavy reliance of EGAT on borrowing to 
finance its power development project. The self financing 
ratios of both NEB and EGAT, were well above those attained 
by most utilities in developing countries. The average self 
financing rate of utilities in developing countries was
18.6 percent, 19.4 percent and 22.1 percent in 1975-1979, 
1980-1984 and 1985-1989 respectively (Besant-Jones, 1993). 
It is evident that CEGB relied on very little borrowing to 
finance its power development project. This is because a)
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Table 6.4; Self Financing Rate
NEB(a) EGAT(b) CEGB(c)
1975 38 . 0 29.2 58 . 9
1976 23 .0 3 8 . 2 91.5
1977 15.0 13.4 8 6 . 6
1978 33.4 13.0 99.5
1979 17.6 9 . 8 5 2 . 9
1980 35.5 1 0 . 8 72.5
1981 64.6 24.4 9 8 . 8
1982 55.6 27.4 96.2
1983 55.2 33 .8 111. 9
1984 55.0 43.1 96 . 0
1985 57.0 2 9 . 9 109.3
1986 43.0 4 2 . 7 163.8
1987 48 . 0 68.3 205.8
1988 55.0 42.0 331.3
1989 61.0 N.A NA
1990 42 .0 N.A NA
Notes: Self financing ratio is calculated as Internallygenerated funds / Capital requirements x 100.
Source: NEB Annual Reports 1975-1990; G.V. Dang and C.J.C,Lim (1990); G.V. Dang (1991) and CEGB Annual Reports 1975-1990.
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Figure 6.6 : Self Financing Rate- NEB, EGAT, CEGB 1975-1990
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its retained earnings after tax was sufficient to cater for 
its capacity expansion programme^ and b) UK electricity 
industry is a mature industry and therefore capacity 
expansion is not as rapid as in Malaysia and Thailand.
NEB achieved a high self financing ratio because most of 
the profit after tax was transferred to Current Development 
Account at the expense of the General Reserve (Figure 6.5) . 
This has resulted in, a) NEB dependent on overdraft 
facilities provided by the local financial institutions as 
shown by the high charges on overdraft facilities (Appendix 
9) and (b) the injection of capital from the Government to 
bail NEB out in financial difficulties (Appendix 13). The 
central question is, why did NEB transfer more than 90 
percent of its profit after tax to Current Development 
Account and rely on overdraft facility and Government 
equity injection to finance its operating expenses? There 
are three plausible answer to this question. Firstly, 
providing a higher self financing ratio of more than 30 
percent will save NEB from paying a high interest rates for 
long term loan. In terms of profitability, a higher self 
financing ratio would result in higher profit due to lower 
interest charges for long term loan. This would place NEB 
in a better position to obtain borrowing for future 
capacity the expansion. However, interest charges for long 
term loan has been on the increasing trend despite the high 
self financing ratio (Appendix 9). This is due to (a) the 
continuing capacity expansion undertaken by NEB has 
increased long term borrowing and (b) the depreciation of 
the Malaysian currency especially against Yen and US dollar 
had increased interest payment due to increase principal 
amount borrowed. The second reason for high self financing 
rate policy is related to the issue of the depreciation of 
the Malaysian currency in (b). A higher self financing
Although the rate of return between NEB and CEGB was comparable as discussed earlier, in absolute term its profit was very much higher as it had a larger turnover.
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ratio would reduce dependency on foreign funds thus 
protecting NEB from foreign exchange fluctuations which has 
been to the disadvantage to NEB (Appendix 10) , Thirdly, the 
government had shown its commitment to provide financial 
assistance in the form of equity injection whenever NEB 
needed fund for its operations. The six occasions of 
government equity injection for cashflow needs during the 
15 year period under study, reflect the government 
commitment to assist NEB in transferring high percentage of 
its profit to Current Development Account ensuring NEB to 
undertake capacity expansion of the electricity sector.
Domestic and External Borrowing
NEB has generally benefited from privileged access to 
public credit and Government guaranteed, extensive credit 
facilities provided either as grants or at subsidised rates 
to fund its expansion plan.
NEB's Borrowing is characterised by two types, domestic 
borrowing and foreign borrowing.
Initially, NEB relied heavily on foreign loan for its 
expansion programme (Figure 6.7) . However, since 1986 NEB's 
reliance on Government loan has increased from 51 percent 
of total loan in 1985 to 65 percent by 1990 (Appendix 8). 
By 1990 NEB had reduced its foreign loan by 3 7 percent from 
M$2.047 billion to M$1.286 billion in 1990. The decreased 
came about as a result of swaps, prepayments and 
refinancing of foreign loans.
The high NEB borrowing in foreign currency has made it 
vulnerable to foreign exchange fluctuation risk. In 
addition to foreign loan, NEB's loan from Government was 
also obtained from foreign sources. About 75 percent of
NEB's Annual Reports 1988 and 1989.
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NEB'S debt has been in foreign currencies mainly yen and US 
dollar. The appreciation of Yen against the Malaysian 
Ringgit had caused concern for NEB. Since 1983 the Yen has 
appreciated by 106 percent from M$0.9776 per YlOO to 
M$2.0451 per YlOO. Likewise the US dollar, Pound Sterling, 
Singapore dollar and Deutsch Mark has all increased against 
the Malaysian Ringgit by 18 percent, 3 8 percent, 45 percent 
and 83 percent respectively (Appendix 10). As a result Yen 
loan has become more expensive in terms of paying the
principal loan which was double in amount and the interest 
rates on the increased principal amount. The high
appreciation of Yen, which constituted a high percentage of 
Government foreign loan, has imposed financial burden to 
NEB and the Malaysian Government. This has the led 
Government to request for renegotiation with the Japanese 
Government and firms on the possibility of reducing
interest rates but was turn down by the Japanese.
Consequently, the Government has decided that no more loans 
are to be obtained from Japan.
The Prime Minister in his visit to Japan in October 1994 said that Malaysia has decided not to borrow any more Yen. New Straits Times, 1994 .
200
Figure 6.7: NEB Borrowing (M$'000) 1975-1990
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Future capital development expenditure programme
A major issue in NEB's capital development expenditure is 
its ability to finance capacity expansion programme to meet 
increasing demand for electricity. It is estimated that 
30,000 MW of electricity is required by year 2020 which at 
current prices is estimated to be in the region of M$100 
billion or about US$40 billion. Within the next ten 
years, NEB requires M$38 billion for its capital 
spending.^ In the short term, by year 2000 it needs M$3.1 
billion to expand its SOOkV transmission lines of which 
M$2 .7 billion to be spend in 1997.^ "^  In addition NEB needs 
another M$3.6 billion by 1999 to maintain existing plants 
and upgrade electricity cables some of which are thirty 
years old bringing its capital requirement to M$7 
billion. IB
Based on the estimated capital requirement of M$100 billion 
in 2 5 years time, average annual capital requirement of M$4 
billion is required to meet the ever growing demand for 
electricity. It is unlikely that NEB could meet the capital 
required for meeting the self financing ratio financial 
covenant imposed by lenders without having to depend on the 
Government increase equity participation. The minimum 
internally generated fund required based on 3 0 percent 
equity, will be in the region of M$1.2 billion annually. As 
seen above NEB's profit was just about M$500 million in 
1990. It is therefore highly unlikely that NEB can achieve 
the minimum self-financing ratio of 3 0 percent in order to 
get financing to undertake development plan without 
Government assistance.
As revealed by Minister of Energy in Utusan Malaysia, 25.05.19 94 
Interview source,
' Disclosed by TNB's Chairman in Utusan Malaysia, 24,09.1994.
 ^ TNB's Chairman as quoted in Utusan Malaysia, 21.06.1994.
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The dependency on Government loan in the future could pose 
a few problems for NEB. Firstly, it exposes NEB to 
Government budgetary constraints which could limit its 
capacity expansion programm. Secondly, higher government 
allocations for the electricity sector would affect public 
investment and spending in other sectors for achieving 
social objectives.
6.8 DEBT EQUITY RATIO
Table 6.5 shows the comparison of the debt-equity ratio 
between NEB, EGAT and CEGB. With the exception of 1985, 
1986 and 1987, NEB has been able to meet its debt-equity 
ratio covenant of not more than 60 percent. In contrast, 
EGAT debt-equity ratio has been consistently high reaching 
75 percent in 1986. CEGB had a low debt-equity ratio 
reflecting the less dependence of CEGB on borrowing to 
finance its expansion programme.
The maintaining of acceptable debt equity ratio is 
important as it has implications for future development of 
the utility. A heavily indebted position will pose
problems for the utility to obtain new loans or negotiate 
better terms and conditions for a new loan. A problem of 
obtaining loans for capital development expansion programme 
is it will stifle the growth of the economy as an increase 
in demand for electricity could not be met. In addition, 
utility will undertake power projects which provides 
highest financial returns while neglecting moderate
financial returns but which have greater social impacts.
NEB has also been able to achieve its Debt Coverage Ratio 
of minimum of 1.3 as shown in Table 6.6 throughout the 
1975-1990 period. EGAT Debt Coverage Ratio was below 1.3 
from 1978 to 1980 and 1984 and 1985. However since 1986- 
1989, both NEB and EGAT recorded about the same ratio.
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Table S .5NEB, EGAT and CEGB : Debt Equity Ratio (1975-1990)
NEB(a) EGAT(b) CEGB(c)
1975 59 56 77
1976 59 56 72
1977 60 56 68
1978 60 55 64
1979 59 55 64
1980 55 62 18
1981 56 64 17
1982 57 63 16
1983 57 61 15
1984 55 56 11
1985 59 66 11
1986 59 75 12
1987 58 70 16
1988 56 65 34
1989 52 59 NA
1990 59 NA NA
Notes: Debt Equity Ratio is calculated as Total Debt /Total AssetsSource: NEB Annual Reports 1975-1990 ; G.V.Dang and C.J.CLim (1990); G.V.Dang (1991);CEGB Annual Reports 
1975-1990.
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Figure 6.8 : Debt Equity Ratio 1976-1990
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Table 6.6NEB, EGAT and CEGB : Debt Coverage Ratio (1975-1990)
NEB(a) EGAT(b) CEGB(C)
1975 1.7 1 . 5 1.3
1976 1.7 1.8 1.2
1977 1.7 1.3 1.5
1978 1.6 1.1 1.6
1979 1.7 1.1 1.6
1980 1.8 0.5 5 .1
1981 1.8 1.8 5.6
1982 1.8 1.7 6.0
1983 1.8 1.7 6.8
1984 1.8 1. 0 9.5
1985 1.5 0.8 9.3
1986 1.5 1.4 8.0
1987 1.5 1.7 7.1
1988 1.5 1.3 2.9
1989 1.7 1.6 NA
1990 1.4 NA NA
Notes :
1 . Starting 198 0 CEGB system of accountingchanged from historical cost : cost basis. basis to current
2 . Debt Coverage Ratio Assets / Total Debt is calculated by Total
Source : NEB Annual Reports 1975-1990 ; G.V .Dang andC.J.C Lim (1990); G .V.Dang (1991) and CEGAnnual Reports 1975-1990.
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6.9 BILLING EFFECTIVENESS
The billing effectiveness of NEB as compared to EGAT, MEA, 
PEA and CEGB is shown in Table 6.7. Comparison includes MEA 
and PEA because they supply electricity to the consumers 
while EGAT only supplies electricity to MEA and PEA. It is 
therefore, in terms of billing that MEA and PEA has similar 
activities and functions as NEB. It is evident that NEB has 
a poor billing effectiveness as compared to the rest. The 
normal period given for customers to pay their electricity 
bill is 14 days for NEB and 30 days for EGAT, MEA and PEA. 
Table 6.7 reveals that the average number of days between 
billing and payment was rather high for NEB. Average 
collection period was extremely high during 1975 to 1986. 
The high average collection period coincides with the 
period of recession and the increased revision of the 
tariff structure. There is a common trend between the 
utilities where all were reducing collection period 
reflecting better billing policies.
NEB'S poor collection period means that a lot of money was 
tied up with customers. One way to redress this problem was 
to seek the use of overdraft facilities which carried high 
interest rates. This problem was highlighted in 1981 by the 
Treasury Department representative who the suggested that 
NEB should take immediate steps to recover a huge debt 
amounting to M$155 million owed to it by sundry customers 
in order to pay interest charges and improve cash flow of 
the company.
Tate (1991), p229
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Table 6.7 Billing(Number Effectiveness of days ) of NEB, EGAT, MEA, PEA and
NEB EGAT MEA PEA CEGB
1975 47 106 90 63 46
1976 57 111 - 65 42
1977 71 103 - 50 38
1978 55 68 - 33 41
1979 75 73 - 29 45
1980 78 68 72 36 38
1981 84 68 68 43 38
1982 87 58 62 44 38
1983 90 63 67 49 41
1984 83 63 70 46 43
1985 76 61 64 39 43
1986 73 70 65 38 47
1987 68 69 60 41 40
1988 64 65 56 38 39
1989 69 57 49 34 NA
1990 65 NA NA NA NA
Notes
Source
Billing Effectiveness or Collection period is calculated by Receivables / Sales x 365 days.
NEB Annual Reports 1975 - 1990; G.V Dang and C.J.C. Lim (1990) ; G.V.Dang (1991) and CEGB Annual Reports 1975 -1990.
MEA stands for Metropolitant Electricity Authority and PEA for Provice Electricity Authority
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Figure 6.10 : Billing Effectiveness of NEB, EGAT, MEA, PEA and
CEGB
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6.10 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have analysed the financial performance 
of NEB from 1975 to 1990 concentrating on a) , rate of 
return criteria and b), operating ratios in terms of self- 
financing ratio, debt equity ratio and debt service ratio. 
These ratios have been part of covenants imposed by major 
lenders such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank. We have also looked at the financial problems of NEB 
and their underlying causes. Finally we have examined 
issues pertaining to capital development expenditure of 
NEB to meet the increase in demand for electricity by 
building more power plants.
From the evidence presented, NEB was able to achieve its 
profitability and operating targets. In fact NEB was 
commended by the World Bank in 1987 for its efficient 
financial management and stable financial record.NEB was 
able to achieve an average rate of return of ROCE of 10.5 
percent higher than its 8 percent target. This is better 
than 8.7 percent achieved by EGAT. NEB has also been able 
to provide dividend its shareholder i.e the Government on 
an average of 6.0 percent per annum. On the operating side, 
prior to 1980, its target of achieving 40-50 percent 
internally generated fund to finance its power development 
project was not achieved due to electricity tariff 
structure which was lagging behind the increase of oil 
prices. However, after the tariffs revision based on the 
long run marginal price concept was introduced in 1980, NEB 
was able to improve its internally generated fund between 
40 to 65 percent which is well above the minimum 
requirement of 30 percent set by the World Bank.
However, although NEB was achieving its financial targets, 
we noted that it was also facing financial, operational and
NEB Annual Report 1987/1988, p 15.
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managerial problems which limit and constraint its 
operations. These problems, limitations and constraints 
originated from two sources. Firstly, government and 
political interference on financial and investment 
decisions. Secondly, managerial and operational problems 
arising from within NEB due lack of proper implementation 
of financial policies.
On the operational level, NEB has a poor credit policy on 
customers billing. Its collection periods were exceeding 60 
days which is far too long as compared to MEA, PEA and 
CEGB. Substantial monies have been tied up in debtors which 
created cashflow problems between 1975-1980. It has to 
resort to Government equity injections and the use of 
overdraft facilities from banks which carried high interest 
rates. Although usage of overdraft facilities has been 
declining since 1983 due to improved profitability, monies 
tied up in debtors were still high. This was still a loss 
to NEB as monies tied up in debtors deprived NEB from 
interest income. Due to the high demand growth for 
electricity as a result of the industrialisation programme 
in the country, NEB has had to channel a greater 
proportion of its net profit to the Capital Development 
Account. As has been pointed out, NEB was unable to achieve 
its target rate of apportioning 10 percent of sales value 
to the General Reserves Account. As a result NEB has got to 
rely on government equity injection at one time or another 
to solve its cashflow problems in order to keep operating 
ratios consistent with lenders covenants.
Reliance on foreign loans has exposed NEB to the volatile 
foreign exchange rates. NEB was paying very high interest 
charges for loans obtained abroad due to the appreciation 
of foreign currencies against the Malaysian Ringgit. 
Although the dependency on foreign loans has decreased to 
25 percent in 1990, interest charges remained high 
constituting 27 percent of profit before interest. The
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appreciation of foreign currencies make it more expensive 
for NEB to repay existing loan and to borrow new ones. 
Besides, borrowing from the traditional source of cheap 
loan from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank was 
more competitive and more difficult to obtain as more 
developing countries compete for the limited funds.
In order to improve the financial performance of NEB one 
has to redress the underlying causes for the financial, 
operational and managerial problems faced by NEB. First, 
less government and political interference is desired 
{Chapter 7 and 8) . Given the Malaysian context, this can 
only be achieved through privatisation means as the 
government has not got the political will to exercise an 
arm-length approach to running public enterprises. As 
pointed out in Chapter 2, since the implementation of the 
New Economic Policy in 1970 government involvement and 
interference in running public enterprises had been heavy 
handed. Second, exposing NEB to capital market discipline 
provides a better means of achieving better financial 
performance. The capital market discipline would put 
pressure on NEB to improve its billing policies and stick 
to plant construction schedule in order to minimise costs. 
As minimising costs is crucial for the survival of NEB this 
will provide incentive for the managers (NEB) to commit and 
design a better and more effective form of internal 
monitoring system. Better monitoring would provides less 
opportunity for its managers (and staff alike) to undertake 
wasteful practices for self benefit or engage in shirking 
activities (discussed in Chapter 7) . Third, more use of 
domestic capital market to fund capacity expansion 
programme would improve profitability and financial 
performance as NEB is less subjected to foreign exchange 
rate fluctuation which has been to the disadvantage to NEB 
due to the depreciation of the Malaysian currency. Looking 
ahead, huge requirements for investment capital are needed 
to meet capacity expansion of 30,000 MW in the next 25
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years leading to the year 2020. Besides, NEB required huge 
funds to improve, upgrade and install new transmission 
lines for industrial users and reduce electricity losses. 
It has been argued that it is highly unlikely that NEB 
could achieve the minimum internally generated fund of 3 0 
percent without having to depend on increased Government 
equity participation in NEB which increases the financial 
burden and commitment in the power sector. Capital market 
would provide NEB with the necessary fund to undertake such 
a massive capacity expansion to meet increasing demand. 
Fourth, introduction of competition would improve the 
financial performance of NEB. This is achieved through 
better costs efficiency by reducing cost of production 
which is a crucial factor in determining the survival of a 
firm in a competitive market environment. The tariff 
structure ensures NEB of sufficient return to meet its 
expenses and at the same time provide surplus to meet its 
capital expenditure programme in meeting increase in demand 
could provide the managers with a complacent attitude. 
Without competition, increased operating costs due to 
operating and technical inefficiencies resulting from poor 
management and maintenance could be easily passed on to the 
consumers.
Privatisation is therefore forms a central issue in 
improving financial performance of NEB. The preceding 
chapter examines further issues pertaining to the 
desirability and implementation of the privatisation 
programme in the electricity sector and looks at problems 
of policy implications. Electricity sector reform in terms 
of introducting competition in the electricity sector is 
discussed in chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 7î PRIVATISING ELECTRICITY IN MALAYSIA
To recapitulate, the objective of this research is to look 
into the desirability and the feasibility of the 
electricity privatisation programme in Malaysia. We have so 
far examined the underlying economic principles of the 
privatisation debate and its empirical evidence, and the 
rationale and objectives of the privatisation programme in 
Malaysia. We have also examined the technical performance 
of NEB using the inter-country comparison approach adopting 
the Data Envelopment Analysis Method. In the previous 
chapter, we have looked at the financial performance of 
NEB, its problems and its capacity expansion programme to 
meet the high growth in electricity demand.
This chapter is intended to serve two purposes : Firstly, 
it is an attempt to evaluate the desirability of the 
electricity privatisation programme by focusing on 
operational and managerial aspects of NEB which could only 
be improved by change of ownership. Secondly, it is an 
attempt to evaluate the achievements of the electricity 
privatisation programme in achieving its intended 
objectives. This chapter consists of five sections. Section
7.2 discusses problems and issues pertaining to the 
desirability of the electricity privatisation programme and 
looks at the issue of whether ownership matters in 
achieving efficiency of NEB. To achieve this objective, it 
focuses on the institutional evidence and the relevance of 
the Theory of bureaucracy, property rights theory and X- 
efficiency theory in explaining problems faced by NEB which 
subsequently led to operational and technical 
inefficiencies. Section 7.3, assesses the achievement of 
the electricity privatisation programme in relation to the 
overall objectives of the privatisation programme. Section
7.4 looks at the international participation in the power 
projects in Malaysia and finally, the Chapter is summarised 
in a brief conclusions in Section 7.5.
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7.2. THE PROBLEMS OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
Poor reliability of supply
Power disruptions in the form of power failures, blackouts, 
delayed supplies and load shedding have been a major 
problem in the electricity sector in Malaysia (Tate, 
1991) . ^ These problems reached its climax in 1992 after 
its privatisation programme when a major black out took 
place which affected the whole country.
Major power supply disruptions in recent years can be 
traced way back to 1981 when a total collapse of the 
Central and Southern system was caused by insufficient 
generation of electricity due to plant breakdown.  ^Between 
1981 and 1982, NEB faced a series of high voltage problem 
and the system experienced another three major 
disruptions.3 Two of these disruptions were caused by 
tripping resulting in the isolation of Kuala Lumpur (South) 
substation from Tuanku Jafar Power Station in Port Dickson, 
Negeri Sembilan. The other disruption was caused by a bush 
fire under the Temenggur-Papan 2 75 kV line resulting in the 
loss of hundreds of MW of load. Another major system 
disturbance also occurred in 1985, caused by loss of both 
the transmission circuits from Paka to Kampung Awah."^  The 
tripping resulted in a loss of 500MW of power generation 
into the grid.^ Since 1990, electricity disruptions, power 
surges and voltage trips have been on the rise. Figures
As noted by Tate these problems were highlighted in newspapers since1950s.
 ^ On 22.07.1981. NEB Annual Report, 1980/81.
 ^ NEB Annual Report, 1981/82.
 ^ On 2 0.6.1985. NEB Annual Report, 1985/86.
 ^ The system demand at that time was 1650MW while the highest demandduring that year was 2134MW which took place in August. It took NEB nine hours to install 90 percent of the electricity supply to affected consumers.
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from the Electricity Supply Department shows that 
disruptions have been on an increasing trend from an 
average of 6,000 a month in 1990.^
The problems of reliability and security of supply can be 
attributable to three factors - bureaucratic delay, poor 
project implementation, and government and political 
intervention.
Bureaucratic delay
One of the major problems with the security of supply was 
that the plan was not executed on time due to bureaucratic 
process. The bureaucratic red tape comes in the form of 
complying to procedural and policy rules set by the 
relevant ministries which are sometimes conflicting and 
give rise to problems of coordination, monitoring and 
supervision by the relevant ministries. Bureaucratic delay 
in selection and awarding of tender, within TNB itself and 
between TNB and the relevant ministries, affects the 
execution of capacity expansion plans to meet increase in 
demand growth. These delays threatened the reliability and 
security of supply as reserved capacity reached minimum 
level in 1992 (Table 7.1) . Problems of monitoring and 
supervision due to bureaucratic process had resulted delay 
in the expansion programme of existing plant. For example 
in 1991 the Ministry of Energy had anticipated that there 
would be problems of electricity supply sometime in 
September or October, 1992.’ To overcome the problem, as a 
short term solution, TNB was to install 2 x 500MW and 2 x 
350MW turbines. In August 1991 a task force was formed to 
look into the short term and long term energy needs of the 
country.® The responsibility of the task force was to
New Straits Times, 01.03.1993.
’ Business Times, 30.07.1991.
® As revealed by the Deputy Minister of Energy in the Star, 06.08.1991
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devise plans and strategies to meet increasing demand until 
1996. According to the Minister quarterly reports would be 
submitted to inform the Cabinet on energy situation.® At 
the same time it was reported that TNB intended to purchase 
electricity from the private sector in order to overcome 
the expected power shortages.^ By August 1991, believing 
that the expansion programme was on schedule, the Ministry 
saw no immediate problem on the security of supply and 
readjusted its forecast by announcing that the country will 
only face a slight shortage in June 1993.^ In spite of 
this a major power failure occurred in June 1992 which took 
place in several areas in Kuala Lumpur affecting households 
and causing disruptions to business and manufacturing 
activities.^ The capability of the system to meet rapidly 
growing peak demands deteriorated to the point where 
planned load shedding and unplanned outages became a daily 
occurrence in late 1992. Power disruptions on average 
jumped to 28,000 a month in early 1992 and 30,000 towards 
the later part of 1992.^ The table below shows the supply 
and demand of electricity from financial year 1990/91 to 
1993/94.
9
10
11
12
The Star, 06.08.1991.
Utusan Malaysia, 20.08.1991.
Deputy Minister of Energy. New Straits Times, 05.08.1992.
The power failure was from 9.00 am to 6.30 pm the same day. Reasons 
given for power failure was tripping or load shedding of several transformers in the city. Business Times, 13.05.1992.
New Straits Times, 15.01.1993
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Table 7,1: TNB's Installed Capacity Expansion (1990 to 1994)
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Installed Capacity (MW) 4,919.0 5,652.0 5,909.0 7,319.0
Maximum Demand (MW) 3,990.0 4,498.0 4,971.0 5,610.0
Reserved Capacity (MW) 929 . 0 1,154.0 938 .0 1,709.0
% of Reserved Capacity 18 .9 20.4 15.9 23.4
% of Reserved Margin 23.3 25.7 18.9 30.5
Source: TNB's Annual Reports 1990-1994.
Poor monitoring
The major power supply disruption in June 1992 should have 
sent the danger signal to the Ministry of Energy and TNB on 
the acute danger of the power shortages facing the country. 
From Table 7.1, one could easily spot the problem of the 
security of supply when reserved capacity was just 18.9 
percent 1990/1991. This was a critical position when one 
takes into consideration of the TNB's maintenance policy 
that 2 0 percent of the installed capacity has to be 
allocated for maintenance at any one time. In September 
1992, the problems of power supply became acute. There was 
no reserved capacity available due to maintenance of plant. 
TNB clarified that its capacity to supply just before the 
September 1992 incident was in the region 4,105MW.^ This 
was 866MW short of peak demand.^ The explanation given by 
TNB was that many plants were old and require more frequent
New Straits Times, 16.02.1993.
In Shaikh Othman article in New Straits Times, ?, 1993.
Calculated from Table 7.1, that is maximum demand in 1992 (4791MW) minus available capacity at that time (4105MW).
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maintenance .^ ’This meant that 3 0 percent of the installed 
capacity was not available at that time, 10 percent higher 
than the usual 20 percent capacity reserved for maintenance 
purposes.
The question is how did TNB, despite of the critical 
situation, try to maintain equilibrium between supply and 
demand in the system? There are two plausible explanations 
to this. Firstly, it increased supply by delaying 
maintenance schedule, especially that of older plants. This 
meant that the capacity taken out for repair and 
maintenance was below the 20 percent under normal 
circumstances. This undoubtedly would have repercussions on 
the efficiency of the older generating plants. Secondly, it 
made arrangements for importing electricity from 
neighbouring countries, Thailand and Singapore, during peak 
demand time. After the blackout incident TNB's on 
recommendation of its consultant increased its reserve 
capacity requirement to 35 percent. This is to ensure that 
TNB can provide the security of supply in a rapidly 
expanding economy.
The blackout incident in September 1992 took place when 
four distributional lines from Paka to Teluk Kelong was 
damaged by lightning resulting the loss of 1,000 MW of 
installed capacity from the system.Prior to this, in the
For example the 600 MW Tuanku Jaafar steam power station in Port Dickson was built in 1968 and has been operating at maximum capacity. In February 1993, three of its seven turbines were out of operation for various reasonsrelated to maintenance (New Straits Times, 24.02.1993). This could be one of thereasons why power disruptions occurred in February and March which resulted 9 firms in Penang filing compensation from TNB as discussed earlier. There was another crisis in March 1993 when lOOOMW was taken out for maintenance work (New Straits Times, 19.01.1994) . During the September blackout, certain older plants such as power stations in Prai and Pasir Gudang were also undergoing overhauling and rehabilitation work besides the Port Dickson plant. TNB's spokesman later clarified that a large part of the problem during the power shortage was due to plants were out for overhaul. New Straits Times, 21.12.1993.
NEB had arrangement with Singapore Electricity Board (SEB) andElectricity Generating Authority Thailand (EGAT) of buying and selling electricity at different time of the day.
Senior General Manager. Utusan Malaysia, 10.10.1992.
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same morning of the blackout incident, there was a cut off 
in transmission connection between TNB and SEB in Singapore 
when a power plant station in Singapore caught fire. This 
meant that Singapore was unable to make up the subsequent 
loss of 1,000 MW. The issue then, knowing that security of 
supply could be in danger due to maintenance problem of the 
old plants, did TNB have the necessary contingency plan to 
cope with the likelihood of an upsurge of demand of the 
scale of the September blackout? TNB did not reveal the 
answer to this question to the public. Two things can be 
concluded from the above incident. Firstly, coordination 
and monitoring of the power plant projects have led to the 
failure of TNB to take necessary steps to balance demand 
and supply. As admitted by the DGES^ °,
" The shortage of energy and electricity disruption in 1992 was as a result of planning and implementation not being able to catch up with demand and consumption"
TNB's failure to secure sufficient reserve margin as a 
result of poor planning has led to the massive tripping as 
demand was higher than supply in the system. Part of the 
problem lies in the monitoring difficulties and the 
involvement of different level of public authority in the 
decision making process. The problem of monitoring also 
brings into limelight the problems of coordination among 
the various ministries and agencies involved in the 
planning of the energy needs in the country in line with 
the rapid economic transformation and growth.
Secondly, the blackout incident has questioned the issue of
New Straits Times, 03.09.1994.
An example of implementation problem is the M$3 0 0 million Sungai Piah hydro-electric project. Its completion was delayed by 2 two years due technical problems with the machine. The generators and the turbines, provided by India­based contractor Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd, could not function properly in the reliability run. The project started in 1987 and was scheduled to be completed in 57 months i.e 1993. New Straits Times, 02.03.1993.
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coordination, red tape, bureaucratic process and delay- 
reflecting the decision making constraints faced by TNB. In 
addressing the problem of power shortages and future 
planning of the electricity sector in February 1993, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry was noted as saying " My 
Ministry is also willing to give ideas to Tenaga on the 
current and future needs of the country's industrial 
sector"^^. Undoubtedly, there was poor coordination between 
TNB as the authority entrusted to ensure enough supply of 
electricity and the Ministry of Trade, the approving 
authority for planning and investment programme. It was 
only in July 1993 that the Minister of Energy announced 
that a Committee comprising of Ministry of Energy, 
Electricity Supply Department (BSD) and TNB would be formed 
which will work closely with the Ministry of Trade, to 
monitor the supply and demand of electricity in the 
country.^ According to the Director General of BSD, they 
realised the problem of power shortages well before 1990 
but "....efforts were not too focused. Although the
Chairman of TNB accepts full responsibility for the 
blackout incident by saying " The buck ends here ", he 
went on to point out that the decision to build new power 
plants did not rest with TNB alone. It also involved many 
other parties among whom were the various Government 
Department and Ministries. The Chairman went on to say, " 
If it is only Tenaga, then decision making will be much 
faster.
The need to have less red tape and less bureaucratic 
decision making process is a major concern for the
New Straits Times, 22.02.1993. 
New Straits Times, 21.07.1993. 
New Straits Times, 01.03.1993. 
New Straits Times, 16.02.1993. 
ibid.
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efficiency of the TNB. As pointed out by the Director 
General of ESD
" This (planning period) has shortened because of rapid development of industries and accelerated demand for electricity. Investment decisions are taken so fast that we have to try and be ahead with the increased supply of electricity to the private sector which is expanding rapidly."^’.
At the same time, the property right theorists put 
ownership as the focus of their explanation as to why 
managers fail to monitor enterprises performance (Chapter 
3) . They argue that as managers cannot directly own 
property rights in state-owned enterprises they have weak 
incentives to monitor performance and take a long-run view 
of its development (Lawson, 1994). In this context there 
was a failure on the part of Ministry of Energy to monitor 
the performance of NEB to implement policy taken especially 
on the plant capacity expansion programme to meet increase 
in demand. Ex post evaluation revealed that even by August 
1992, just a month before the blackout, the Ministry failed 
to monitor the acute problems of power supply. While 
approving participation of the IPPs from the private sector 
in electricity generation, implementation of the Ministry 
decision was not carried out with any urgency. Despite of 
the critical supply position, the Minister was quoted as 
saying, " We plan to implement it (entry of IPP in the 
electricity sector) within two years as the present plant 
capacity of TNB is not sufficient to cater for future 
electricity demand which is ever increasing."^® Based on 
this statement one could conclude that the Government 
intended to introduce IPPs into the electricity sector by 
late 1994. And if this is true then the IPPs generating 
plants would come into the system some time late 1997. The
New Straits Times, 16.02.1993. Words in bracket are mine.
®^ A translation from " Kita merancang pelaksanaannya siap dalam tempuh du a tahun kerana janakuasa TNB yang ada sekarang tidak berupaya menampung keperluan yang semakin meningkat pada masa depan". Berita Marian, 10/8/1992.
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Ministry believed that, at that time, TNB's plant expansion 
programme would be able to cope up with the demand growth 
until such time. This obviously reflects the difficulty of 
monitoring by the Ministry of Energy of the electricity 
supply. The policy did not reflect the sense of urgency on 
part of the Ministry to resolve problems of acute power 
shortages in spite of all the complaints of frequent supply 
disruption by the public in the newspaper. However, as we 
have described above the plans were not implemented as 
scheduled.
Unsatisfactory track record of project implementation
Another problem which plagued NEB was that of project 
implementation. The inability of NEB to complete 
construction projects as scheduled has two implications. 
One as discussed in Chapter 6, was that NEB had to incur 
higher costs of capital in terms of interest paid and 
second, was unreliability of supply due to a failure to 
expand supply in line with demand growth. Most of the 
difficulties centred on the construction of hydro­
electricity stations where unanticipated problems slowed 
down the progress of construction. Temenggor Dam, Kenyir 
Dam and Sg Piah Dam were also behind completion schedule by 
between twelve to twenty-four months.
One of the contributory factors which led to the blackout 
in September 1992 was the failure to complete the Sg Piah 
hydro-electricity project. In its 1986/87 Annual Report, 
NEB planned that the Sg Piah hydro project would be 
completed in 1992 in time to alleviate the problem of the 
anticipated increase in peak demand in that year. The 
delays were due various factors such as delay in awarding 
of contracts, delay in signing the Loan Agreement by the 
Government and poor contractor's performance. Another 
problem associated with the delay in construction of the
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hydro-electricity project is the very nature of the 
project. Most of the projects were located in remote and 
inaccessible areas. ^®The civil construction works were 
extensive and highly dependent on exogenous factors such as 
weather, the nature of the terrain and the supply of 
labour, which are beyond the control of the contractors.
Autonomy of TNB and Government intervention
Initially NEB was set up based on commercial undertakings 
with minimum Government interference in its operations. 
However, the Board began to be sensitive towards matters of 
national interest after independence, although at the same 
time it maintained that Government should not interfere 
with the running of the enterprise.^ NEB was then assured 
that it would continue to be an independent, self 
accounting, statutory corporation, free from ministerial 
interference in running its affairs.^^
Although assurance of an autonomy was given, NEB in 
practise was never really free from Government and 
political interference. The problem lies in the appointment 
of the members of Board of Directors. The Board was 
composed almost entirely of political appointees. Besides 
some limited representation from commercial and industrial 
sectors, the rest of the Board members were either 
representatives of ministries or political appointees with 
political connections either within UMNO or MCA. The 
existence of this political element exposed NEB to the 
political expediency of the politicians and the government 
which impeded the running of NEB. As noted by Tate (1991),
Tate (1991).
As clarified by the Federal Legislative Council in 1952 and the Chairman in 1957. Tate (1991) p 43.
Assurance given by Minister of Commerce and Industry. Tate (1991), p50.
Annual Reports reveal that between six to seven members of the Board out of ten are political appointees.
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this trend continued right until its corporatisation/" 
When the new Minister of Energy came into office in 1979, 
he made an unprecedented attendance at the Board meeting." 
Although he did not participate in the meeting, as pointed 
out by Tate, he "provided the Board with what the cabinet 
thought regarding the Board's activities". This reflects 
the extent of political interference which erodes and 
limits the autonomy of NEB in carrying out its duties.
Government intervention in awarding of contracts has also 
impeded NEB in running its operations and the 
implementation of its plant expansion programme. Some 
engineers in TNB claimed that the delays in awarding 
contracts have been a major problem in project 
implementation." They claimed that intervention by the 
Economic Planning Unit and the Treasury has hindered TNB's 
work. A case in point is that, following the decision of 
the Cabinet on " Buy British Last " policy the Prime 
Minister expressed his disapproval of retaining Ewbank of 
Britain as their consultants for the Second Phase of Port 
Klang power station." On the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister, NEB opted for Electric Power Development 
Corporation of Japan. The Pergau Dam controversy have 
sparked political consequences on TNB's autonomy in running 
its operations. In line with the Government policy not to 
award contracts to British firms, TNB had to cancelled a 
contract for British companies to supply five 33MW gas 
turbines at a cost of M$150 million. Another construction 
contract of SOOkW transmission lines awarded to a British 
firm to enable IPP Sikap Energy Ventures to supply power to
Tate (1991) pl73 .
During his tenure as Minister of Energy, Loe Moggie attended the Board meeting on four occasions. Tate (1991), p230.
New Straits Times, 01.03.1993.
Tate (1991), p246. Eubank was the consultant for the First Phase of the Port Klang power station .
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TNB was also cancelled."
The commercial status of NEB again came into question with 
the implementation of the NEP. NEB, besides operating on a 
commercial basis was obligated to undertake socio-economic 
objectives with developmental goals. As viewed by the 
Public Service department the objectives of NEB should " be 
related to the national objectives of promoting national 
unity whereby measures and programmes to be undertaken 
should be geared to redressing the imbalances of 
opportunities and on job creation for Malaysians in less 
favourable positions and to further extend the supply of 
electricity to rural areas and providing the necessary 
incentives to the growth of industries in rural areas" 
(Tate 1991)^®. It added that " the true value of an 
electricity undertaking to a nation should not be measured 
in terms of its financial viability. It is also the broader 
indirect benefits that are likely to be of far greater 
social and economic significance."" On the same note the 
Prime Minister in 1972 suggested that NEB is a service 
organisation and not a profit motivated enterprise.^®
Accountability
There was little evidence to support that TNB was 
accountable to the consumers. The question of public 
accountability became a controversial issue when the 
Ministry of Energy and TNB failed to provide satisfactory 
explanation to the public for the causes of the September 
1992 blackout incident. Although disruptions had been a 
daily occurrence in Petaling Jaya and Kuala Lumpur for a
New Straits Times, 28.02.1994.
" Report on NEB " by Management Analysis Unit of the Public Service Department in 1970.
Tate (1991) , pl80.
ibid, p215.
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couple of months before the incidents, the Ministry of 
Energy denied that load shedding was undertaken by 
The Minister described the September 1992 incident as "an 
act of God " declined to take responsibility for the 
matter^ and put the blame squarely on TNB^^. The Minister 
further warned NEB that they should be more efficient and 
solve the power crisis failing which they would be held 
responsible for not supporting the country's 
industrialisation policy." This invited furious criticism 
from the public. The disappointment of the public in 
relation to the explanation given is reflected in 
newspapers by two columnists who questioned and highlighted 
the issue of public accountability both by the Ministry and 
TNB. They challenged the Ministry of Energy and TNB to 
explained openly what actually went w r o n g . A n  ex Member 
of Parliament claimed that the Minister of Energy is fully 
responsible for the problems^®. Responding to public
criticism the Minister later clarified that " the
blackouts we have are due to technical and mechanical 
faults which lead to break downs. The absence of public 
accountability by both the Ministry and TNB was also 
reflected earlier in July 1992, two months before the 
September incident. In its explanation to the public, TNB 
attributed the problems of rising disruptions to 
thunderstorms", thereby avoiding accountability and
43
ibid.
New Straits Times, 01.10.1992.
New Straits Times, 28.02.1993.
New Straits Times, 15.03.1993.
Rustam Sani in Utusan Malaysia, 07.06.1993 and S.O. Majid in New Straits Times, 15.02.1993.
Lee Lam Thye. Utusan Malaysia, 03.03.1993.
New Straits Times, 08.04.1993.
TNB's managing Director explaining the cause of power disruptions. New Straits Times, 01.03.1993.
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failing to provide transparency to the public.
An interesting question is, why did the Ministry or TNB 
refuse to accept full responsibility or provide 
transparency to the public on the true nature of the 
problem? There are two possible reasons for this - a) 
political and b) legal. Politically, the response is an 
example of the expediencies in providing explanations which 
are due to the short-termist nature of political life. One 
could argue that as the political life of politicians 
relies on electoral votes, shifting away from real issues 
and blaming the public servants is a better options than 
confronting the issues which will jeopardise the 
politician's position. This is not an uncommon phenomena in 
the political sphere in Malaysia . As pointed out by a 
highly placed senior civil servants, "Civil service bashing 
seems to be one of the best methods used by politicians to 
attract attention."" In this context responsibility 
shirking as describe in the theory of bureaucracy could 
also be applied to politicians in general. Secondly, the 
Government cannot accept liability of negligence or accept 
responsibility because they are liable to be sued over the 
breach of contract in providing security of supply to the 
consumers. Admitting liability would be tantamount to 
inviting legal litigation against TNB in the form of 
seeking compensation by firms over the losses due to the 
black out incident. One could argue that the September 1992 
incident was not an isolated case where the Ministry and 
TNB denied responsibility for disruptions.
Rent seeking behaviour and corruption
There is evidence that NEB was having a problem of 
monitoring malpractice among its employees. Some illegal
Malaysian Business, 01.05.1985. This view is also shared by the President of the Administrative and Diplomatic Service Association and the Secretary General of the Public Enterprises Ministry that " It seems to be the fashion : criticising the civil service."
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factories were connected with electricity supply." It is 
also reported that TNB had found its staff involve in 
helping consumers to "steal" electricity through tampering 
with meters.®^ Similarly, it was revealed that illegal 
electricity connections were found made to households which 
were not entitled to power supply with the probable 
knowledge of TNB officers."
Some claimed that corruption and malpractice were taking 
place in NEB where rent seeking activities create 
opportunities for bribery and corruption. The purchase of 
8 gas turbines generators in 1990 from Asia Brown Boveri 
(ABB) generated furious debate in Parliament following 
allegations that tenders for the contract were rigged and 
that their cost, then reported to be M$1 billion, grossly 
inflated." These allegations, which were dismissed by the 
Minister, were contained in a widely circulated letter 
purportedly sent by a group identified only as " Concerned 
Engineers of TNB " . During the Budget session in Parliament 
in December 1990, a member of the opposition raised 
questions pertaining to significant corruption within 
TNB." In its Bulletin a major opposition party pointed out
The Corruption Agency was ask by the Member of Parliament of Pulai in Johor, to investigate how these illegal factories have access to electricity supply. He claimed that there were abuse of power in some of the relevant Government Department or Agencies (Utusan Malaysia, 05.05.1992). The State Housing and Local Government Committee Chairman pointed out that some of these factories costs million of ringgit and had heavy equipment, operating on agricultural land. The matters come under the jurisdiction of four Government Agencies namely Municipal Council, TNB, Water Supply Department and Land and Mine Office. All the four Agencies were asked to investigate how these factories were given electricity and water supply (The Star, 14.05.1992)
The Star, 19.05.1992. It is also reported that several people were caught stealing power in Taiping in Perak. Some of those involve were huge hawkers complex, some light industries and household consumers.
This was revealed during a visit by Ampang State Assemblyman during his visit to Taman Cahaya, Ampang. Harian Metro, 23.06.1992.
New Straits Times, 01.03.1993.
DAP Member of Parliament for Petaling Jaya. The Rocket, Volume 24 / 4 ,  1991. The above accusations were in reply to answers given by the Minister in Parliament.
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that there were indications that the Minister of Energy was 
involved in some questionable deals. Among the issues 
raised were the awarding of contracts to an inexperienced 
contractor. It claimed that the Minister had a special 
relationship with Bharat Heavy Electrical, a supplier to 
TNB and that the purchase of the gas turbine from Asean 
Brown Boveri was overpriced. It also questioned the conduct 
of some retired TNB officials who joined top posts in 
contractors firm for TNB after their retirement. The 
opposition party claimed that this is a contravention of 
the Pension Act 239, which states that retired officials of 
TNB must not join companies doing business with TNB for a 
period of five years after retirement. The report cited 
three cases where senior TNB staff joined the TNB 
contractor's company and held posts such as Director of 
Business Development, Technical Director and Managing 
Director after retiring.
Evidence also seems to suggest that lobbying and rent 
seeking activities by interested parties to get 
construction projects were present in TNB. This is 
reflected in the case of the Kenering-Bersia project. The 
Treasury in 1980 rejected the recommendation of the Board 
to award the project to Hazama-Mitsubishi but instead 
wanted to award it to another company, Nedam/CPBO/Percon 
JV." The rejection by the Treasury was due to two reasons. 
Firstly, Hazama-Mitsuibishi had made the bidding, the 
lowest among the tenderers, only after having discovered 
the bidding of their rivals secondly, the Treasury wish to 
give local firms an opportunity to participate in the 
proj ect.
Tate (1991) . 
Tate (1991) .
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7 .3 THE PRIVATISATION OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND ITS 
ACHIEVEMENT 
Listings of NEB on KLSE
Under the name of Tenaga Nasional Berhad(TNB), NEB was 
incorporated as a public limited company under the 
Malaysian Company Act 1965, corporatising its operation 
through the Electricity Supply (Successor Company) 1990. 
Pursuant to Section 3 of the Act, all properties, rights 
and liabilities of NEB were transferred to TNB. Its 
operations are regulated through a licence issued by the 
Director General of Electricity Supply. The licence is 
valid for twenty one years but it does not however contain 
any provision for renewal."
Privatisation Achiements
7.3.1 Reducing financial burden of government on
providing infrastructure. 
Revenue collected from listings
TNB listed 3 0 percent of its shares on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) on 28.05.1992 at M$8.00 a share, a 
premium of M$3.50 above its issue price of M$4.50." At 
M$4.50 a share TNB was valued at M$13.5 billion which was 
about 10 percent of market capitalization of the 300 
companies listed on the KLSE." The listing was the biggest 
in the flotation history in the country. The capital 
accumulated during the listing which was six times
Interview source.
TNB opening premium of M$3.50 is one of the highest ever recorded by 
a company going public. Sports Toto Malaysia Berhad registered M$3.15 above its issue price, Edaran Mobil Nasional Berhad (EON) at M$1.2 0 and Southern Bank M$1.50 above their issue prices.
Financial Times, 18.02.1992.
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oversubscribed, would have been sufficient to absorb its 
entire shares if they were put up for the listing.
However, the shares of TNB were seriously underpriced. 
Using a "fully paid" basis, the Government stood to collect 
M$6 billion before expense from the issues. The market 
valued these issues, at an opening prices, at M$3 billion. 
Thus the loss to the government amounted to over 5 0 percent 
of the value as a result of underpricing. Although some 
loss was inevitable," the amount involved in this case is 
surely excessive. The cost of underpricing was in conflict 
with the financial objectives of the privatisation 
programme and equity distribution. The technique used to 
determine the listings premium did not benefit either the 
Government or the tax payer. The issue is then who 
benefited from the underpricing? Generally three groups 
benefited from it . Firstly, the "priority applicants" 
which include the privileged institutions and companies 
listed with the Ministry of Finance which provide pre­
placed shares to those entitled. These institutions include 
the unit trusts such as National Unit Trust (ASN), 
Bumiputra Unit trust (ASB), some cooperatives. Employees 
Provident Funds, Pilgrimage Board and the Bank Simpanan 
Nasional. Secondly, the Bumiputra companies which qualify 
in fulfilling certain criteria and thirdly, the 
underwriters who earn their commission for standing by to 
take up shares in the event of a flop.
However some might argue that the underpricing is justified 
since the market's capacity to handle such large issue was 
in doubt. Such arguments have little basis for two reasons. 
First looking at the listing record of the KLSE, as
Inevitable because there needs to be a margin between the premium and the listing price to attract investors investing in the listed company. The question is what is the right margin between the premium and the listings price. In the context of the listing of TNB, the margin of M$3.50 a share is the gain earned by the shareholder on every unit held. Had the premium been higher more revenue would be accrued by the Government. In a way, the lower the premium the more revenue forgone by the Government.
233
discussed in Chapter 2, all those companies seeking 
listings on the KLSE were over subscribed by many times 
over. This includes the privatisation of the Telecom shares 
which was the largest flotation in the history of KLSE 
before the privatisation of TNB. Second, Security Companies 
have correctly estimated in their studies that the actual 
price of the TNB shares would be in the region of M$8.00 a 
share. However, the loss to the Government is cushioned by 
the fact that the Government still holds 73 percent of 
TNB's equity. In the event if the Government fully divests 
its interest in TNB, it stands to gain from the increase in 
share TNB's share prices after its listing. In addition the 
loss can be treated as a transfer payment from the Federal 
Government to government institutional holders and 
cooperatives which received pre-placed shares during the 
listings. Since a large part of the shares went to
institutional investors one would argue that the public 
nevertheless received the indirect benefit of the listings.
Another feature of the privatisation of TNB, just like the 
Malaysian Airline System and the Telecommunication 
Department, was that it was partial. There are two
justifications for adopting this policy. Firstly, the 
Government was cautious in its strategy in carrying out the 
privatisation programme. Privatisation on a partial basis 
will ensure that mistakes or errors made can be absorbed 
and rectified instead of facing a disastrous outcome. Full 
privatisation requires substantial investment from the
domestic capital market : the risk was too high to
undertake. Secondly, going for full divestiture would 
create a crowding out effect on other listings in other 
sectors. For example in 1994, the banking sector provided 
a total of M$12 billion loan to the public for purchase of 
shares in listed companies." In addition the policy 
ensures that the capital market has the capacity to absorb
® This is higher than the previous year (1993) of M$11.5 billion. Utusan Malaysia, 09.02.95.
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future listings as the privatisation programme gains 
momentum where more utilities and projects will be 
privatised.
Impact on the financial performance of TNB 
Short term
The profitability of TNB from financial year 1990/91 to 
financial year 1993/94 is shown in Table below.
Table 7.2 : TNB's Profit and Loss (1990-1994)
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Turnover 3 , 6 8 8 . 3 4,269.2 5,010.6 5 , 6 0 8 . 8
Total Operating Exp 2 , 9 9 6 . 4 2,865.1 3 , 1 7 4 . 9 3 , 6 2 2 . 4
Profit Before Taxation 6 9 1 . 9 1,404.1 1,835.7 1 , 9 8 6 . 4
Taxation (194.8) (263 . 7 ) (315.4) ( 258 . 4 )
Profit After Taxation 497.1 1,140.4 1,519.9 1 , 7 2 8 . 0
Dividends (Net) (35.2) (131.9) (241.9) (252.6)
Retained Profit 461.9 1,008.5 1,278.0 1 , 4 7 5 . 4
Source: TNB's Annual Report 1990/91 to 1993/94
The above Table shows that profit has been increasing at an 
average of 54.9 percent per annum. This is attributable to 
rising electricity demand and turnover growth of 14.2 
percent and 15.0 percent respectively, against a 6 percent 
average annual increase operating costs. The low increase 
in operating cost is partly due to the savings in fuel 
costs and the lower interest payable due to the debt 
rescheduling (Chapter 6) as shown in Table 7.3.
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Table 7.3 ;: Breakdown of Debt Currency {%) : 1990-1994"
1990/91 1991/92 1993/94
Ringgit 21.0 29.0 31. 0
Yen 31.0 26 . 0 25 . 0
US Dollar 28.0 20.0 21. 0
European 19 . 0 24 . 0 18 . 0
Others 1. 0 1. 0 5 . 0
Total 100.0 100.0 100 . 0
Total Borrowed 5,580.6 5,810.0 6,584.1
Note :
a : Total debt for 1992/93 financial year was M$5,382.No break down available.
Source : NEB's Annual Reports, 1990/91 to 1993/94.
Profit Before Tax in 1994 has increased by 2.4 times as 
compared to 1990 when it was corporatised. This has 
benefited the Government through a) increase in taxation 
from revenue and b) increase in dividends from 70 percent 
holding of equity in TNB. The increase in profitability has 
made TNB financially strong as retained profit has also 
increase by 3 times since the 1990/1991 financial year. 
Given the current scenario, where the IPPs has invested 
about M$9 billion to meet capacity expansion until year 
2,000, TNB should be cash rich. This will benefit TNB in 
the long run where expansion of capacity can be financed 
through internally generated fund thus lowering debt equity 
ratio. A low debt equity ratio will ensure higher 
profitability due to lower costs of capital. Table 7.4 
shows that TNB has been able to reduce its production costs 
by 12 cents a unit while maintaining its electricity price 
as shown in the Table below.
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Table 7.4: Revenue, costs, capital expenditure and employees(1990-1994)
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Total Unit Sold 19,538.0 22,630.8 25,484.7 29,132.9
Sales Revenue 3,515.2 4,089.8 4,819.3 5,408.1
Cost / unit of elec 15.3 12.8 12.5 12.4
Price / unit of elec 18 . 0 18 .1 18.9 18 .6
Capital Expenditure 1,931.4 3,076.0 4,052 .1
Employees 23,065 22,752 22,767 24,281
Source: NEB's Annual Reports : 1990/91 to 1993/94
Long term
In the long run, TNB's revenue will depend on a) its 
capacity expansion and higher demand growth of electricity 
in the sector b) efficiency and cost saving measures c) 
diversifications into unrelated business activities. The 
prospect of the financial performance will depend on the 
following factors :
Capacity expansion and demand growth
Traditionally electricity growth has always been higher 
than GDP growth. Economic Growth in the Sixth Malaysia Plan 
is expected to exceed the average of 8 percent per annum 
exceeding the 7 percent forecasted." The shift in the 
sectoral composition of TNB's consumers towards industrial 
users will be a key factor in demand growth for electricity 
in the future. The M$80 billion investment target for the 
manufacturing sector during this period is expected to be 
surpassed. In 1990 and 1991 alone total investment in the
The Treasury releasing the Economic Report in October 1994 forecasts GDP growth in 1994 and 1995 to be 8.5 percent for both years, NST, 22.11.1994.
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manufacturing sector totalling M$56.4 billion." Demand for 
electricity during the Sixth Malaysia Plan is forecast to 
grow at an average rate of 12 percent per annum as compared 
to GDP growth of 7.5 percent per annum.
Reducing transmission and distribution losses
Future operating profit may also be improved through 
minimising electricity losses during transmission and 
distribution. TNB is investing in better transmission and 
distribution lines, replacing some of the existing old 
66kV, 132kV and 275kV cables which stretch 11,000
kilometres throughout Peninsular Malaysia, and is upgrading 
to higher voltage cable 6,110 km cable of 500kV by year 
2000." Losses would thus be reduced. Based on the 
estimated generation figure a reduction by one percent will 
provide TNB with extra revenue of M$65 million in 1995 and 
M$70 million in 1996.
Equity stake in IPPs companies
The Government has imposed condition on the IPPs that an 
equity of 20 percent should be offered to TNB. Although TNB 
is not obliged to take up the offer, it would be difficult 
to interpret if it is not doing so. Besides revenue, TNB's 
other benefit is its eligibility to sit on the Board of 
Directors. This would provide TNB with accessability to 
inside information thus reducing asymmetric information 
problems on competitors.
Diversifying into unrelated activities
The Minister dismissed the possibility of NEB diversifying
As revealed by Minister of Trade and Industry in addressing on National Conference on Industrialisation in Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur. NST, 17.06.1994.
As revealed by TNB's Chairman. Utusan Malaysia, 24.09.1993.
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its business activities after it is listed on KLSE. " 
Tenaga is licensed as a utility company supplying power. If 
it undertakes other businesses, then it is incompatible 
with the licence granted to it. However, with the 
privatisation programme, TNB could diversify into non­
energy related business activities" through subsidiary 
companies. The license granted is silent on the range of 
activities permitted to TNB. Accordingly TNB has set up 
subsidiaries to diversify into activities which are not 
related to its core business of generating, transmitting 
and supplying electricity." TNB has a substantial land 
asset which is located in the prime residential areas in 
the city such as in Kenny Hills, Taman Duta and Jalan 
Ampang in which it is keen to develop." It is also 
venturing into unrelated business and there is a 
possibility that it will be venturing offshore in future." 
TNB is diversifying into non related business’^® area to 
help it expand its business activities.
Venturing into international markets
TNB has also formed a joint venture company with one of the
The Star, 03.01.1992.
TNB's Memorandum and Articles of Association empowers it to carry on any business activity except that of life insurance, fire insurance or banking.
Tenaga Nasional Engineering Consultancy Sdn Bhd (TNEC) Managing Director in an interview with NST. TNEC is a wholly owned subsidiary of TNB. It has secured a few hundred million ringgit worth of contract for conversion of the Malacca Power Station into combined cycle plant. NST, 25.17.1994.
In a paper on Privatisation of Tenaga Nasional Berhad presented by its Managing Director in a Seminar on Malaysian Securities Market in Tokyo, Japan on 29 .11.1991,
Malaysian Digest, February/March, 1994.
Tenaga Nasional Engineering Consultancy Sdn Bhd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of NEB was set up to venture into new business. It also provides consultancy services to IPP Genting Sanyen Power Sdn Bhd and Sikap Energy 
Ventures Sdn Bhd. New Straits Times, 25.05.1994.
New Straits Times, 03.01.1994.
239
largest hydro-electric power companies in the world, 
Kvaerner Energy AS of Norway, to undertake power 
development project world wide.^^ In addition TNB was 
having negotiation with several Indian state authorities on 
the privatisation of power projects in I n d i a . T o  
undertake the IPP projects, TNB has formed a joint venture 
company with two Indian firms and signed a memorandum of 
understanding with a group of Malaysian companies" to 
undertake a 2x500MW coal-fired thermal plant costing about 
M$1.8 billion in Tamil Naidu."^ ®
Policy on reserved capacity.
Future profit will also be greatly affected by the 
Government policy of having TNB's adopt a reserve margin of 
35 percent by 1995 as compared to 10 percent in 1993." A 
higher reserve margin is a means of securing better 
security of supply by constructing more generating plants 
at the expense of profitability. With more new generating 
plants, operating allocations for depreciation and interest 
rates will eat into operating profit. However this could be 
offset by the growth in demand for electricity which is 
expected to be in the region of 12 percent per annum.
Kvaerner Energy AS is a supplier of power plant equipment to TNB fora number of projects. The company has signed memorandum of understanding relatingto the formation of joint venture in 1994 to undertake a 29MW power project in Philippines. The two parties are also identifying hydro-electricity projects in Vietnam, Laos, India and Latin America where there is huge hydro-electric power potential. NST, 15.10.1994.
As revealed by TNB's Chairman. NST, 14.10.1994.
It is reported that TNB will have a 4 0 percent stake, Usaha Tegas Energy Sdn Bhd 3 0 percent, Arab Development Bank 2 0 percent and an individual 10 percent. NST, 14.10.1994.
As reported in the New Delhi Financial Daily a consortium led by TNBhas been awarded stage four of thermal power project in Tamil Naidu. NST,13.09.1994 .
As revealed by the Minister of Energy the proposal to have 3 5 percent reserve margin was recommended by the National Grid Company from Britain in its study to ascertain and overcome the power crisis in Malaysia.
TNB Annual Report, 19 91.
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7.3.2 New Economic Policy and wider share of ownership 
Wider ownership of capital
The objective of widening share of capital can be discussed 
in terms of the distribution of share holdings as listed 
below :
Table 7.6 : Distribution of Share holding: 1993 and 1994
Size of Share- % Share- %share holding holders holdings
1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994 1993 1994
1 499 6 6 0 . 0™ 0 . 0 600 600 0.0”
500 5, 000 98,488 75,785 96 .1 95.1 131,299,700 105,822,400 4 .4 3.5
5,001 - 10,000 2, 617 2,473 2.6 3 .1 19,101,000 18,107,000 0 . 6 0 . 6
10,001 - 100,000 1, 051 1,231 1.0 1,5 24,794,400 29,305,000 0.8 10 . 0
100,001 - 1,000,000 138 126 0 .1 0.2 53,894,000 47,041,700 1.8 1.5
> 1,000 , 000 82 84 0.1 0.1 2,786,180,300 2,839,398,300 92 .4 93 .4
Total 100,374 79,705 100 . 0 100 . 0 3,786,180,300 3,039,675,000 100 . 0 100 . 0
Source; TNB's Annual Reports 1992/93 and 1993/94
It is obvious that the distribution of ownership is highly 
skewed: 82 big shareholders control 92.4 percent of the
shares. The majority of the 98,448 shareholders hold 
minority shares of just 4.4 percent of the total shares 
listed reflecting the uneven distribution of the share 
holdings. However the 82 majority shareholders come from 
institutional investors constituting unit trusts investors, 
cooperatives and various state Governments. This provides 
the justification for better distribution of ownership 
among the public. For example the National Unit Trust (ASN) 
and the Bumiputra Unit Trust (ASB) have about 3 million 
investors registered between them. The Government allocated 
3 million TNB's share to a cooperative MOCCIS as a measure
0.00598
0.00002
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to redistribute wealth arising out of the privatisation 
programme.®® Perak state Government was allocated 4 million 
TNB shares at M$4.50 a unit by the Ministry of Finance." 
Similarly Penang State Government was allocated 2 million 
units. ®^
In order to ensure wider share of ownership among the 
public more shares should be allocated to the unit trusts, 
pension boards and cooperatives in future divestment 
programme. ®® This strategy will provide a better 
opportunity for the small investors who cant afford to buy 
shares on the KLSE" to invest in TNB through their 
membership in such organisation.
New Economic Policy
Number of Bumiputra shareholders
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the objectives of the NEP 
is to achieve 3 0 percent Bumiputra equity in the commercial 
and industrial sector in the country. The Government in 
its rationale for the privatisation policy has regarded the 
privatisation programme as a tool for achieving this 
objective. The achievement of the NEP with regard to the 
privatisation of the NEB can be illustrated from the 
following breakdown of TNB's share holding at the end of
®® Deputy Minister of Finance. Berita Minggu, 21.06.1992.
®^  As revealed by the Public Enterprise and Industry Chairman. The Star,13.10.1992.
®^  The Star, 18.06.1992.
There are about 600 out of 3 000 cooperatives which are properly run in the country.
Shares a traded in lots basis of 1000 units/shares each. Assuming a share price of M$14 a unit (the highest ever achieved by TNB's shares, one needs to have M$14, 000 to buy TNB shares on the stock market. This is beyond the affordabality of average Malaysians. By allocating shares to Unit Trusts more ordinary Malaysians, including the poor, would be in a position to participate in the scheme as each unit trust shares cost only M$1.00.
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the financial year:
Table 7.7 : Composition of share holding (1991 - 1994)
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 Change
Bumiputra shareholders 86,076 62,714 27,765 ( 3 ) x
Non Bumiputra shareholders 111,053 92,237 51,343 (2) X
Institutional shareholders 1,880 1,600 884 2 X
International shareholders 195 280 274 41%
Government shareholders 23 34 40 74%
Nominees 79 167 173 2x
Notes :( ) denotes decline X denotes times
Source: TNB Annual Report, 1991-1993
From Table 7.7, it is obvious that the individual investors 
have been declining in numbers thus confirming the 
suspicion that most of those who participated in the 
listings were short-termist individual investors. The 
number of Bumiputra individual holders have decreased by 3 
times as compared to twice of the non Bumiputras. One 
possible reason is that many of the Bumiputra individual 
investors were also National Unit Trust (ASN) and Bumiputra 
Unit Trust (ASB) unit holders who sold their unit trusts 
shares to buy TNB shares and then resold them after the
listings, making some profits on the transactions." If the 
profit made by the individual Bumiputra unit trust holder 
is further invested in investment activity such as buying
Before the listings of TNB, Tenaga shares were fetching at M$6.30 in the black market, i.e M$2.10 above its premium price of M$4.50 a share. It was reported that these shares were mainly offered by Bumiputra investors who have been informed of an allocation of the shares. Business Times, 13.03.1992 .
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unit trust shares or future premium listings on KLSE or 
invested in business venture then it helps Government 
efforts toward achieving the NEP objective. However, if the 
profit is used for personal consumption then it is 
detrimental to the achievement of the 3 0 percent Bumiputra 
equity participation as targeted by the NEP. However, in 
terms of investment, holding TNB shares promise higher 
future returns than holding unit trust shares. This is 
because holding TNB's shares provides the unit trust 
investors with dividend in the short run and capital 
appreciation of share value in the long run. Thus from long 
term investment point of view one would expect the unit 
trust investors to retain their TNB's. Thus one can 
conclude that the unit trust investors sold their TNB's 
shares for personal consumptions.
Since 1991/92 the ratio of Bumiputra to non-Bumiputra 
individual holders has been declining from 86 : 111 to
27:51. However to make a more meaningful assessment of the 
achievement of the NEP, one needs know value of shares own 
by the individual Bumiputra investors. A similar trend is 
observed for institutional shareholders. It is difficult to 
know whether institutions sold their shares for the purpose 
of further investment or just for quick money to be 
distributed as dividends to its shareholders. The long term 
investors come from the Government shareholders and 
international shareholders and these have increased in 
numbers. However there is an increasing trend in the 
preference of individual investors towards using nominee 
companies to take charge of their investment as reflected 
in the increase in the number of nominee companies as 
shareholders of TNB.
Bumiputra equity participation
The list of 20 Major shareholders in 1993 and 1994 are as 
follows :
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Table 7.8 : Institutional Breakdown of Share holding {1993-19941
Nov 1993 Nov 1994
Ministry of Finance Inc 72.871 22.409
Khazanah Holdings Bhd - 39.679
Central Bank - 8.389
Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB) 2 . 033 2.112
Amanah Saham Bumiputra (ASN) 4 .388 4.221
Nominee Companies 7.679 9.308
Institutions® 1.725 2.546
State 0.321 0.286
Total Percentage 89.623 90.531
Total shares 2, 702,340,300 2,750,350,800
Notes : a Includes Bank Simpanan Nasional Berhad (0.611%),LTAT (0.390%), LUTH (0.335%), EPF (1.210%)
Source: TNB Annual Reports, 1992/93 and 1993/94
The above figures show that only 17 percent of the shares 
were allocated for individual shareholders with 7.679 
percent through nominee companies. Surprisingly the 
Government did not allocate 3 0 percent of the total shares 
to Bumiputra which would be in accordance with the NEP 
objectives of Bumiputra equity participation in TNB. In 
terms of equity participation, Bumiputra institutions (PNB, 
ASN. ASB, LTAT and LUTH) hold only about 7 percent of the 
total shares. However data is not available on the share 
holding breakdown for nominee companies and individual in 
order to know the actual equity participation of the 
Bumiputra community. One possible reason as to why the 
Government did not allocate 30 percent of TNB shares to 
Bumiputras is the perceived limited Bumiputra funds to 
undertake such a big allocation which would undermine 
future Bumiputra participation in KLSE listings.
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To address the issue of Bumiputra individuals selling their 
pre-placed shares given to Bumiputra community and 
jeopardise Government effort to achieve the 30 percent 
target, any future divestment of Government equity in TNB 
should be allocated, at least 3 0 percent, to Bumiputra 
institutions such as LTAT, LUTH, PNB, ASN, ASB and all the 
9 state unit trust companies. This will ensure that the 
investment caters for a more wider share of ownership among 
Bumiputras in the long run.
Construction projects
The small and medium Bumiputra contractors are also 
benefiting from the privatisation programme. TNB has 
allocated M$500 million worth of contracts to Bumiputra 
contractors to undertake construction works in 1995." The 
construction of the 400 km of 500kv transmission network 
worth of M$8.8 billion was awarded to a consortium of PNB 
and MRCB between 1996 to 2000." One of the critical issues 
involving Bumiputra contractors participating in TNB 
projects is the allowance of 20 percent above tender 
price." This policy does not take into consideration the 
aim of achieving the lowest possible production cost and 
ultimately higher costs will have to be passed over to the 
consumers. This is an example of efficiency versus equity 
in distribution and the multiple conflicting objectives of 
the privatisation programme which underline the difficulty 
of achieving all stated objectives of the programme.
State Economic Development Corporation (SEDCs) 
participation
In 1994, the Ministry of Energy has started a vendor scheme programme for small and medium Bumiputra construction firms to undertake projects in the privatised companies such as Telekom and TNB. For this programme Telekom has allocated M$800 million worth of project to these firms. New Straits Times 27.01.95.
New Straits Times, 28.01.95 
Interview source,
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The privatisation programme has provided an opportunity for 
SEDCs to participate in the electricity sector. Three SEDCs 
submitted application and approved for licence on joint 
venture basis with the private sectors. This includes the 
Hypergantic Sdn Bhd a subsidiary of Negeri Sembilan State 
Government teaming up with TNB, Sime Darby and Malaysian 
Resources Corporation Bhd, to build M$1 billion 450 MW 
natural gas power plant®®, Melaka Power Sdn Bhd, a joint 
venture between Melaka SEDC with TNB, Arab Malaysian 
Development Berhad and Power Tech Sdn Bhd building a M$ 
900 million 250 MW combined cycle plant®®, and Landmarks 
Bhd, Perils SEDC with Time Engineering building M$1.4 
billion 600 MW power plant®^. Sikap Sdn Bhd is a 100 
percent Bumiputra company®^ and some of its shareholders 
were former TNB executives.®® The participation of the 
SEDCs in the IPPs projects have two positive effects on the 
public. Firstly, as electricity generation is a lucrative 
business i.e an ever expanding business in terms of demand 
growth with little risks on the demand side, SEDCs 
involvement will generate revenue to the state in the form 
of a dividend which enables the government to continue 
undertaking developmental projects for the benefit of the 
public. This will help to reduce the dependency of the 
state government on Federal budget and to lessen the 
Federal Government financial burden on those states. In a 
wider context, many state's Government such as Penang, 
Perak and Pahang, and institutions and cooperatives also 
hold shares in the privatised TNB. Secondly, the 
involvement of SEDCs contributes towards the achievement of 
the NEP objective of creating a Bumiputra commercial
91
92
93
New Straits Times, 28.05,1993. 
ibid.
New Straits Times, 26.02.1992. 
New Straits Times, 02.03.1993. 
New Straits Times, 24,02.1993.
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society through Bumiputra exposure and participation in the 
electricity sector. Priority is given to Bumiputra 
participation in the electricity generation sector. In 
issuing new licences priority will be given to local 
companies with majority Bumiputra equity." However, this 
will not really guarantee Bumiputra participation in the 
generation sector. The rent seeking activities could hamper 
Government objectives of achieving Bumiputra participation 
in the industry. As observed by Kasper (1987) regulation in 
Malaysia has created profit seeking by lobbying and 
political connection rather than hard work, investment and 
risk taking. A licence for electricity generation is not 
based on open tendering process and can be sold at a high 
premium. Sikap Energy Ventures was sold to new 
shareholders, later known as Segari Energy Ventures, before 
it became an established company. The new shareholders 
consist of Malakoff Bhd (75 percent), TNB (20 percent) and 
Malaysian Resources Corporation Bhd (MRCB)". In line with 
the issue raised by Kasper on rent seeking activities, the 
Government is concerned about Bumiputras company selling 
their licence for quick gains. To avoid this problems, the 
Government should consider imposing conditions where the 
license given is not transferable to new ownership without 
the approval of the regulatory body. One would argue that 
this will lead to more intervention by the regulator in the 
industry and is contrary to market discipline in 
determining efficiency in the industry. However, this is a 
trade off between more intervention by the regulator and 
ensuring wider distribution of ownership among a racial 
group to meet the objective of more Bumiputra participation 
in the electricity industry. This strategy needs to be 
adopted in order to counter the possible rent seeking 
activities to get the licence by interested parties.
New Straits Times, 02.11.1994.
Malakoff Bhd is wholly-owned by MRCB. New Straits Times 07.09.1994
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7.3.3 Efficiency / Quality of service 
Efficiency
No studies have been done to measure the impact of the 
privatisation programme on the efficiency of TNB in terms 
of total factor productivity analysis possibly because of 
two reasons. Firstly, less published data is available on 
technical and financial matters after the corporatisation 
and privatisation of the NEB. Information such as the 
thermal efficiency, load factor, and electricity loss were 
not available as such information is treated as trade 
secrets." Secondly, a comparison based on a two year time 
series data does not provide meaningful comparison.
However, the privatisation has addressed the question of 
incentives, the central issue of property right theorists, 
to motivate NEB employees to achieve better efficiency. 
Incentives were given in 3 forms / shares, increases in pay 
and a bonus. The Executive Chairman and the Managing 
Director were each allocated 300 thousand units and 250 
thousand units respectively under the ESOS scheme." 
Several other senior executives were allocated as high as 
200 thousand units." The lay Board of Directors were 
allocated 10 thousand shares each. In addition TNB also 
allocated 2 million shares to 375 of its pensioners." 
However, in conforming to the status of Government 
employee, the Government appointed Board of Directors 
through the various Ministries, did not get any allocation 
of shares. This policy demonstrated the basic fundamental
These technical indicators, after privatisation, are presented only in graphic forms in the Annual Reports.
TNB Annual Report, 19 92/93
®® As disclosed by TNB's Executive Chairman, New Straits Times,09.04.1992.
®® Berita Harian, 16.03.1992.
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difference of incentives between public and private 
enterprises (although TNB is still 70 percent owned by the 
Government).
TNB also introduced an employee loyalty scheme which is 
being introduced for the first time in the privatisation 
programme, essentially aimed at encouraging employees to 
retain TNB shares for a longer duration. Under the 
scheme, TNB employees have options to subscribe for 
additional shares in TNB provided they still retained the 
Pink Form shares for a specific period of time.
There was also no retrenchment exercise in the 
privatisation of TNB. The policy was adopted for three 
reasons. Firstly, the company is forbidden to take such 
action within 5 years after privatisation. This is to 
protect the employees from being dismissed on ground of 
cost cutting measures by TNB. Second, electricity is a 
growing industry and TNB could absorb its excess staff, if 
any, to support its expansion programme. Thirdly TNB could 
reduce its staff through attrition. With the participation 
of IPPs many of TNBs staff will be recruited by the IPPs as 
they need more experienced staff to join their operations 
thus eliminating the possibility of retrenchment measures.
However, the privatisation programme has increased staff 
costs and benefits as shown in the Table below.
New Straits Times, 11.02.1992.
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Table 7. 9 : Staff Cost and Benefits {M$'000)
1989/90 1990/91 1991/92
Total Staff Cost
Basic Salary (1) 203,954 282,437 288,948
Overtime 49,043 65,916 78,740
Bonus - 41,000 56,084
Entertainment Allowance 2,855 3,122 3,071
Others(2) 16,303 14,833 14,724
Total Salaries 272,155 407,308 441,567
Employees Benefit
Medical and dispensary 17,992 21,366 22,300
Pension & Gratuities 20,484 35,391 40,253
EPF 24,032 32,937 33,995
Others 1,826 17,061 27,339
Total Employees Benefits 64,334 106,755 123,887
Total Staff Cost 336,489 514,063 565,454
Notes
(1) Includes entertainment allowance, electricity allowance, hardship allowance, dhoby allowance.
(2) Includes ;
Unrecorded leave 830 1,400 1,243Local Leave Pay 31,539 29,200 29,579Sick Leave Pay 3,820 4,724 5,006Sports Leave 298 404 327Total 36,487 35,728 36,155
Source: TNB Source Internal Report (1993)
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When TNB was corporatised in 1991, salaries jumped by 
almost 40 percent from about M$203 million to M$282 million 
to bring them into line with salaries in the private 
sector. In the same year a bonus was given, although not 
after a hard confrontation and negotiation between the 
Management and the Unions. However, two notable features 
were unusual or inconsistent with the corporatisation and 
privatisation policy. One, the increase in overtime by 
almost 30 percent from M$49 million to M$65.9 million in 
1990. Two, the exceptionally high medical expenses and 
dispensary of M$21 million, and sick leave pay of M$4.7 
million. We will address this issue in the light of the 
theory of bureaucracy, property rights theory and the X- 
Inefficiency theory in a later part of this Chapter.
Quality of service
The privatisation of TNB has put pressure on TNB to improve 
its quality of service and to be more responsive to 
customer needs. Consumers were accorded certain rights as 
spelt out in the terms and conditions of the licence given 
to TNB, the most important of which are restoration of 
electricity supply within four hours in the event of an 
interruption and within two days in the event of a 
blackout. TNB is obliged to make arrangements to collect 
payment for bills from the handicapped and senior citizens 
who might have problems travelling. Written complaints 
should be answered within seven days of receipt of letter 
and twenty four hours for complaints by telephone. 
Disconnection of supply for non-payment of bills are to be 
reconnected the same day if payment is made before one p.m. 
TNB officials should not arrive later than 30 minutes after 
the appointment and any postponement of appointment should 
not be delayed by more than two days.
As disclosed by the Director General of Electricity Supply Department (JBE) in New Straits Times, 03.09.1994
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market discipline
Since its privatisation, TNB has been exposed to market 
discipline in terms of its accountability to the 
consumers. The cost of the September 1992 power failure in 
the form of losses registered by firms was massive. The 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange recorded a M$17 million losses 
resulting from one day suspension of o p e r a t i o n , X96 
firms lost a total of M$219^°^ in revenue while TNB itself 
lost M$6 million^^. It was reported that some consumers 
were contemplating taking legal action against TNB because 
of the losses incurred during the blackout.In addition, 
nine factories in Penang were filing compensation claims 
totalling M$17.6 million for losses suffered in January and 
March due to further supply disruptions.The Director 
General of Electricity Supply Department clarified that 
those firms and factories which experience disruptions in 
electricity supply can take TNB to court if they believe 
that TNB has contravened the contract of supplying 
e l e c t r i c i t y . "^7 Commenting on this, the Deputy Minister of 
Energy pointed out that TNB will not compensate 
corporations which suffered heavy losses during the 
September power failure as it was caused by natural 
disaster.
Evidently, the privatisation of NEB has made the company
New Straits Times, 03.10.1992.
New Straits Times, 14.02.1993.
Utusan Malaysia, 03.03.1993.
As confirmed by the Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer 
of Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM). New Straits Times, 14/2/1993.
Confirmed by the Chief Minister of Penang. NST, 24/6/93.
Utusan Malaysia, 06.10.1992.
The Star, 12.10.1993. He was quoted as saying, "TNB will not do so because the failure was caused solely by thunderstorm and lighting."
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contractually accountable to its customers. Penalty on non 
performance of contractual obligation to secure the 
reliability and security of supply as specified by the 
Electricity Act and stipulated in its license, is enforced 
through the court of law. Applying the rationale of the X- 
efficiency theory, this will spur the company to improve 
its efficiency in order to avoid the penalty of the market 
discipline, which comes not only in the form of maintaining 
the lowest possible cost of production so as to stay in 
business, but also in fulfilling its contractual 
obligation to customers.
7.4 INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS PARTICIPATION IN POWER
PROJECTS
The listings attracted international investors. The number 
of international shareholders increased from 195 in 1991/92 
to 280 in 1993/94 reflecting the international investors 
confidence in the long term investment growth of TNB.
However, in terms of foreign participation involvement in 
the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) it was
disappointing. This could be attributable to two reasons.
Firstly, foreign participation is on a minority basis which 
is not attractive to foreign companies and secondly these 
newly formed Malaysian companies do not have experience in 
running the electricity sector and therefore do not command 
the confidence of the foreign investors. For example, Sikap 
Energy Ventures Sdn Bhd offer of 25 percent equity to Asean 
Brown Bovari of Sweden^* was not taken up. Similarly, 
YTL Power failed to attract National Power Pic of the UK as
New Straits Times, 14.07.1993.
British Gas Pic initially indicated that it was interested to construct, operate and own a plant in Malaysia with local construction company (New Straits Times, 28.05.1993). However it did not materialise.
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the latter pulled out^ ^^  as both parties, YTL Corp the 
majority shareholder and National Power, failed to reach an 
agreement on the project^^ However, the lack of foreign 
participation shows that there is sufficient domestic 
capital to undertake electricity projects in the country as 
shown by their capability to raise M$9 billion to undertake 
the power projects.
7.5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter began with two policy issues: a) Why is
privatisation of the electricity sector desirable in 
Malaysia? and b) Has the privatisation of the electricity 
sector achieved its objectives?
To answer the first question we have examined the problems 
faced by NEB in running its operations which are related to 
the issue of ownership. As expected, NEB has been beseted 
by problems similar to most public enterprises in Malaysia 
as discussed in Chapter 3. These problems came in the form 
of government and political intervention, plural 
accountability, and bureaucratic delay and red tape which 
limit and constrain NEB from efficient operations. These 
problems have threatened security of electricity supply 
resulting a major blackout in the country in 1992. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, government and political 
interference in public enterprises is not surprising as 
there are tendencies for politicians to use public 
enterprises as a source of patronage, wealth and power. 
Evidence presented in this chapter on rent seeking 
behaviour and allegations of corruption by the politicians 
and the NEB's staff is a major cause of concern for 
efficient running of NEB. We have seen in this chapter.
Initially YTL Power shareholders were YTL Corp Bhd (55 percent), National Power Pic of UK (10 percent), Bumiputras individuals (30 percent) and International Finance Corporation (5 percent). New Straits Times, 14.07.1993.
New Straits Times, 23.07.1993.
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government and political intervention sometimes undermines 
investment and financial decisions of NEB. As politicians 
are utility maximising agents, political interference could 
led to financial and investment decision inconsistent with 
optimal management practices.
The second issue addressed in this chapter is whether 
privatisation of the electricity sector has met its 
intended objectives. Financially, the participation of the 
five IPPs have benefited the government. The IPPs have 
invested M$9 billion in capacity expansion programme 
relieving the government from its financial responsibility 
in providing electricity to the country. The Bakun hydro­
electricity project, which is to cater for the long term 
needs of the electricity in the country, is being 
undertaken by a private firm at a cost of M$17 billion 
(Chapter 8) . The IPPs participation in the electricity 
industry is crucial in ensuring rapid development of the 
economy in the future. Investment programme by the year 
2020 is estimated to be in the region of about M$100
billion. Similarly, the privatisation programme has placed 
TNB in a financially better position to undertake more 
projects in the future. With the prospect of increasing
revenue through diversifying into other business
activities, equity stakes in the IPPs companies and 
venturing into international markets TNB is expected to 
benefit from the privatisation programme as well.
The privatisation programme has also achieved the Bumiputra 
equity participation in the listings but with a worrying 
prospect of not being able to sustain the objectives as the 
number of Bumiputra individual shareholders is decreasing 
by the year. Similarly, the number of institutional 
shareholders have been declining while international and 
government shareholders has been increasing. These trends 
confirm that in the long run the objectives of wider share 
of ownership is difficult to sustain. In terms of
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efficiency it is not possible to measure its impact to make 
any meaningful evaluation given the short time frame of 
post privatisation period. However, indications are that 
NEB is now subjected to market discipline to ensure better 
reliability of supply.
The next chapter looks at electricity sector reform in 
Malaysia focusing on the government policy of introducing 
competition in the generation sector. As we have pointed 
out this is an essential element to accompany the 
privatisation programme to ensure the attainment of 
efficiency objective. It discusses the reform of the 
industry structure and its liberalisation i.e the opening 
up of competition or the removal of restrictions on
competition in order to increase efficiency of the
industry. It examines the present industry structure as a 
transitionary period to introduce limited form of
competition and an alternative model is developed for long
term achievement of efficiency objective. It looks at the 
rationale and objectives of the theory of regulation and 
methods of regulation. It then examines the regulatory 
framework of the industry and assesses the regulatory 
reform of the electricity industry.
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CHAPTER 8î ELECTRICITY REFORM IN MALAYSIA
Chapter seven discusses the problems of the electricity 
sector which provide justification for the privatisation of 
the NEB and the electricity sector. We have also looked at 
the achievements of the privatisation programme as measured 
against the intended objectives of the programme. As we 
have pointed out in the last chapter, it would be too 
premature to measure the success of the privatisation 
programme in terms of increased economic efficiency due to 
the limited time frame available for comparison. Although 
the NEB has been privatised, as we have seen, it still 
exhibits its pre-privatisation problem of government and 
political interference, poor planning and bureaucratic 
delay, and a poor track record of project implementation, 
which eventually led to the September 1992 blackout 
incident that affected the whole country.
The objective of this Chapter is two fold: firstly to
examine the impact of the Government policy of introducing 
IPPs into the electricity sector on the attainment of 
increased efficiency through competition, and then to 
provide an alternative model for increasing efficiency; and 
secondly, to look into the regulatory aspects required to 
ensure the realisation of such objectives in the short term 
(1993-2015) and long term (Post 2016) . This Chapter is 
organised as follows : Section 2 looks at participation of 
the private sector in the electricty industry after the 
black out incident in 1992 . Section 3 examines the present 
industry structure and discusses issues and problems 
relating to achieving the efficiency objectives of the 
privatisation programme. Section 4 examines an alternative 
model of industry structure and strategy to introduce 
competition to enhance efficiency in the electricity 
sector. Section 5 discusses the regulatory framework of 
the industry and examines the effectiveness of the 
regulatory body in discharging its role to introduce
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competition in the electricity sector. Section 7 provides 
a conclusion on issues discussed in this chapter.
8 .2 PARTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE ELECTRICITY 
INDUSTRY
As a temporary measure to ease the problem of power 
shortages in 1992, the Cabinet approved the issuing of 
licences for a duration of 6 months to allow factories to 
generate electricity to meet their own requirement.^ During 
this period the small private generators were given a 
subsidy of 9 cents per unit of electricity as their costs 
of production were higher by the same margin.^ However, 
this is unlikely to continue in the long run as producing 
electricity at a higher price than that of TNB is 
inefficient and requires government subsidies. To redress 
the shortage of electricity supply, the Government invited 
IPPs to participate in electricity generation. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, IPPs participation in 
the electricity sector was planned to materialise only in 
1994. Thus, the awarding of licences to the IPPs in 1993 
was done not on efficiency motives but in response to the 
blackout incident, to provide a quick solution to the power 
shortages facing the country. As we will see later this has 
had serious effects, in the short run as well as in the 
long run, on the efficiency of the electricity sector.
The Government conceded that one of the reasons for 
inviting the participation of the IPPs in the electricity
The Star, 30.06.1993.
 ^ The New Straits Times, 12.02.1993. Based on the 1992/93 cost ofproduction of electricity of TNB of 12.4 cents a unit, the cost of production of the private generators is therefore estimated to be in the region of about 21.4 cents a unit. Looking at this figure, there was no loss to the commercial consumers as commercial rates was 21.22 cents a unit. However, there is a possibility of the industrial customers making a gain of about 1.45 cents for every unit they produced. This is because the cost of production was 12.4, 1.45 cents less than the industrial rates of 13.85 cents a unit. The amount of subsidy paid by TNB could not be estimated because of lack of available data on the amount of electricity generated by the small generators.
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sector is the inability of TNB to provide efficient 
generation and to meet the demand growth resulting from 
constraints and limitations faced by TNB.^ It announced its 
decision to invite the private sector's participation in 
power generation in September 1991 on an open tender 
process/ Priority is given to local companies which have 
joint venture arrangements with foreign companies, or local 
companies which have a working cooperation with companies 
that have the necessary experience in power transmission. 
The rationale for this policy is first, to encourage 
foreign firms to provide funds and invest in the 
electricity sector in Malaysia and second, to benefit from 
foreign organisational and operational expertise and 
transfer technology from foreign firms to Malaysia. The 
response from the private sector was encouraging as 
reflected by the 2 0 proposals^ received by the Economic 
Planning Unit before August 1992. Most of the interested 
parties were construction based companies in a joint 
venture basis with foreign firms.^
The power shortage problem was overcome within five months 
by increasing total installed capacity through the plant 
expansion programme and the fast-track plant construction 
programme undertaken by TNB. Ninety tonnes of power plant 
equipment was air-freighted in order to undertake the fast- 
track plant construction programme. "^ This was made possible 
because the Ministry had given full authority to TNB to 
solve the problems without interference. Additional 
installed capacity of the electricity sector will increase
Director General of ESD . New Straits Times, 03.09.1994.
Announced by Minister of Energy. Business Times, 03.09.1991.
 ^ However according to an interview source some of these were just in the form of letter of intent.
® Examples are Times Engineering Bhd and YTL Corporation both of which got their tender accepted. New Straits Times, 05.08.1992.
 ^ The New Straits Times, 03.01.1994.
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by 2,300 MW through IPPs participation which will cater for 
electricity demand until year 2000. The participation of 
the IPPs has shortened the planning period and relieved TNB 
to some extent of planning and construction activities in 
the electricity sector expansion programme. YTL Power, the 
first IPP to be awarded a licence, would provide 1,170 MW 
of electricity from its power plants in Paka in Trengganu 
and Pasir Gudang in Johor within 23 months of the licence 
being awarded in October 1992.® As a result of the 
installation of new CCGS plants the power project can be 
completed in a time frame of less than 15 months.
The participation of the IPP in generating activities has 
proved that it is possible to develop a local capital 
market to fund infrastructure projects in order to achieve 
privatisation objectives. The five IPPs have been able to 
raise about M$9 billion to participate in the generation of 
electricity.* By 1997 generation capacity is planned to 
reach 11,700 MW against a projected demand of 7,800MW - 
8, OOOMW. It is expected that by 1995, TNB will increase its 
reserved capacity to 35 percent to ensure a consistent 
supply of electricity in the country.
The IPPs electricity plants are expected to be in 
commission by 1996 when total installed capacity of the 
IPPs will constitute about 40 percent of the total 
installed capacity of about 10,000 MW. Only TNB has been 
given the licence to generate, distribute and supply 
electricity after the privatisation programme.
Awarding of IPPs licence
The process of obtaining an IPP licence was done on a
New Straits Times, 01.03.1993.
* The Minister of Energy. New Straits Times, 27/07/1993.
Revealed by the Minister of Energy in New Straits Times, 29.05.1993.
261
negotiation basis. One argument in support of the 
negotiated tender approach is that it is less bureaucratic 
and the decision making process is shortened. This approach 
was well suited for the Government in trying to solve the 
acute power shortages problem in the country. However, 
critics could argue that the awarding of licences to the 
IPPs on a negotiated basis has some fundamental flaws in 
achieving cost efficiency. Firstly, the negotiated tender 
approach encourages rent seeking activities (as discussed 
in Chapter 4)^  ^ which could work against the interest of 
the consumers. Secondly, an open tender approach would have 
been a better option both for TNB and the consumers as a 
whole where price is determined in the tender offer before 
the licence is awarded. This is argued for two reasons. 
Firstly, an open tender system including tenders from TNB 
would be a better alternative in terms of achieving the 
lowest production cost of electricity from competing 
sources. Secondly, the failure to achieve the lowest 
production cost will increase price, reduce the profit 
margin and the profitability of TNB. This leads to a loss 
of revenue to the Government in terms of less dividends and 
taxation received due to lower profitability than would 
have been otherwise. However, there is a problem associated 
with using the open tender approach. It would have given an 
advantage to TNB in making the offer price, as they have 
access to full information regarding the cost of building 
an electricity plant. Given the scenario, this information 
is costly for the IPPs which will give rise to high 
transaction costs (Chapter 4) involved in getting the 
licence. In addition TNB is in a position to quote lower 
production costs because of the possibility of cross 
subsidy within power plants. However, these problems could 
have been addressed by requiring TNB to submit its tender 
through a new subsidiary company. This would restrict cross
“ As discussed the rent seeking activities by the entrepreneurs from the private sector or the lobby group could lead to bribery and corruption. The cost incurred to the entrepreneurs could be built into the project cost which is then transferred to the price paid by the consumers.
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subsidy between plants or within departments in TNB as the 
subsidiary company would have separate legal and financial 
entities which could be easily accounted for.
Although electricity comes under the purview of the 
Electricity Supply Department and the Ministry of Energy, 
the awarding of licences and the negotiation process was 
handled by the Privatisation Unit of the Economic Planning 
Unit (EPU), Prime Minister Department. Some critics have 
questioned the involvement of the EPU in the implementation 
of the electricity privatisation programme especially its 
role in processing applications and negotiating the award 
of licences.^ There is a strong argument against the 
interference of EPU in the decision making process of 
awarding the licence. The jurisdiction actually comes under 
the purview of the Ministry of Energy which has delegated 
the responsibility to the Director General of Electricity 
Supply (DGES) . However, one can also look at the issue from 
three perspectives as to why involvement of the EPU was 
necessary at that time. Firstly, the Privatisation Unit of 
the EPU has been set up to oversee the planning and 
successful implementation of the privatisation programme in 
the country. By virtue of its set-up which is under the PM 
Department, it carries more weight or authority in getting 
things done to ensure successful implementation of the 
programme. Secondly, the track record of the Ministry of 
Energy in supervising, monitoring and ensuring the security 
of supply in the country has not been impressive, as 
reflected by the major power supply disruptions including 
the September blackout in 1992. Another failure of such 
magnitude, would be a detrimental to the economy and would 
undermine investors confidence to invest in the country. To 
overcome the shortage of electricity supply the Government
According to an interview source, this have caused some friction among officials on Ministries concerned. Two plausible reasons for this friction. One, there was no clear guidelines on roles and responsibilities of all the parties involved. Second, intervention by the EPU tends to weaken the decision making power of other Ministries.
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had to take drastic action to see its successful 
implementation. Thirdly, there is also a lack of expertise 
in the Ministry to undertake the programme on a negotiated 
tender basis.
Criteria of Awarding a Licence
The Government announced that local companies with foreign 
partners experienced in electricity would be given 
priority. In addition Bumiputra companies would be given 
special consideration.^® The participation of foreign 
companies was aimed at getting funding from abroad to part- 
finance the projects. However efforts made by applicants to 
get foreign partners did not materialise. Negotiations 
between YTL and the National Grid of Britain failed to 
agree on terms and conditions for the joint venture. 
Hypergantic also failed to team up with a company from 
United States for an undisclosed reason.^ With the 
exceptions of YTL, the other four IPPs are majority owned 
by Bumiputras.
Evidence shows that some of the IPPs were having financial 
difficulties in undertaking the project. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that some IPPs started to seek 
partners with strong financial standings to provide backing 
to the project only after the issuance of the licence. For 
example Sikap was reported to make an offer of equity 
participation to Perak State Government and National Equity 
Corporation (PNB), which was not taken up.^ ? It required a 
M$1 billion shareholders fund in order to obtain a M$2
“ As revealed by the Minister of Energy. The New Straits Times.
The New Straits Times .
The New Straits Times.
State Economic Development Boards, Bumiputra owned institutions and a minority of Bumiputra individuals.
New Straits Times, 24.02.1993.
2 6 4
billion loan to construct the M$3 billion project/® The 
company was later sold to Malakoff presumably because of 
the failure to get the right partners needed to provide the 
required shareholders fund in order to obtain project 
financing. With strong financial backing from the new 
shareholders Sikap, later renamed as Segari, was able to 
obtain financing facilities from the Employees Provident 
Fund (EPF) and two leading banks. Bank Bumiputra and 
Malayan Banking Berhad.^* Some view this as contrary to the 
government strategy of increasing Bumiputra participation 
in commercial and industrial sectors through the 
privatisation programme. It does not come as a surprise 
when later both the Prime Minister^ and the Minister of 
Energy commented that there were those who were given 
opportunity in the privatisation programme who sold their 
projects®® to others instead of undertaking them. YTL Power 
had similar problems of raising the capital. Final 
participation of TNB (20 percent), Employees Provident Fund 
(10 percent) Mayban Ventures (20 percent),John Laing 
Investment Singapore Pte Ltd and a Bumiputra company Bara 
Aktif Sdn Bhd,®® came after an initial failure to get other 
partners to undertake the project.
One important issue which needs to be addressed here is 
whether the procedure and criteria used by the authority®*
A criteria imposed by lenders is that at least one third of the total cost of project must come from the borrower.
New Straits Times, 13.04.1994.
According to interview source this is generally the view on many people in the relevant ministries concerned.
®^  Utusan Malaysia, 29.10.1994.
®® An interview source claimed that the initial shareholders of Sikap made a few millions from selling the company.
®® Utusan Malaysia, 15.09.1994.
The word authority is used here as there was confusion over who is really responsible in issuing the licences - Economic Planning Unit, Electricity Supply Department or Ministry of Energy.
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in awarding the licence is appropriate in ensuring 
successful completion of the project by the licensee. The 
awarding of licence without proper regards to financial 
standings of the applicants as demonstrated in both cases 
discussed above is a notable flaw in the Government's 
strategy. One way of over coming this problem in the future 
is to require applicants to have the necessary financial 
standing which will allow them to obtain loan facilities by 
banks or other lenders before being considered. This could 
be done by interested parties forming consortiums to vie 
for the projects.
Signing of Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
The negotiations and signing of the Power Purchase 
Agreements between TNB and the IPPs were completed after 
the IPPs had obtained their licence from the Electricity 
Supply Department (ESD). This had a negative impact on 
achieving the lowest cost of production possible which 
could have benefited the customers and the country as a 
whole. This is because given the acute problem of power 
shortages, TNB was faced with the conflicting objectives of 
maximisation of profit in terms of getting the best 
purchasing price of electricity from the IPPs, which would 
take a lengthy bargaining and negotiation period, or 
solving the shortage of electricity problem in the cause of 
the national interest by giving in to the price demand of 
the IPPs. In another words, while the IPPs could prolong 
the negotiation process, as time was on their side while 
TNB was faced with the task of solving the shortage of 
power problems at the shortest time possible. Thus, it 
makes it harder for TNB to get a better deal from the APPs 
agreement. The pressure was therefore on TNB to get the 
APPs accepted and signed without delay. This obviously has 
given the IPPs an advantage to get a better selling price 
deal for their electricity output. YTL Power, the first IPP 
to sign the APP got the highest price for its electricity
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at 15.5 cents a unit while Sikap achieved 13.5 cents a 
unit. The Minister of energy and the Chairman expressed 
their dissatisfaction over the purchasing price of the 
electricity which TNB has to pay to the IPP. The Minister 
claimed that the price agreed in the APP does not provide 
a profit for TNB.®®
8.3 RESTRUCTURING - PRESENT INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1992 -
2015)
As discussed in Chapter 7, TNB's organisational and 
operational set up remains intact after privatisation. It 
still controls the transmission and distribution 
activities. The operations are still based on a regional 
organisational, consisting of Southern, Central, Northern 
and Eastern regions. Five IPPs were approved to generate 
and sell electricity for a 21 year period. The present 
industry structure is shown in Figure 8.1 and the 
distribution of present installed capacity as at December 
1994 is as follows:
Malaysian Business, 1-15 June 1992, 1992 
New Straits Times, 23.11.1994.
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Figure 8.1: Liberalisation of Generation
IPPs(GeneratingCompanies)
TNB USERS
Northern Region
Central Region
Eastern Region
Southern Region
MRB
Trans
DistBAK
LAN
SEG
YTL
Gen
GIG
Notes :
YTL - YTL Power Berhad 
SEG - Segari Power Berhad 
GIG - Gigantic Power Berhad 
LAN - Landmark Power Berhad 
MRB - Malaysian Resources Berhad 
BAK - Bakun Project
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Table 8.2 : Breakdown of generating capacity by companies - 1994
Generation Company Capacity (MW)
Tenaga Nasional Bhd (TNB) 7,319
Yeoh Teong Ley Power (YTL) 2,000
Segari Sdn Bhd (SEG) 1,700
Gigantic Bhd (GIG) 1 , 0 0 0
Land Mark Bhd (LAN) 1 , 7 0 0
Genting Sanyen® (GEN) 300
Melaka Power Sdn Bhd (MPB) 450
Bakunf (BAK) 2,500
TOTAL 1 7 , 6 6 9
Notes :
a - Genting Sanyen produced electricity for own consumption in Genting.
b - Bakun's project is at its initial stage although no licence has been issued.
Under the present industry structure all the IPPs will sell 
their electricity output to NEB for a 21 year period, 
that is until year 2015.^® Even with the existence of the 
six IPPs in the industry, the structure and the fixed 
tariff structure of the IPPS do not allow effective 
competition to take place.
Competition Policy
There seems to be no doubt that the Government does not
New Straits Times 02.03.1993.
The year is calculated from the date of signing the Agreement in 1994. This also coincides with the validity of the licence for 21 years. Although no published source available on the exact expiry date of the APPs, the year 2 015 could be rightly assumed. The Ministry of Energy has also mentioned that the introduction of (effective) competition is only possible by 2015.
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have a definite policy as to how competition should be 
introduced in the electricity sector in order to achieve 
better efficiency. This is demonstrated by the conflicting 
signals from the Minister of Energy with regards to 
Government effort to introduce competition in the industry. 
Initially, when privatisation of the electricity sector was 
approved by the Cabinet in 1988, the Minister of Energy 
made a statement that NEB would eventually concentrate 
solely on electricity generation after its privatisation 
programme. Again in January 1994, there was another 
indication of the separation of generation from 
transmission and distribution in the future. In a statement 
the Minister of Energy was quoted as saying " I believe^^ 
the industry structure for Malaysia in future will change. 
It may combine vertically integrated licensees, with 
competitive generation and common carriage for all buyers 
and sellers in the wholesale electricity market."^” 
However later, the Minister made a conflicting statement 
confirming that transmission and distribution activities 
would still come under TNB's jurisdiction. This 
clarification came in the light of falling shares price of 
TNB in the stock market in response to the earlier 
statement made by the Minister on the separation of 
transmission and distribution from TNB's activities.
In May 1994, again the Minister of Energy clarified that 
competition will only exist after the year 2000
The use of the word "believe" can be interpreted in many different ways. Firstly just a personal opinion. It is difficult to guess whether the opinion is based on knowledge of future plans of the Government and does not want to reveal it to the public for fear of causing speculative activities in the KLSE, or just based on a hunch. Secondly, it can be taken as an indication that the Government has no policy or master plan strategy as to how effective competition should be introduced. Whatever the interpretation adopted, it signifies the uncertainty in the introduction of effective competition in the industry. However, what is certain is that in the next 21 years there will be no such competition given the current policy where IPPs are guaranteed a market and a predetermined price for 
their electricity.
New Strait Times, 19.01.1994.
Utusan Malaysia, 10.05.1994.
270
According to the Minister this will takes place once the 
IPPs start producing electricity which TNB will not be 
obliged to buy at the current rates of 15.5 percent a unit. 
According to the Minister, IPPs will be required to submit 
price tender to TNB which is anticipated by the Minister to 
be cheaper than the present rates. This statement is 
conflicting. One could not fully interpret and understand 
the Governments thinking on the direction of introducing 
competition. After all the IPPs have signed their APPs 
with TNB which includes pre-determined tariff rates for a 
21 year period. Thus the introduction of a tariff based on 
a merit order or pool system, as adopted by the electricity 
industry in Britain,could only be introduced after the 
year 2015. In November 1994, the Minister made another 
statement which implied the Government had a plan to 
introduce effective competition by the year 2000. He was 
quoted as saying that " Tenaga Nasional Berhad is the major 
supplier now and will remain the controller of the industry 
until year 2010."^ T^he statement confirming the position of 
TNB in the industry can be taken as controlling entry into 
the industry through limiting the issuance licence until 
the year 2010. It does not come as a surprise that later 
the Ministry initiated a move to give protection in the 
form of a production quota to TNB^ .^ This however conflicts 
with his earlier statement in January 1994, where he 
clarified that as a result of the blackout incident 
privatisation and competition would be accelerated and 
introduced.
To add to the uncertainty and confusion, there were also
There is a possibility of a reporting mistake by the newspaper on this issue. However, we take it as true because there has been no correction made either by the Ministry or the reporting newspaper on this matter.
New Straits Times, 02.11.1994.
New Straits Times, 23.11.1994.
New Straits Times, 19.01.1994.
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inter-Ministry conflicting statements and signals on policy 
matters which reflect the lack of planning and coordination 
by the Government. In early November 1994, the Prime 
Minister made a statement that the Government planned to 
issue more licences to increase the electricity supply. 
Commenting on the statement, the Minister of Energy 
clarified that more licences would be issued if there was 
an increase in demand particularly from the industrial 
sector.He went on to clarify that the Government will 
only issue new licences to IPP in another two years time 
after ensuring existing IPPs are viable and functioning. 
What is difficult to understand is that the question of the 
viability of the IPPs is being raised after licences have 
been issued to six IPPs. One may then argue that the 
statement demonstrates the lack of proper plan and strategy 
as to how competition should be introduced in the 
electricity sector. This view was confirmed when in late 
November 1 9 9 4 , the Minister went to the Cabinet to 
request a production quota for TNB with the view of 
providing ensuring its market dominance in the electricity 
sector.
Protection of incumbent
While one of the objectives of privatisation programmes is 
the enhancement of productivity and efficiency to be 
achieved through competition, a proposal to limit the 
amount of power generated by IPPs conflicts with this. The 
Minister submitted a proposal to the Cabinet to reduce the 
amount of power generated by IPPs from the current 40 
percent to 30 percent.^ The Ministry proposed that there 
should be a policy on the extent of private sector
New Straits Times, 02.11.1994. 
ibid.
New Straits Times, 23.11.1994.
3^  New Straits Times, 23.11.1994.
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participation in the electricity sector in future. It 
claimed that failure to achieve this ratio would have grave 
repercussions on the tariff structure which would affect 
the consumers. The Ministry argued that it is detrimental 
to TNB to buy electricity from the IPPs and distribute it 
without making a profit.Advocating a definite policy on 
the percentage of power required from the IPPs the Minister 
was quoted as saying, " At the moment, there are no plans 
to issue new licences for IPPs. But there is a necessity to 
have a definite policy on the percentage of power IPPs 
should p r o v i d e " . O n e  can argue that if accepted, this 
policy would be a step backward to the introduction of 
effective competition in the electricity industry. A 
protection given to TNB to maintain it as a major and 
dominant producer will encourage rent seeking activities to 
feature in the market place. If this happens, the market is 
then posed with an institutional problem of dealing with 
the market power of TNB. Eventually, this could translate 
into a higher price for electricity in the absence of fair 
competition.
Market power and Merger potential
The Government has specified that all IPPs are obliged to 
offer TNB up to 20 percent stake in their c o m p a n i e s . TNB 
has agreed in principle to take up stakes in some IPPs but 
will only decide when IPPs have sorted out their own 
internal matters such as financing and equity partnerships 
and all technical negotiations between itself and the IPPs 
have been concluded.^ The five IPPs will be supplying 
about 4,500MW or almost 40 percent of electricity supply by
40
41
42
4 3
New Straits Times, 23.11.1994. 
ibid.
New Straits Times, 09.07.1993. 
New Straits Times, 19.08.1993.
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the year 2000.^^ TNB estimated that it will require M$500 
million should it decide to take up stakes in five licensed 
IPPs^ ,^ excluding Genting Sanyen Sdn Bhd which does not 
sell electricity to TNB. All the five IPPs have invested 
about M$9 billion in power plants to produce electricity.^ 
The IPP have set up an association known as PENJANA to work 
towards their common objectives and sort out problems 
facing them.Among the objectives of the Association is 
its strong commitment to ensure quality is maintained by 
the industry with profitability subject to social 
responsibility. TNB ,will also be invited to join the
Association.
In the absence of merger restrictions the possibility of 
concentration of market power is a threat to the effort of 
introducing competition in the electricity industry. For 
example Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad (MRCB), a 
shareholder of Hypergantic Sdn Bhd, has increased its 
controlling stakes in electricity generation with the
acquisition of an 80 percent stake in Segari Sdn Bhd 
through Malakoff Sdn Bhd. The two IPP constitute about 
3,700 MW which is 26 percent of the total installed
capacity. This raises two important issues: one, the
possibility of merger between the generating firms and two, 
the issue of interlocking directorship which could be 
detrimental to the introduction of competition in the
electricity industry in the long run. The possibility of 
merger between IPPs gives rise to the problem of market 
power. If a business group is large in relation to the 
entire economy or the industry, it can use its power or
New Straits Times, 23.11.1994.
45 New Straits Times, 09.07.1993
Utusan Malaysia, 10.05.1994.
4 7 New Straits Times, 07.09.1994.
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position to gain privileged access to scarce resources 
These resources include underprice credit, import licences, 
tariff protection, and a host of favours granted by the 
government and the private sector in a disequilibrium 
market. The interlocking directorship could also act 
against the interest of the consumers through coordinated 
decision making by the relevant IPPs and undermine the 
Government's effort to introduce competition in the 
industry.
The issue of market power again becomes important in the 
light of completion of the Bakun hydro-electricity project 
in 2002. Presently, it is not known how the Bakun factor 
will affect the future electricity supply equation and the 
electricity tariffs in Peninsular Malaysia. With potential 
capacity of 10,000MW and with limited demand for 
electricity in East Malaysia one could assume that 
electricity produced by the project is for supply in 
Peninsular Malaysia. The first phase of the project will 
have an installed capacity of 2,500 MW which is estimated 
to be ready by the year 2002. In the event of realising its 
full potential of 10,000 MW, Bakun will control about 45 
percent of the nation's electricity requirement by year the 
2020. In the absence of clear policy on electricity and 
strategy to induce competition, it is difficult to 
anticipate the impact of Bakun hydro-electricity on 
electricity tariff and competition in the electricity 
industry. If the Bakun project materialises, it will 
deprive entry of more IPPs until the year 2020. However, in 
the event of the ASEAN electricity grid comes to reality 
then there is potential for more IPPs to participate in the 
generation of electricity. This will facilate the ESD to 
introduce more competition in the industry.
Competition in export market
Although there is no effective competition in the
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generation of electricity in the domestic market, limited 
competition exists in the export market to Thailand and 
Singapore. For a start, the Government has approved 
Landmarks Berhad to supply electricity to EGAT in Southern 
Thailand. The Cabinet has also approved YTL to supply 500 
MW annually to the Public Utilities Board of Singapore/** 
In the long term perspective, if the Asean Electricity 
Grid*^ materialises, then effective competition in 
electricity generation will take place sooner than 
expected, that is before the year 2015. With such a huge 
potential capacity, the Bakun hydro-plant and other 
generating companies are well placed to compete in the 
export market in the Asean region.
Tariff
The licence restricts TNB from imposing a tariff exceeding 
those charges fixed under tariffs as in September, 1990.^° 
Future tariffs will be based on the "CPI-M+Y" formula which 
incorporate an adjustment for fuel-cost-pass through 
element. The formula is to be reviewed every four years by 
the Director General of the ESD.^*
i) Price Formula
The formula in general form is :
A = P (1 + CPI - M) + Y - K
where
A = Maximum allowed average revenue per unit for 
the coming year
New Straits Times, 29.07.1994.
The Asean countries has plan to construct electricity grid for member 
countries to export and import electricity.
Interview source.
New Straits Times.
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P = Non-fuel component of the average tariff for
the previous year 
CPI = Consumer Price Index
M = Efficiency factor
Y = Fuel-cost-pass through
K = Correction factor
The price formula ensures TNB does not abuse its dominant 
position by making excessive charges for electricity. This 
general formula takes consideration of both the supplier 
and the consumer interests. It accommodates the duties of 
the Director General as imposed under Section 4 of the 
Electricity Supply Act 1990 to promote the interest of 
consumers of electricity supplied in respect of the price 
to be charged. It also aims to secure that the licensees 
are able to finance the carrying on of activities for which 
they are authorised by their licence. Thus, the formula 
will enable TNB's tariffs to be set sufficiently to earn a 
reasonable rate of return on its assets as well as funding 
its future investment required to meet demand.
The determination of "M" - will take account of potential 
gains and TNB's investment needs. Potential efficiency 
gains come from improved low availability, increased 
thermal efficiency of certain plants, and rehabilitation 
programmes. The "Y" factor provides the amount of fuel cost 
that could be recovered through the tariffs. It allows 
adjustment to be made to the fuel element in TNB's tariffs 
whenever the actual cost per unit exceeds the "benchmark"
fuel price from the Base Year 1992. It is understood that
only an increase or decrease of fuel element by more than 
+ or - 10 percent will be passed on to the consumers.^
This means that if the actual fuel costs per unit exceed
the "benchmark" by 13.5 percent, the additional fuel cost 
per unit to be passed on to the customers is 3.5 percent of
Interview source.
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the "benchmark".
The "K" factor provides correction of forecasting errors 
and takes the following general form:
K = (R-A)(l+I)
where
R
A
actual revenue per unit for the year in 
respect of which the correction is to be 
made
Allowed revenue per unit for the year in 
respect of which the correction is to be 
made
a specified interest rate
However, there are some problems of implementing the 
formula due to the following reasons :
i) Hydro electricity constitutes 25 percent of the 
installed plant capacity of TNB, as at 1992. The above 
formula does not provide adjustment of an unanticipated 
shortfall in the availability of water for hydrogen. In 
this event more fuel will be needed to replace electricity 
which would have been produced from hydro sources.
ii) The CPI does not reflect NEB's actual cost structure 
which is shown as follows:
Fuel :
Operation and maintenance
Interest payments
Loan repayments
Profit
Taxes
NEB
25
12
15
15
15
15
CPI
4-5
7-10
It can be seen that the financing cost constitutes of 
interest as the major cost elements. In addition NEB faces
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high foreign exchange exposure as ninety percent of its 
borrowing is in foreign currency. The interest cost and 
fuel cost are not weighted accordingly within the CPI 
components. One way of overcoming this problem is to 
provide a fuel adjustment clause Y in the formula which 
allows any increase or decrease in fuel costs to be passed 
on directly to the consumers. For example if the tariff 
were 17 cents per KWh and fuel cost 4.8 cents per KWh, an 
increase of fuel cost to 6.5 cents per KWh would allow 
tariff setting of 17 cents plus fuel cost increase of 1.5 
cents a KWh. However the problems with this method is that 
it does not provide incentives for NEB to optimise its fuel 
mix but would simply pass it through.
Since adopting the electricity tariff formula, two price 
adjustments have been made to electricity prices. The first 
was in March 1994 where the price was reduced by 0.65 
percent and the second in July 1994 where price dropped by
5.2 percent equivalent to 1.04 sen per unit from 19.73 sen 
to 18.69 sen per unit. The adjustment rate is to be 
adjusted every three month depending on fuel costs.^
Treatment of IPPs in the Equation
The Minister has claimed that the electricity price paid by 
TNB to the IPPs does not provide TNB with profit. In 
addition it was claimed that consumers will be losing if 
the participation of the IPPs in generation is more than 
3 0 percent. It is understood that IPPs will be supplying 
base-load electricity generation and TNB under its 
arrangement with the IPPs is obliged to buy the full 
amount.®* This could have an impact on TNB's future 
profitability. In this case, IPP's have an advantage over 
TNB due to the following:
Minister of Energy. New Straits Times, 09.06.1994. 
Interview source.
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1) The first issue is whether IPPs would be required to 
maintain the reserved capacity for the security of supply 
reason. This has not been decided. The uncertainty of the 
policy is reflected in the statement made by the Minister 
of Energy, " My Ministry has looked into the matter and has 
directed TNB to do so. This percentage can be attained 
through TNB's own power houses or through co-generation 
with private firms".®® Adopting a policy under which IPPs 
are not required to maintain reserved capacity would affect 
the electricity expansion plan and participation both by 
IPPs and TNB in the electricity sector. The future 
investment plan will then tilt in favour of the IPPs - for 
three reasons. Firstly, if IPPs do not have to maintain a 
reserve capacity of 25-3 0 percent as required of TNB 
plants, then TNB's cost of production is going to be higher 
than that of IPP. For example, a 1000 MW - IPP plant can 
operate at full capacity during peak period and provide a 
higher return than a TNB's plant of the same size but 
operating at lesser capacity providing the IPP a 
competitive edge in terms of lower unit costs. Second, a 
higher rate of return to the IPPs will shorten the payback 
period on investment by the IPPs. A shorter loan financing 
period will reduce interest charges thus allowing IPPs to 
quote a lower project cost for future capacity expansion 
programme. If this lower cost of production is passed on to 
the consumers in terms of low electricity price, then 
consumers should benefit from such productivity gains. 
However, the APP which provides a 21 year guaranteed fixed 
electricity price for the IPPs will deprive such gains from 
the consumers. Thirdly, TNB is faced with uncertainty on 
foreign exchange fluctuations thus exposing uncertainty on 
its cost of production. IPPs would expect a stable cost of 
production as borrowing is made in the domestic market.
2) As the IPPs are using the latest technology, such as
New Straits Times.
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combined cycle plant (CCGTs), costs of production of IPPs 
will be lower than TNB's own overall cost of production for 
three reasons. Firstly, CCGTs are technically much more 
efficient than fossil-fuel plant (Robinson, 1992). This 
technology constitutes only about 25 percent of TNB's 
electricity generation plant.®® Secondly, the cost of 
building a gas-fired electricity generation plant is much 
cheaper at M$1.5 million - M$1.7 million per MW as compared 
to M$2.8 million - M$3.0 million in the case of hydro­
electric power.®7 Thirdly, TNB has low thermal efficiency 
for its thermal plants due to old age and these require 
rehabilitation work and high maintenance costs (Chapter 6) . 
In the likelihood of competition in the supply of 
electricity IPPs have a clear advantage in terms of more 
competitive tariffs to offer due to higher technical 
efficiency. If the first merit order system is used during 
the off peak period the IPPs will benefit more as their 
plants are more efficient than most thermal plants operated 
by TNB.
However, these high costs incurred by TNB have to be 
weighed against two factors which are to the advantage of 
TNB. Firstly, TNB has the advantage of lower costs of 
capital for its past projects as well as present projects. 
As discussed previously (Chapter 6), about 96 percent of 
TNB's loans are Government guaranteed and thus enjoy a 
lower interest rate as compared to the market rate which 
will keep cost of production lower. For example in 1991, 
TNB obtained a M$500 million soft loan from Britain at 
0.835 percent interest rates to finance the Pergau 
project.®* The repayment will begin six years after 
completion of the dam, in 17 instalments over eleven-year
The technical efficiency of CCGT technology is around 50 percent as compared to about 35 percent that of fossil-fuel plant.
®^  Minister of Energy, in New Straits Times 11.02.1992.
®* Malaysian Business, 1-15 June, 1992.
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period. It can be argued that as long as the Government is 
the majority shareholder TNB will be in a position to 
obtain loans cheaper than the market rate. Secondly, TNB 
also enjoys technical economies of scale®^ which provide 
decreasing unit costs for its output which IPPs do not 
have. The adoption of larger generating units and their 
concentration in larger power stations such as Paka and 
Pasir Gudang placed TNB in a position to reap significant 
economies of scale. However, although this is true in 
technical aspects, it does not necessarily reflect its 
advantage in an operational sense. Diseconomies of scale in 
production occur when firms get beyond a certain size after 
which costs per unit of output may start to increase. 
Management problems of coordination, monitoring, 
supervision and control becomes larger and more complex, 
and lines of communication get longer. As we have seen in 
Chapter 7, supervision and monitoring problems®* of TNB are 
demonstrated by its difficulty in controlling shirking 
activities as reflected in high medical expenses and a high 
number of medical leaves taken by TNB's employee. The 
problem of communication is another feature of TNB due to 
its size, and the high number of staff could offset gains 
from technical economies of scale. For example, the 
Executive Chairman has commented that some of the regional 
offices were not even aware that there was an austerity 
drive to minimise wastage and keep costs down in TNB in 
order for TNB to remain competitive.®^
3) TNB has a contractual obligation to buy electricity
Scale economies refer to the effect of increasing output along a negatively sloped Long Run Average Cost curve resulting from rising output within the boundary of known frontier or technology. In the context of efficient frontier as described in Chapter 5, a firm will be moving closer to the reference frontier indicating relative efficiency improvement.
One could argue that the monitoring and supervision problems are a function of the management system and the size of the employee. The problem becomes greater as size increases and the system of management is centralised which cause a problem of moral hazard and adverse selection.
New Straits Times.
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from the IPPs for a 21 year period. The IPPs have been 
assured of a ready market where TNB is obliged under its 
agreement to buy all electricity produced by the IPPs. 
However rates differ slightly among the IPPs. Under the 
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with YTL, the first IPP to 
be given the licence to generate electricity, TNB is buying 
electricity at 15.5 cents per kWh and 14 sen per kWh during 
Sundays and public holidays.^ However Segari has a lower 
rate at 13 cents per kWh during peak and 8 cents per kWh 
during off-peak.®* The differences in rates among the IPPs 
probably was attributable to combinations of factors such 
as the different cost structures, timing of approval of 
licence, negotiation skills and the personality of those 
involved in the negotiation. In addition, as described 
earlier there was pressure for TNB to finalise PPA 
agreements to solve problems of power shortages quickly 
when the PPA was negotiated. TNB also lacked experience 
when negotiating for its first APP with YTL, which made it 
difficult for TNB to get a better deal. With experience, 
TNB managed to negotiate a lower price for its electricity 
from Segari.®*
Determination of PPA's price structure
It is apparent that the IPPs flat rate structure did not go 
too well with the Ministry of Energy which favours a more 
competitive rates structure. Initially, the Minister of 
Energy maintained that IPP's selling price would not be 
higher than TNB's own cost of production.®® Showing his 
disappointment, the Minister was quoted as saying, " With 
no competition to establish a price, it will be difficult
New Straits Times, 14.07.1993,
New Straits Times.
According to a source, the price of electricity produced by other generating firms will be in the region of 13.5 cents a unit.
®® Malaysian Business, 1-15 June, 1992.
283
to verify gains from the issuance of these licences."®® One 
argument put forward as to the attractive term enjoyed by 
the IPP is to encourage private sectors participation in 
the electricity industry. According to a source, ®^ the 
return on investment for the IPPs is in the region of 20 
percent which is considered to be attractive enough to 
entice private sector participation in the capital 
intensive power industry.®* For example the Hypergantic Sdn 
Bhd will expects the payback period within 7-8 years after 
operations. ®^
Looking back, there are two issues which need to be 
examined in relation to the electricity price agreed 
between TNB and the IPPs. Firstly, is the agreed price of
15.5 cents per unit for YTL and 13.5 cents per unit for 
Segari, a justifiable price for TNB? Secondly, why did TNB 
accept the price despite the claim that the agreed price 
does not provide any profit for TNB? In order to answer the 
first question we need to know what is the estimated cost 
of production of the two IPPs. Although one would expect 
the costs functions of each individual IPPs to vary, one 
could assume the variations to be minimal as the IPPs are 
using the same technology, combined gas cycle turbine 
(CCGT) . In the absence of available data and accurate 
estimation, it is difficult to estimate the projected costs 
of production of the IPPs on a per unit basis. However, one 
could use the 2 0 percent rate of return promised by the 
regulator to the IPPs as a basis to estimate the cost of 
production for both IPPs. Using this estimation method, a 
20 percent rate of return on 15.5 cents per unit of 
selling price will provide YTL with a return of 3.1 cents
New Straits Times, 19.01.1994.
®^  Interview source.
®* Interview source.
®^  As revealed by the Managing Director of Hypergantic Bhd in NewStraits Times, 05.04.1994.
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per unit at a production cost of 12.4 cents per unit (i.e
15.5 cents - 3.1 cents). This means that YTL cost of
production is the same as TNB's cost of production in 
1992/93 at 12.4 cents per unit, when the priced was agreed 
(i.e PPA signed). Similarly, profit margin for TNB and YTL 
is about the same in the region of 3 cents per unit/?* 
Looking at the Segari case, using the same 20 percent 
return on 13.5 cents per unit gives us its cost of 
production of 10.8 cents per unit.'^ *-, leaving it with a 
profit margin of 2.7 cents every unit of electricity sold 
to TNB.
Between the two costs of production calculated above, we 
argue that the 10.8 cents per unit is reflective of the 
estimated cost of production of the IPPs. This is argued 
for two reasons. Firstly, since YTL is using the CCGT 
plant, its cost of production is expected to be lower than 
that of TNB. As pointed out earlier, some of the TNB's 
thermal plants have low thermal capacity due to old age and 
require high maintenance costs. Thus YTL costs of 
production should be lower than those of TNB's 12.4 cents 
per unit. Secondly, the 20 percent rate of return allowed 
for IPPs, was meant to act as an incentive for the IPPs to 
participate in the capital intensive electricity sector. 
Based on this principle, one could argue that as all the 
IPPs should get at least the 2 0 percent return to attract 
them into the industry, then Segari's cost which is the
That is calculated as follows:
YTL selling price = 15.5 cents / unitYTL Production cost = 12.4 cents / unitProfit margin = 3.1 cents / unit
TNB selling price = 18.9 cents / unitBuying price from YTL = 15.5 cents / unitProfit margin = 3.4 cents / unit
That is calculated by:
Selling price = 13.5 cents/unitProfit margin = 2.7 cents/unit i.e(20% of 13.5cents)Cost of pro- = 10.8 cents/unitduction
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lowest among the two should represent the 20 percent 
minimum rate of returned.
Based on the above calculations, there is no justification 
to support the Ministry of Energy and TNB's claim that it 
is not making any profit from purchasing electricity 
produced by the IPPs. However, it could be argued that YTL 
has a higher profit margin as compared to Segari if its 
cost of production is assumed to be at 10.8 cents per unit. 
While YTL is making a higher margin on the selling price of
15.5 cents per unit, TNB is earning a higher profit margin 
from its purchasing price of 13.5 cents a unit of 
electricity from Segari. This estimation correlates closer 
to the payback period of 7-8 years’* of the two IPPs which 
is based on the 70 percent supply availability. This 
dismisses the earlier fear of the possibility that a higher 
purchased price paid to IPPs will be absorbed by TNB to be 
passed on to the consumers.’*
However, one may argue that the introduction of the IPPs 
has created a loss to the consumers. The reason is that, 
the lower cost of electricity production by using CCGS is 
not passed on to the consumers through a lower tariff. 
Looking from another perspective, while it is not a loss to 
TNB, as it still make the same profit margin from selling 
a unit of electricity purchased from the IPPs, consumers 
are deprived of what would have been a lower price for the 
next 21 years. The rationale for providing the 20 percent 
return is to encourage private sector participation in the 
generation of electricity. However, this is not consistent 
with the objective of increasing efficiency through the
Interview source.
’* Before the signing of the APPs, sources from the EPU did not discount the possibility that the high purchase price paid by TNB to the IPPs would be absorbed by TNB and then passed on to the end users. New Straits Times, 05.08.1992 This is another evidence which substantiated the claim that IPPs participation in the electricity sector essentially was not economically motivated but in response to a quick solution to the power shortages problem in 
the country.
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lower production costs and higher productivity achieved by 
the introduction of competition. The trade off in achieving 
the two conflicting objectives certainly points in favour 
of the former. Although the Government has succeeded in 
encouraging the private sectors's participation it is at 
the expense of efficiency and consumers interest in the 
long run. The problems of trying to keep electricity prices 
low will make entry unattractive (Helm, 1993) for rewarding 
investors for risk taking. On the other hand no one would 
be prepared to enter the market unless backed by a power 
purchase contract with TNB. These have created several 
difficulties associated with increasing competition in the 
electricity industry.
It was initially suggested that in the absence of 
competitive tendering, the purchase price by TNB for IPP's 
electricity be based on TNB's unit cost plus profit margin 
for new plant.’* However the Government has adopted a flat 
rate per unit supplied rule. The issue which arises then is 
in the event of an increase of fuel cost IPPs will have to 
absorb the extra costs which could impair profitability and 
security of supply. One solution is the incorporation of 
the CPI-M+Y formula in the PPA between TNB and the IPPs. 
This will then take account of escalation of the base 
price. However two issues have to addressed here. One, the 
non fuel costs of IPPs are likely to be small and thus it 
may not be appropriate to apply an escalation factor to an 
IPP's total non-fuel costs. Two, the CPI-M component 
assumes the existence of inefficiency where the higher the 
value of M the greater the potential efficiency gains thus 
providing correct incentives to improve performance. 
However, the M factor should be zero in a competitive 
tendering process. On the other hand in the absence of 
competitive tendering process, as in the case of negotiated 
basis where asymmetry of information tends to be
Interview source.
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significance, then the M factor should be positive. In the 
case of the IPPs the problems of escalation is minimised by 
the fact that all IPPs are operating on a combined cycle 
gas plant and IPPs have signed long term contracts with 
PETRONAS for the supply of gas. This ensures a stable cost 
of production for the IPPs and has been given due 
consideration in the formulation of flat rate tariffs. It 
is reported that the fixed rate will be adjusted based on 
a gas- passed through formula at the ceiling and floor 
prices of gas of M$6.40 and M$5.00 per million BTU 
respectively.’® This means that both parties will 
renegotiate the rate when the price of gas reaches the 
stipulated ceiling or floor levels.
The second issue is, why did TNB agree on the price (i.e 
sign the PPA) despite the claim that it is not making 
profit? There are three plausible answers to this.
Firstly, as admitted by a senior TNB official, one of the 
problems faced by NEB was that they had no precedent to 
work on regarding the terms and conditions of the entirely 
new arrangement and there were no specific guidelines to 
follow.’® Secondly, according to one source, there was also 
political interference and pressure for NEB to accept the 
rates.” There were overlapping roles and responsibilities 
among the various authorities involved in the privatisation 
programme. The Ministry of Energy and the EPU stepped in as 
mediators when negotiations came to deadlock over certain 
terms.’* Anyway, the dissatisfaction expressed by the 
Minister of Energy on the outcome of the agreement suggests 
that as mediator it was not having much say in getting a 
satisfactory deal (as it claimed) for TNB. Thirdly, as been
New Straits Times, 01.04.1993 
New Straits Times, 03.01.1994 
Interview source.
Business Times, 15.05.1992.
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pointed out, TNB had a weak negotiation position during the 
negotiation process as the result of the September 
blackout. While there was an urgent need to address the 
problems of shortages of power which is the responsibility 
of TNB, the IPPs had time on their side to prolong the 
negotiations. The Government was concerned about the delay 
in the negotiations and cautioned both parties to expedite 
the process as the national interest was at stake.
Long term prospect of introducing competition (Year 2 000 - 
Year 2015)
One of the issues which is detrimental to the introduction 
of competition in the long run is the guaranteed price for 
the IPP for the duration of 21 years. The decision to award 
this privilege can be traced to two motives. One motive was 
to induce the private sector to participate in the capital 
intensive investment and reduce uncertainty. Second, 
extending the infant industry argument, for the IPPs to get 
protection and special treatment in order to ensure their 
orderly development. The policy on infant industry 
regulation has led to further uncertainty on the long term 
effort to introduce competition in the power industry. One 
issue that needs to be examined is how future IPPs are 
incorporated in the long term strategy to introduce 
competition. The present capacity of 14,000 MW caters until 
the year 2000. As pointed out, effective competition can 
only exist by year 2016 (21 years from now i.e 1995) when 
the present IPPs either have to renew their licences or 
make an exit from the industry. The question to be 
addressed is what policy or strategy is appropriate during 
the second transition period (i.e 2001-2016) before full 
competition can be introduced in the power sector following 
the year 2016. In order to formulate a competition policy 
three important factors have to be taken into account.
Interview source
2 8 9
Firstly, the completion of the Bakun project. If it is 
completed by the year 2000 with its 10,000 MW capacity the 
Bakun hydro-electricity plant will then deny the entry of 
future IPPs. In fact one can safely say that no new IPPs 
are required until the year 2020, and effective competition 
can only take place after year 2016. Second, if the ASEAN 
grid materialises by the year 2000, then electricity will 
be exported to neighbouring countries like Indonesia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand on a larger scale. In 
this situation it is more beneficial for Malaysia to export 
electricity from its Bakun power station because of lower 
costs. With low production cost more foreign exchange 
earnings will flow from abroad due to the higher profit 
margin. Given this scenario, more IPPs are desirable in 
Peninsula Malaysia. However, if the ASEAN grid does not 
materialises by year 2000, or if it does not materialise at 
all, then one possible way to encourage new IPPs is to 
continue the infant industry treatment only up to year 
2016 .
Another issue which is still uncertain is this.: if new IPPs 
are brought in after the year 2000, do they receive the 
same guaranteed purchase price as enjoyed by the existing 
IPPs? The same treatment means that there will be no change 
in status quo on competition in the industry. Not extending 
the same privilege means that the new IPPs are playing on 
a different field which is to the advantage of the existing 
IPPs. This policy could be a deterrent to entry for future 
new IPPs and could lead to under-investment in the power 
sector in the future. If the Government intends to change 
the policy, then the problem is the cut off point. 
Potential entrants to the industry would be deterred to 
invest as it is to their disadvantage of not having being 
guaranteed a market.
290
8.4 ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING
Model 2 - Vertical Separation between Generation andTransmission, and Liberalisation of Generation (Transitional period to introducing competition)
Figure 8.2 : Model 2 of Industry Structure - Transition period 1995 to 2016
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Generation
Based on the model developed in Section 3.3, restructuring 
and liberalisation of the electricity generation can be 
carried out to achieve efficiency in the present industry 
structure by two approaches: One, by adopting a policy of 
vertical separation between generation and transmission 
activities, and two, by a horizontal breakup of TNB with 
the liberalisation of generating activity.
One way to minimise the problem of externalities due to the 
de-intergration process (Section 3.3) is by providing 
incentives for the generating companies to have equity 
interest in the transmission company. This strategy has 
been adopted and proved successful in Britain and US. Given 
the equity interest of the IPPs in the transmission 
company, the transmission investment programme is likely to 
be carried out in accordance with the generation investment 
programme. The reason is that their survival and growth 
also depended on the smooth running and expansion of the 
transmission line.®° The answer to monopoly power by the 
transmission is by regulating transmission so that it does 
not use its monopoly power to overcharge consumers. In an 
unregulated electricity supply system the vertical 
separation would be highly damaging for two reasons. One, 
the monopolistic transmission entity would have as much 
market power as an integrated utility and two, the 
inefficiencies from loss of coordination benefits could be 
significant. Therefore there is a strong argument in favour 
of regulating both the generation and the transmission 
activities.
The second restructuring option available (which could be 
done simultaneously) is the horizontal break up of TNB into 
four different regional units as subsidiary companies.
Equity participation of each generating company could be based on the percentage of their installed capacity to total capacity.
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Although this model does not produce competitive 
characteristics in the industry structure, it provides 
efficiency gains through minimising X-inefficiencies and 
wastage arising from supervision and monitoring problems as 
a result of asymmetric information between the headquarters 
and the regional offices. As we have explained in the 
previous chapter, TNB was having problems in monitoring 
activities of the regional offices in ensuring policies and 
directives were carried out. These problems as we have seen 
are demonstrated in the failure of some regional offices to 
implement the austerity drive measures to keep costs down 
and the illegal connection of the electricity to certain 
areas. The problem of asymmetric information is again 
reflected in monitoring shirking activities at the regional 
level. For example as shown in Table 7.5, medical and 
dispensary costs were exceptionally high from 1989 to 
1992.®^ On the average in the financial year 1989/90, TNB 
was spending M$77 8 a year per employee on these costs on an 
increasing trend. By 1991/91 these costs has increased to 
M$976 a year. This means that, with average costs of M$15 
per visit for medical care (i.e the current fee), each 
employee visited his doctor five times a month. On average 
therefore one can conclude that every employee of TNB 
visited his doctor once a week. In addition sick pay leave
1989/90 1990/91 1991/92
Medical cost 17 . 9 21.3 22 .3& dispensary (M$ mil)
No of employee 23,108 23,065 22,767
Cost/employee/year 778 .60 926 . 00 976.00
Cost/employee/month 65 . 00 77 .00 82 . 00
No. of visit for 4 5 5.5medical care by an employee per month
Assumptions used: Medical fee of M$15.00 per visit which is on theaverage the current rate.
Does not take into consideration of serious illness which needs special medical attention which obviously costs more.
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has been on an increasing trend from M$3.8 million in 
financial year 1989/90 to M$5.0 million in 1991/91 (Table
7.5 under notes). Exceptionally high costs of medical, 
dispensary and sick leave pay reflects the problem of 
monitoring shirking activities by TNB in its regional 
offices. Another acute monitoring problem resulting from 
asymmetric information is indicated by high overtime 
allowances as shown in Table 7.5. These allowances shot up 
by 34 percent in financial year 1990/91 from just M$49 
million in the previous year to M$70 million. By the 
1991/92 financial year it jumped by 61 percent as compared 
to 1989/90 figure. There are two plausible explanation for 
this. Firstly, the increase of shirking activities among 
the lower category of employee especially in the technical 
group.Secondly, the morale and motivation of employees 
dropped during the initial stage of the privatisation 
programme which affected the productivity of labour. While 
there is some justifications for overtime to increase due 
to the reduction in the number of employees, the 
exceptionally high increase does not mitigate such a view. 
Total numbers of employees decreased only by 33, from 
23,108 to 23,065 in 1990/91.
Creating subsidiaries would minimise the problem associated 
with monitoring and supervision which are delegated to the 
regional manager. The burden of monitoring performance is 
thus rest with the manager of the subsidiary. This gives 
more authority to the manager and creates more pressure for 
him to monitor performance of his subordinates in order to 
achieve performance standards set by the principal (in this 
case the Board) which will determine his salary, bonuses 
and other benefits. Within the subsidiary company, less 
asymmetric information between the manager and the 
subordinates due for the smaller number of employee
® Generally most executives are not entitled for overtime allowances. Most of the overtime incurred by the technical group who has to attend to matters outside their normal hours of eight hour duty. Interview source.
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provides better opportunity to the manager to monitor rent 
seeking and shirking activities which lead to minimising 
costs, wastage and inefficiencies. The separate financial 
entity of the subsidiary exposes it to financial market 
discipline which could act as a mechanism of cost 
controlling and eliminate wastage and inefficiencies. 
Since the subsidiary company has its own corporate 
structure it could provide better opportunities for career 
advancement and promotion which could act as an incentive 
for the achievement of better efficiency. Increased 
efficiency will be reflected in terms of low production 
costs which can be passed on to the consumers in the form 
of lower electricity prices. By horizontal break up, the 
informational and the transaction costs of monitoring will 
be reduced and the responsibility of monitoring lies with 
the Board and the head of the respective subsidiary unit. 
The self maximising behaviour of the employee could be 
reduced as the reward and incentive are better and depend 
on performance of the subsidiary company.
The second component to this model is the divestment of 
Government shares in TNB to public hands - in other words 
going for a fully privatised TNB. The alternative model 
also attempts to address two problems associated with the 
Niskanen theory of bureaucracy which are faced by TNB as a 
government owned utility ; firstly, the issue of government 
and political interference which by limiting TNB's autonomy 
in carrying out its activities could affect its 
performance, and secondly, the self interested maximising 
behaviour of the bureaucrats, in this case the managers. As 
we have pointed out the Government and political 
interference still persist in TNB directly or indirectly 
through its representatives on the Board or through its 
plural accountability to different Ministries. Full 
privatised TNB will make room for professionals and 
business corporations to be appointed on the Board to lead 
and monitor performance of the company. Monitoring can also
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be carried out by market discipline, including monitoring 
by lenders (financial institutions and banks) as they have 
a short term interest to recover their money. With the 
present ownership structure. Government interference can 
come from two sources. One, from the Ministry of Finance 
who owns about 40 percent of the TNB's equity and the 
Ministry of Energy who is responsible for the electricity 
sector. Interference from the Ministry of Finance on 
investment decision could most likely come through its 
representative in the Board®^. Likewise, interference from 
the Ministry of Energy could come in the form of lobbying 
providing quota protection for TNB. Without change of 
ownership, TNB can still be used as a political tool to 
achieve political, social and personal objectives of the 
politicians. In the Malaysian context, the theory of 
bureaucracy is not only applicable to bureaucrats but also 
to politicians. As we have discussed in Chapter 3, huge 
bureaucracy is also associated with political power, 
prestige and patronism which can be used for political 
gains. Second, another source of political interference is 
from Khazanah Holdings®^ which holds about 3 0 percent of 
the shares. Interference from Khazanah Holdings or through 
the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister 
Department. As we have seen, the Privatisation Unit of the 
EPU is a powerful unit with wide-ranging involvement in 
privatisation matters. Going for full privatisation address 
the issue of direct Government and political intervention 
in public enterprises. In addition, about 50 percent of the 
Government owned companies were loss making (Chapter 3) , 
this despite the fact that they were created for commercial 
objectives and were operating in a competitive market
One would not expect direct intervention on financial matters, procedures and directives from the Ministry of Finance as TNB is incorporated 
under the Company's Act 1965.
Under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, but its set up iw within the Ministry of Finance
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environment. As pointed out by the report/® one of the 
reasons for the failure of Government owned companies is 
that there is no pressure for senior officials to perform 
better in contrast to the hiring and firing system used in 
the private sector. This is because there is no threat of 
bankruptcy as the public
enterprises are well aware that the Government will bail 
out bad public enterprises by injecting more funds to 
ensure continuance of operations. Security of tenure, 
enables the managers to pursue their self-maximising 
behaviour without fear of being punished in the event of 
failure to achieve the enterprise's objectives. The 
eagerness associated with the creation and expansion of the 
Nuclear Department in the early 1980s and the controversy 
arising from Board's ignorance of such development (Chapter 
7) demonstrates the relevance of self interest maximisation 
of some of the employees associated with the expansion of 
budgets, staffs and prestige as explained by the theory of 
bureaucracy.
It could be argued that one of the reasons for the failure 
of Government owned companies is because the government's 
appointment of the Chief Executive and Board members is 
based on the patronage system. This provides security of 
tenure to managers in running the organisation. Salleh 
(1989) have shown that private companies tend to be more 
efficient than public companies in terms of lower unit 
costs and that they achieve higher profitability. Thus this 
alternative model addresses the issue of increasing 
efficiency and productivity not through competition (as 
there is no scope for it until the year 2016) but through 
further restructuring of the industry which will enable us 
to address the issue of agency and incentive problems in 
TNB.
Ministry of Finance (1991)
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Competition in transmission and distribution
As pointed out earlier, transmission is a monopoly activity 
and thus needs regulation to avoid monopoly abuse. However, 
the Government has been unable to unambiguously clarify its 
position as to whether transmission will be privatised. 
Contrary to an earlier statement, the Government has stated 
that transmission of electricity will not be privatised and 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad will continue to be the prime 
distributor in the country.®® This is in conflict with the 
initial Government plan to separate generation from 
transmission and distribution activities. In a statement 
before the privatisation programme of the electricity 
sector in 1991 the Minister confirmed the plan, " Our 
ultimate aim is to make Tenaga become a company responsible 
for power transmission and distribution only. "®"^ In Jan 
1994 it was reported that the Minister of Energy openly 
said that the Government would further liberalise the power 
sector which will include the privatisation of transmission 
and distribution activities.®® However, the following month 
the Minister confirmed that the monopoly of transmission 
and supply of electricity should still be vested in TNB.®® 
The clarification came in the wake of falling TNB's share 
prices due to rumours that transmission will be privatised 
since Government was working on the National Grid Code. The 
Minister went on to say " Tenaga Nasional has trained and 
experienced expertise and employee, there is no reason for 
us to privatise the electricity supply."®®
Although direct competition in the existing transmission
Minister of Energy, in New Straits Times, 10.08.1994 
Business Times, 03.09.1991.
New Straits Times, 03.01.1994.
New Straits Times, 15.02.1993 
New Straits Times, 10.08.1994.
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and distribution network is unlikely, competition in the 
form of providing new transmission lines is still possible. 
An example is to provide a transmission line to service new 
areas providing direct links between new power stations and 
principal markets as an alternative to existing indirect 
links. In the light of the Bakun project, generation and 
transmission should be fully integrated as only one 
generating company is involved in the generation of 
electricity to be supplied to Peninsular Malaysia.
8.5 REGULATION
8.5.1 Rationales for regulation
We have argued that there is an economic case for 
regulation of the generation and transmission company. 
Basically the need to regulate arises from the argument of 
market failure i.e the market fails to operate efficiently. 
There are several reasons why markets fail to operate at 
optimal level. One arises from the problem of asymmetric 
information where producers and consumers have difficulty 
in making choices in markets due to complex, and costly 
information which leads to differences in information held 
by both parties. Asymmetric information results in bias 
towards one of the parties involved in the transaction. 
From the suppliers point of view this can lead to too much 
or too little production which affects both the productive 
and the allocative efficiency of the firm and the industry.
Second, the case of no effective competition resulting in 
market power to the producer. The problems of market power 
exist when a market suffers from ineffective competition 
thus creating a monopoly market condition. Monopoly markets 
fail because of both allocative and cost inefficiencies 
Standard economic theory suggests that a monopoly tends to 
abuse its monopoly power by reducing quantity and charging 
higher price. As discussed in Chapter 6, whenever price
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does not equate with the marginal cost of supplying the 
goods there is an inefficient allocation of resources which 
results in a loss of welfare or allocative inefficiency. 
Again if marginal cost pricing rules are followed in the 
public utilities this can lead to financial losses by the 
utilities. Certain industries have the characteristics of 
decreasing cost industries, that is as the firm expands its 
costs per unit decline up to a minimum efficient scale. 
When the firm reaches this point, the cost per unit is 
roughly constant regardless of the firm size. An industry 
with decreasing costs tend to be a natural monopolist.
The third economic case for regulation is the problem of 
externalities which arise when economic agents impose on, 
or deliver benefits to others who are not parties to the 
transaction. When the behaviour of a firm affects other 
firms or people in either a positive or negative^^ way then 
it is necessary for regulatory intervention to improve the 
welfare of all parties concerned. However, Posner (1974) 
argued that market failure arises from inadequate 
specification and enforcement of property rights rather 
than from inherent defects of market mechanism. According 
to Posner the appropriate ways for dealing with pollution 
for example is to make the polluter pay the costs of 
pollution activity by means of a tax rather than attempt to 
prevent pollution by administrative means.
These basic problems limit the power of markets to produce 
efficiently. Intervention in the form of regulation is 
therefore required to ensure that the pursuit of profit 
does not conflict with social welfare and efficiency 
(Train, 1991, 1994) and this provide rationale for various 
kinds of economic regulations. However, Littlechild (1983)
An example of positive externality occurs in the telephone network. Present subscribers to a network also benefited from the addition of further subscribers due to increased possibilities of communication. On the other hand, the generation of electricity using fossil fuel produces acid rain resulting more pollution. This imposes direct cost on others which are not borne by the firm.
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argues that competitive markets by themselves are the best 
regulators. They serve the interest of consumers through 
the operation of market forces. He argues that "Competition 
is indisputably the most effective means - perhaps 
ultimately the only effective means - of protecting 
consumers against monopoly power. Regulation is therefore 
essentially a means of preventing the worst excesses of 
monopoly; it is not a substitute for competition. This view 
places consumer interest as a primary concern and the
reliance on competition to achieve efficiency which will 
benefit the consumers. To achieve the desired efficiency 
results appropriate regulation is necessary. Appropriate 
regulation means maximising the benefits from removing 
market failures in relation to the costs of government
intervention (Jones, 1993). The costs of regulation include 
the opportunity cost of the private and public resources 
devoted to the regulatory process. Vickers and Yarrow point 
out that there is a need for regulatory policy to influence 
the behaviour of the regulated firms by establishing an 
appropriate incentive system to guide or constrain economic 
decisions.
8.5.2 Problems of regulation
However there are problems associated with regulation which 
arise from the basic informational asymmetry ; One, where 
the regulators usually have far less information about the 
costs and demand conditions facing the firms they regulate 
than do the firms themselves and second, capture of the 
regulator by the industry and the politicians.
The probability of the industry not providing the true
information as requested by the regulator, to protect their 
own interest, could be detrimental for the regulator to 
regulate effectively. Initially this will involve high 
information and transaction costs to the regulator. 
However, given time as more generating fifms participate in
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the industry the regulator could have access to more 
information easily.
The second problem is, regulators could have their own 
agendas which include career advancement, self- 
aggrandizement, political support (Train, 1994) . The 
capture theory suggests that over time regulated firms gain 
control over the process by which they are regulated 
(Posner, 1974). Stigler (1975) on the same issue comments 
that " as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry 
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit" 
(p.115). Willig (1993) argues that government proved to be 
incapable of abiding by its own rules where political 
reality is inevitably injected into regulation. He pointed 
out that regulators are often political actors themselves 
or serve at the pleasure of those in political power. He 
further argues that regulators of private enterprises are 
less able to act contrary to public interest than high- 
ranking officials in public enterprises. When the 
individual agenda or political agendas of public officials 
are important the regulated private firms may be better 
insulated from these pressures.
8.5.3 Regulatory Framework of the electricity sector in 
Malaysia
The Electricity Supply Act (1990), among other things
provides for the appointment and specifies the functions of 
the Director General of Electricity, and also for the
supply of electricity at a reasonable price and the 
licensing of electrical installation, plant and equipment.
The functions, duties and powers of the DG as stipulated in 
the Act include, inter alia, the following:
a) to exercise regulatory functions in respect of the
service of providing the licensee including the
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determination of performance standards and standards 
of facilities and services and enforcement thereof;
b) to promote competition in the generation and supply of
electricity and to ensure the optimum supply of 
electricity at reasonable prices
c) to promote the interest of customers of electricity
supplied by the licensees in respect of price to be 
charged, the continuity of electricity supply and the 
quality of services provided
d) to secure that all reasonable demands for electricity
are satisfied
e) to secure that licensees are able to finance the
carrying on of activities which they are authorised by 
their licences to carry on;
f) to promote and encourage the generation of energy with
the view of economic development of Malaysia
g) to carry on all such other activities as may appear to
the Director General requisite, advantageous or 
convenient for the purpose of carrying out or in
connection with the performance of his functions and
duties under the Act.
The Act also gives wide powers to the Power and Energy 
Minister where he may make regulations in respect of any 
matter which may be prescribed under the Act. Under the 
Act TNB has certain duties and obligations to supply 
electricity in Peninsular Malaysia. However, there is no 
provision for the license to be renewed after its expiry 
date (21 years) creating uncertainty in the industry which
will have an impact on the investment programme of the
generating firms. Since the Minister has the power to amend
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and make regulation under the Act, this provides 
opportunity for rent seeking activities by the industry 
towards the end of the expiry period.
Studies on the framework to regulate the IPPs were 
completed in October 1993 and will be submitted to the 
authorities for a p p r o v a l . A  national electricity grid 
code was also formulated in 1993 to regulate the power 
industry*^ The main objective of the code is to provide 
excess to all grid users without discrimination. The system 
is expected to be connected to the rest of the Asean 
countries to form the Asean grid system.
8.5.4 Regulation in the Malaysian context
Duplication of responsibility
The Electricity Act is aimed at regulating the conduct or 
behaviour of TNB and IPPs in the electricity market. 
However, one of the problems of TNB in complying with the 
regulations is that it also comes under the control of 
other Ministries with regards to its operations. The 
duplication of responsibilities has led to friction among 
the related Ministries and the privatised bodies. The 
Finance Ministry is in the process of producing guideline 
to define more clearly the powers of ministries in 
controlling privatised companies.^There are three possible 
reasons for this problems. First, there is lack of 
separation between ownership and power which sometimes 
could lead to conflicts of interest. TNB is still owned by 
the Ministry of Finance and Khazanah Holdings as majority 
shareholder. The Finance Ministry has its responsibilities 
as a ministry and at the same time as a shareholder which
Disclosed by DG of BSD. Business Times, 23.10.1993 
New Straits Times, 03.08.1993.
Deputy Finance Minister. Star, 16.3.1991.
304
could come into conflict. Khazanah Holdings as has already 
been mentioned is under the Chairmanship of the Prime 
Minister. Secondly, ESD is not an independent authority as 
it comes under the Ministry of Power and Energy. The Deputy 
Minister has said " A ministry has its responsibilities and 
prerogative as the major, and sometimes sole, shareholder 
of the privatised entities". The EPU has also drawn up a 
paper outlining the scope of power of various ministries 
over privatised bodies. The paper was to be submitted for 
discussion in the Cabinet initially without the views of 
the Ministry of E n e r g y . The Minister of Energy said that 
there was a confusion over the scope of power of the 
Finance Ministry and Energy Ministry over Telekom and 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad:
" We don't know which aspects we have control over and 
which we don't. Sometimes when I enquire about some 
matters concerning Tenaga Nasional, I'm told that
Tenaga Nasional is under the Finance Ministry ......
since they come under the purview of my ministry, I 
decide on the policies and I'm also answerable to 
parliament and the people."
Regulatory capture
Given the Malaysian scenario where bureaucrats, politicians 
and businessmen are closely linked, the issue of regulatory 
capture and administrative appropriation could pose a 
threat to achieving the efficiency objectives of the 
privatisation programme where both issues are essentially 
asymmetrical (Levy, 1993) . Since many parties i.e Economic 
Planning Unit, Electricity Supply Department, Ministry of 
Energy and Ministry of Finance are involved within the 
regulatory system, this could provide room for capture and
The Star 25.04.1991
96 Star, 25.04.1991
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expropriation. Three ways could be adopted to deal with 
these problems. One, there should be a clear separation of 
policy, regulatory and operational responsibilities. Two, 
by having precise and specific rules about substance, 
process or procedures which restrain the discretion of 
decision maker. Complex monitoring procedures are 
vulnerable to asymmetries of information and differential 
bargaining power. Three, by adopting open bidding or a 
tender process capture at the time of the deal can be 
avoided. A case in point is the awarding of licences to 
IPPs in response to the power shortages in September 1992. 
The absence of a requirement to tender competitively has 
led to long term problems of introducing competition in the 
industry.
Power of the regulator and the Ministry
Although the use of regulatory mechanisms is required to 
constrain the power of the IPPs in order to achieve optimal 
regulation, the next issue is of course the rule of law 
which also requires the power of the public regulator to be 
constrained. Butler, Robinson et.al (1993) argue that there 
should be a transparency, rational and beneficial in 
regulatory decision - i.e the regulator should be required 
to give reasons for each proposed change in the utilities 
licence terms. This would then indicate the direction of 
policy and the long term objectives of the regulator. 
Presently no Monopolies and Mergers Commission exists in 
Malaysia to address any dispute between the regulator and 
the IPPs. The dispute can be settled in court although it 
is not the best solution to solving disputes among the 
various parties involve. This is because court settlement 
involves legal costs to the reputation of both parties 
which could severely damage their relationship.
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Autonomy and plural accountability
Another factor which could reduce the regulators role in 
promoting competition due to the regulatory capture is 
based on two issues pertaining to accountability. One, ESD 
is not an independent body. It comes under the Ministry of 
Energy and the appointment of the Director General is made 
by the Minister himself. The question is therefore whether 
the DG of ESD could conduct his tasks free from ministerial 
interference or "ministerial capture"? Second, as pointed 
out there is a dominant influence of EPU over ESD in policy 
matters which come under the purview of the ESD and the 
Ministry of Energy. A classic example is the issuance of 
IPP licences. In this case regulatory capture comes within 
the Government department which is distinctively different 
from ministerial interference. It could work in this way. 
The interested party may pursue rent seeking activities 
outside the formal framework^ "^ , in order to get a licence 
for IPPs. Laffont and Tirole (1993, pp. 100-103) suggest 
the situation could lead to the granting of a licence to "a 
relative or compatriot of the president". This could then 
well lead to a problem of over-investment which affect both 
productive efficiency and allocative efficiency of the 
electricity industry.
8.6 CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter began with two central questions on efficiency 
issues in the privatisation programme of the electricity 
sector. One, has the privatisation programme increased the 
efficiency of the electricity sector? Secondly, what is the 
role of the regulatory system in ensuring the realisation 
of the efficiency objectives given the structure of the 
electricity industry?
The framework refers to the Electricity Act stipulates that the power 
to issue licence for IPPs comes under the purview of the DG of the JBE.
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Although TNB has been privatised (partially) , it still 
exhibits its old problems; poor planning, bureaucratic 
delay, poor track record of project implementation and, 
Government and political interference which affect its 
financial and investment decisions. The restructuring of 
the industry which accompanied privatisation did not 
provide sufficient framework for the achievement of 
efficiency through competition among the generating firms. 
The awarding of licences on a negotiated basis and the flat 
rate of electricity price paid to the IPPs for a twenty one 
year period, did not conform to the objectives of achieving 
efficiency through competition. The price formula of CPI- 
M+Y formula benefited both TNB and the IPPs. This is 
because it was formulated when there was so much scope for 
efficiency improvement by TNB. Such efficiency improvements 
will not be transferred to the customers. Putting it in
other words, in the long run TNB is reaping benefit out of
its inefficient practices before the formula was 
formulated. The effort to provide a protected quota to TNB, 
the potential concentration of market power through merger 
and acquisition within the generating firms, and the 
absence of Merger and Monopolies Commission highlighted the 
problems faced by the industry to achieve efficiency 
through competition.
As discussed, the Government has no proper plan or strategy 
on how to introduce competition in the industry as 
demonstrated by the conflicting signals from the 
Government. However, one could argue that the approach 
taken by the Government to introduce competition could be 
viewed as a transitionary path and a sensible one, given 
the initial imperfections and the strategic importance of 
the industry to the economy. One would agree that there is
a possible conflict, at least in the short term, between
the objectives of promoting competition, on the one hand, 
and looking after the customers interest on the other hand 
i.e minimising operating costs of the existing system and
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a low electricity price. However, what is questionable is 
that the time frame given for this evolutionary approach to 
take place is far too long to benefit the industry and the 
consumers.
Although efficiency could not be achieved through 
competition within the present framework, it is proposed 
that an alternative model of achieving efficiency through 
further restructuring of the industry should be adopted. 
The model provides vertical separation between generation 
and transmission, and the horizontal break up of TNB into 
four subsidiaries of TNB and a fully privatised TNB.
As pointed out, the present system is neither planned nor 
strictly market driven. The expansion of capacity decision 
has been determined by a combination of regulatory bias and 
political action, and government and political 
interference. It is obvious from the evidence that there 
was little overall coordination or coherence as a result of 
ad hoc elements in policy decision making. Regulatory 
capture could create significant problems for optimal 
regulation. To combat the problem of regulatory capture as 
well as other rent seeking related activities such as 
bribery and corruption, three issues need to be addressed. 
Firstly, less regulation is required. Secondly, regulation 
should be clear and unambiguous. Thirdly, rewards of 
bribery and corruption have to be minimised by imposing 
higher penalties. The capture issue exists both for public 
and for regulated firms.
It is argued that in order for the regulator to achieve its 
objectives in promoting competition, ensuring an orderly 
investment programme and protecting the consumers, it 
should be given the autonomy to carry out its duties.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
The study presented in this thesis contributes to an 
understanding of issues underlying the privatisation policy 
in Malaysia in general and in the electricity sector in 
particular, and highlights other issues which need to be 
addressed in order to achieve a successful electricity 
privatisation programme. The objective of this thesis was 
to address two policy questions involving the privatisation 
of the electricity sector in Malaysia : a) Why is
privatisation of the electricity sector in Malaysia 
desirable and b) Given the Malaysian context, is the 
privatisation programme feasible? Can it be implemented 
and achieve its intended objectives as specified by the 
government.
9.2 DESIRABILITY OF THE PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME
To address the first policy question we have examined three 
related questions. Firstly, what is the rationale and 
objectives of the privatisation programme in Malaysia 
secondly, what has been the performance of the electricity 
sector and thirdly, can privatisation improve the 
performance of the electricity sector.
Rationale of the Privatisation Programme
As we have seen (Chapter 2) there are two underlying 
factors which led to the Government adopting the 
privatisation policy ; the weak financial position of the 
Federal Government and the poor performance of the public 
enterprises set up under the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
(1970-1990) . The decline of the Malaysian economy from the 
beginning of late seventies to early eighties has led the 
Malaysian government to examine and review its development 
policy. Falling commodity prices contributed to large
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fiscal deficits. Appreciation of currencies of major 
trading partners such as Japan, Britain, Singapore and USA 
has raised foreign debt service. In addition the NEP has 
resulted in a huge public sector and heavy Government 
involvement in commercial activities which have created 
monitoring and supervision problems to the Government. The 
poor financial performance of the public enterprises which 
were set up to create a Bumiputra commercial society has 
further compounded the financial problems of the Federal 
Government. The NEP's target of achieving 30 percent
Bumiputra participation in commerce and industry was also 
not achieved. Most state governments and public enterprises 
depended on Federal Government's budgetary assistance thus 
undermining its ability to pursue its developmental plan. 
The privatisation policy was then undertaken as a strategy 
to reduce the financial burden of the government by 
minimising its involvement and intervention in the economy 
and encouraging more private sector participation in the 
development of the economy. The Government's privatisation 
objectives were then; to relieve financial the and
administrative burden of the Government in undertaking and 
maintaining a huge and constantly expanding network of 
services and infrastructure; to increase efficiency and 
productivity through competition and entrepreneurship; to 
stimulate private investment to increase the rate of
growth; to reduce the size of the public sector and its
monopolistic tendencies and bureaucratic support in the 
economy and finally to promote wider distribution of wealth 
through share ownership of privatised public utilities and 
enterprises in line with the NEB objectives of creating 
Bumiputra commercial society.
The Performance of the Electricity Utility (National 
Elefetricity Board - NEB)
The performance of NEB as measured in terms of its 
technical efficiency and financial performance was mixed.
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Employing the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model, based 
on inter-country utility comparison, it was shown that the 
relative technical efficiency of NEB has not been 
impressive (Chapter 5) . Using a cross section data of 27 
countries in 1987 NEB's efficiency rating was 18, operating 
at a relative efficiency of 70 percent. Comparisons based 
on time series data from 1975 to 1990 between NEB, EGAT and 
CEGB show that on the average NEB was also relatively less 
efficient (at 89 % efficiency) than EGAT (at 97 %
efficiency) and CEGB (100 % efficiency) . The main reason 
for the different level of efficiency was that NEB has a 
lower thermal efficiency and higher system losses than 
EGAT. Another possible reason is that EGAT enjoyed 
increasing return to scale as it had bigger plant capacity. 
The results above suggests that there is a lot of scope for 
NEB to improve its technical performance given the right 
strategy and policy.
In terms of financial performance NEB, on average from 
1975-1990, has a good financial performance track record 
(Chapter 6) which was commended by the World Bank in 1989. 
It has been able to meet covenants imposed by its major 
lenders, the World Bank and the Asian Development bank, on 
rates of returns, self financing rate, debt coverage ratio. 
Its performance was better than that of EGAT which is 
reflected by higher rate of return as measured by Return on 
Capital Employed (ROCE), a higher self financing rate, 
higher debt coverage ratio and lower debt equity ratio. 
However, its billing effectiveness was not as efficient as 
EGAT and CEGB.
Privatisation and Performance of the Electricity Sector
We have examined the issue as to whether the privatisation 
programme, that is the change of ownership from public to 
private, can improve the efficiency of public enterprises 
(Chapter 3) . This leads us to the controversial issue of
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performance comparison between the private firm and public 
enterprises. From a theoretical perspective, the property 
rights theory, the theory of bureaucracy and the X- 
Inefficiency theory all attempt to explain why performance 
of the public enterprises might be less efficient than 
private enterprises. The theory of bureaucracy suggests 
that bureaucrats are both utility maximisers and budget 
maximisers. According to this theory, the bureaucrat as 
utility maximiser will try to maximise his utility faction, 
which includes his salary, the size of staff working under 
him and their salaries and his power and status. As a 
result, public sector bureaucracy tends to expand output 
over what is socially optimal and to incur higher costs of 
production. The property-rights theorists centred their 
argument on public ownership as the source of inefficiency. 
They argue that the non-transferability of ownership 
implies that the public has weak incentives to check on the 
performance of the public enterprises. Similarly, the 
managers of the public enterprise have the same weak 
incentives to monitor and to take the long-term view of the 
public enterprises development, as they cannot increase 
their own wealth by increasing the wealth of the firm. The 
X-Inefficiency theory focuses on the imperfectly specified 
contracts and the difficulty associated with the policing 
and the enforcement of the contract as the reason for 
bureaucratic inefficiency. Inefficiency comes in the form 
of waste, over-manning and low productivity. With these 
inefficiencies the public enterprise is not operating on 
its production possibility frontier but instead at some 
point within the frontier. These theories provide an 
understanding of the problems, limitations and constraints 
that confront public enterprises which have to be addressed 
in order to improve their performance. Based on these 
theories we can predict the behaviour and characteristics 
of public enterprises. Characteristics of the public 
enterprises as modelled along these theories are; political 
and government intervention, multiple sometimes conflicting
311
objectives, plural accountability to several ministries, 
existence of a patronage system, dependency on Government 
budgetary assistance and a weak incentive to achieve better 
performance. The outcome of these characteristics are that 
public enterprises may be instructed to give preferential 
rates to domestic customers, provide similar service 
regardless of location, to borrow from approved 
institutions at preferential rates, adopt labour intensive 
techniques, construct plants in line with national plan and 
meet social objectives at the expense of profits. From the 
above we can predict that outputs of public enterprises are 
likely to be at sub-optimal levels.
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, empirical evidence from 
previous studies done in Europe, UK and US have shown that 
there is no conclusive evidence to support the superiority 
of the private enterprises over the public enterprises and 
vice versa. In the case of Malaysia, empirical evidence 
from the few studies on the comparative performance of 
public and private enterprises tend to support the view 
that public enterprises are less efficient than the private 
enterprises. Performance comparisons in cement, 
construction and milling industries in Malaysia, show that 
private enterprises tend to perform better than public 
enterprises in terms of lower cost per unit of output and 
higher profitability and productivity. Studies of the 
profitability of the public enterprises also showed that 50 
percent of public enterprises in commercial activities were 
loss making inspite of various sorts of Government 
assistance such as equity fund, low interest rates, 
subsidised input costs in certain cases and bureaucratic 
preference treatment.
Institutional evidence in Malaysia shows that the behaviour 
and conduct of the public enterprises in general, conforms 
to the model of state owned enterprises as developed by the 
theory of bureaucracy, property rights theory and the X-
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inefficiency theory discussed in Chapter 3 ; over-manning 
or over-size department, higher unit cost of production, 
and high investment programme. The growth of the public 
enterprises in Malaysia is consistent with the theory of 
bureaucracy. Public sector expansion in Malaysia was 
associated with the implementation of the NEP. Departmental 
expansion means more responsibilities which provide better 
promotion opportunities with higher salary scales for 
departmental heads and senior managers who are senior 
bureaucrats in the organisation. In addition, expansion of 
departments leads to better benefits, and associated power 
and prestige for top bureaucrats. Politicians too have 
vested interest in the expansion of the public enterprises 
in association with the NEP. The patronage system which is 
entrenched in the Malaysian political and administrative 
systems made bureaucrats more vulnerable to political 
manipulation and government intervention in the operations 
of the public enterprises. This has led to an overlapping 
of the political and administrative functions as there was 
no clear separation between political and administrative 
spheres. Chairman of public enterprises and some top 
bureaucrats were selected and appointed more on the basis 
of political connections than on merit. It was not 
surprising that as a result of this some enterprises were 
created with duplicating functions and overstaffing, and 
were used as political tools and as power bases for some 
politicians.
As we have described earlier (Chapters 3,7, and 8), 
Government intervention in the economy has created more 
opportunity for rent seeking activities which lead to 
bribery and corruption. The performance of the public 
enterprises undermined by mismanagement and corrupt 
practises reflects the maximisation of bureaucrats self 
interest. Government and political intervention combined 
with the patronage system resulted in rent seeking 
activities among bureaucrats and politicians and led to
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unnecessary expansion of some public enterprises. Bribery 
and corruption lead to the use of capital and other 
resources inconsistent with optimal management practices. 
It resulted in higher costs of inputs and higher cost of 
production which subsequently transferred to the consumers 
through higher pricing. Although there are laws and 
regulations such as the Anti Corruption Act 1961 (Amendment 
1971), Financial Procedures Act 1972 and the General Orders 
(Conduct and Discipline) to curb corruption and malpractice 
in the public sector, the problems were getting serious 
over time for reasons of difficulty in getting evidence for 
offenders to be brought to court.
The patronage system dominantly prevailing in the political 
and administrative system through appointment of the 
Chairman and the Board members have created problem of 
accountability of the public enterprises. As studies have 
shown, some Chairman and Chief Executives of public 
enterprises have no regard for financial objectives and 
procedures set for the public enterprises. Sometimes 
investments made and expenses incurred were not necessarily 
based on financial criteria but were based on political and 
personal considerations. The appointment of a Board based 
on political consideration and connections rather than 
merits has made it difficult for the Board to check the 
running and performance of the public enterprises. Although 
most of the public enterprises operate in a competitive 
commercial environment they lacked self dependence to 
survive and compete competitively. As we have pointed out, 
there are two plausible reasons for this. Firstly, the 
patronage system provides protection for any possible 
enforcement of contracts pertaining to wrong doings or 
failure to fulfil obligations under the contract. Secondly, 
the public enterprises have strong ties and links with the 
Government as the owner, in terms of budgets and financial 
matters. This insulates the public enterprises from closure 
or bankruptcy. In the event of a closure, employees of
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public enterprises can always be absorbed in other public 
enterprises to avoid any possible political repercussions 
to the Government. As a result there was less pressure for 
public enterprises to achieve their financial objectives. 
This is evident by the fact that 50 percent of the public 
enterprises were incurring losses from year 1982 to 1990 
(available data). These public enterprises despite 
incurring losses kept operating at the cost of the tax 
payers. As discussed in Chapter 4, more often than not they 
put the blame on social objectives as the cause of the poor 
performance,
The bureaucrats also had no incentive to cut costs as they 
were not beneficiaries to such actions. Bonus systems which 
relate performance and income does not prevail in the 
public sector. Bureaucrats in the public enterprises, due 
to the nature of the contractual agreement of appointment 
are not easily removed from office irrespective of 
performance of the enterprise. As pointed out some of the 
head of departments were reluctant to take disciplinary 
action for fear of being unpopular or because of the 
entrenched patronage system in the administrative sphere. 
Monitoring and supervision of the public enterprises by 
various relevant Ministries was not too effective. 
Monitoring and supervision problems due to asymmetric 
information was associated with the increasingly huge size 
of the bureaucracy. Official incompetence on the part of 
Ministries exacerbated these problems of monitoring and 
supervision. This is compounded by the fact that public 
enterprises have to be accountable to different Ministries 
with different roles requiring different types of 
information and coordination. Efforts taken to standardise 
and coordinate by different Ministries do not guarantee 
efficient and effective control due to limited resources, 
red tape and bureaucratic process. In addition most 
bureaucrats believe that they are underpaid as compared to 
their counterparts in the private sector. The public sector
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salary scale is based on a fixed annual increment and not 
performance based. As a result of less incentives, 
motivations for higher productivity were low in the public 
sector.
We have addressed the issue of whether ownership matters in 
improving performance of the utility. The results of our 
findings on NEB fit into the public enterprise model 
described above. The findings support the general 
implications of the property rights analysis, theory of 
bureaucracy and the X-Inefficiency theory on the behaviour 
and performance of NEB. In spite of its privatisation in 
1992, TNB is Still inhibited by problems relating to its 
operations which hindered it from achieving better 
performance.
Government and political intervention have inhibited the 
autonomous decision making of the utility. As discussed in 
Chapter 6 and 7, intervention at the highest level come 
from the. Prime Minister, Minister of Finance and the 
Minister of Energy affecting commercial and investment 
decision making process. The Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Finance's intervention in the award of 
contracts and choosing of consultants, purchasing of plants 
and attendance of the Minister of Energy during the Board 
meeting on a number of occasion is a testimony to the 
extent of Government intervention in NEB. Government and 
political intervention also come into the Board room in the 
form of the selection of Board members on the basis of 
political connections rather than merit. As political 
appointees Board members carry "political weights" in 
influencing and determining the directions of decisions of 
the Board. The politically appointed Board member's system 
had some negative effects on the way the Board was 
functioning. In the words of its former Chairman " in 
consequence of this (Board members as being political
316
appointees)/ several Board members have shown little or no 
interest in the activities of the Board and have absented 
themselves from meeting after meeting".= One could further 
conclude that the patronage system^ in the political and 
administrative system of the country could also be a strong 
contributory factor which led to such conduct and behaviour 
of the Board members.
It was observed that NEB was having financial difficulties 
due to various reasons: Firstly, the tariff structure is 
government controlled. In the event of an increase in oil 
price NEB'S profit will be eroded as prices could not be 
raised as quickly as operating costs. Secondly, the high 
dependency on foreign loans has exposed NEB to foreign 
exchange fluctuation risk. With the appreciation of foreign 
currencies against the Malaysian Ringgit notably the Yen 
and the American Dollar, NEB's outstanding loan has become 
increasingly expensive to repay as also new borrowing. 
Thirdly, NEB has still to depend on equity injection for 
its cashflow requirements in spite of a high internally 
generated fund from retained profit, in order to meet the 
high demand growth of electricity from the industrial 
sector. Part of the cashflow problems of the NEB was due to 
poor billing policies which left substantial monies tied up 
in debtors. Although financial performance has improved 
since the last tariff revision in 1980 which based tariff 
structure on LRMC pricing, meeting investment in the 
electricity sector could still prove difficult for NEB. 
Capital requirement to meet demand growth is estimated at 
around M$100 billion until the year 2 020 - an average
Words in brackets are of the researcher
 ^ Tate, {1991, pl70) . As mentioned by the Chairman in his handing over notes to his successor in 1964 . He also urged his successor to draw the attention of the Minister on this trend and for the Minister to pay more regard in the choice of the Board Members. However as pointed by Tate, the existence of a strong political element was retained right to the end.
 ^ As pointed by Tate (1991, pl71), quite a number of Board members serve the Board for a period of at least eight years.
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annual capital requirement of M$4 billion a year. Fourthly, 
Government and political intervention and interference 
sometimes led to financial decisions incompatible to the 
commercial objectives of the utility.
As a public enterprise with social objectives NEB undertook 
an unprofitable electrification programme. However, the 
financial implications on this unprofitable project is 
outweighed by the preferential treatment in terms of a 
lower tax rate and capital expenditure allowance and with 
subsidised or low interest rates enjoyed by NEB. In 
addition, the burden of undertaking rural electricity 
project was shared between the Federal Government, State 
Government and NEB.
There is evidence of the existence of rent seeking 
activities (Chapter 6). This is demonstrated in the 
rejection by the Treasury on the recommendation of awarding 
contracts to JVC, alleging that the company submitted their 
application after finding out the tender price of their 
competitors. The Treasury in turn wished to offer the 
contract to a local Bumiputra company. Rent seeking 
activities could lead to bribery and corruption and 
increase cost of production (Chapter 3) . The Opposition 
party alleged that there were grounds to believe that NEB 
is no exception on this matter. As we have pointed out in 
Chapter 7, corruption could occur in awarding of contracts, 
tampering of meters and illegal connections all imposing 
costs on NEB . The costs of corruption comes about in the 
form of higher production and investment costs which 
eventually are embedded in the electricity price paid by 
the consumers.4 Thus one can argue that corruption tends to
 ^ The cost of corruption is not only borne by the electricity consumers but also by all members of the public in the form of higher costs of consumer goods. In addition it undermines an industry's competitiveness domestically and internationally. If the corruption cost is just embedded into production costs without affecting price then corruption does not directly affect electricity consumers. However it still affects the Government as a shareholder in terms of 
less dividends paid due to lower profitability.
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shift NEB away from the efficient frontier contributing to 
technical inefficiency.
We have argued that ownership does matter in improving the 
performance of the electricity sector in Malaysia. We have 
also argued throughout, that the debate is not only on 
whether private enterprises are more superior to public 
enterprises but also to focus attention on what factors 
might inhibit performance of the public enterprises. 
Eliminating these factors therefore would contribute to 
better performance or efficiency of the public enterprises. 
We have pointed out in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 that in 
order for privatisation objectives to be achieved and NEB 
to improve its performance and efficiency two issues need 
to be addressed. One, is the question of what changes in 
the framework of public enterprise control are necessary to 
bring about efficiency. This involves a revolutionary 
change in the objectives of TNB, the introduction of 
competition among the generating firms in the electricity 
industry, the establishment of an effective regulator to 
monitor economic regulations imposed on the industry, the 
freedom to raise capital and the minimisation of government 
and political interference in the running of the TNB. 
Second, the internal changes address the vital role of 
appropriate incentives to all parties in NEB - the Board 
members, managers and employees.
Performance and efficiency improvements will have to 
address all the above issues. Ownership issues relate to 
problems of autonomy, objectives and market discipline 
while the competition issue relates to the structure and 
nature of the industry. Although autonomy, objectives and 
market discipline, and government and political 
intervention issues can be tackled on their own account, 
all are highly dependent on the issue of ownership. We 
argue that without change of ownership, the other issues 
will be difficult to address. This is because as the owner
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or the shareholder of public enterprises is the Government, 
political intervention is most likely to occur. Government, 
just like any other private enterprise shareholders, will 
directly or indirectly exercise their rights in 
controlling, supervising and monitoring the performance of 
the public enterprises. While participation of the 
shareholders in private firms is aimed at increasing the 
efficiency and profitability of the company, government 
and political intervention in public enterprises leads to 
policies or decisions inconsistent with optimal management 
practices due to political, social and personal 
considerations. Thus as mentioned in the previous chapters, 
we argue that the limitations and constraints on the public 
enterprises could only be addressed effectively by the 
change of ownership. Addressing the issue of ownership will 
consequently address the issue of autonomy, objectives and 
market discipline of the public enterprises which will 
subsequently improve their performances.
9.3 FEASIBILITY OF THE PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME
The second policy questions addressed in this thesis is 
whether, given the Malaysian context, the privatisation 
programme is feasible and objectives are achievable.
Capital Market
When the privatisation programme was first introduced there 
was scepticism among the policy makers and the public in 
general as to the capacity of the local capital market to 
absorb the flotation of the public enterprises in Malaysia. 
However, listings of shares of the Malaysian Airline System 
(MAS), the Telecommunication Department and the National 
Electricity Board (NEB) have been over subscribed many 
times over. A strategy is needed to ensure future 
divestment of the remaining 70 percent equity by the 
Government as the value is excessively large (M$7 billion)
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for the capital market to absorb it at one go. This can be 
achieved a) on staggered basis or b) by pre-placing TNB's 
shares to institutional investors, unit trusts agencies, 
cooperatives, pension funds besides the general public. 
Full government divestment, in the long run, is one of the 
essential requirements of the successful implementation of 
the privatisation programme.
Effectiveness
Although it is a bit premature to conclude on the
achievements of the privatisation of the electricity in 
achieving its intended objectives, one nevertheless can
assess its progress towards achieving those objectives. 
Firstly, the Government has not only benefited financially 
in terms of increases in dividends and taxation paid by the 
company due to improved profitability (Chapter 6). In the 
longer term, the diversification programme will provide TNB 
with potential earning growth and higher profitability 
which directly and indirectly benefits the Government. And 
related to this, is the participation of the private sector 
which has released the Government from planning and 
building the electricity infrastructure responsibilities 
(Chapter 7). Private entrepreneurs have injected M$9 
billion in private investment into the electricity sector. 
Government stands to save another M$17 billion from 
building the Bakun Hydro electricity project with the 
submarine transmission cable from East Malaysia to 
Peninsular Malaysia which has been privatised. In the long 
term perspective, the private sector could be relied upon 
to undertake the massive investment programme in capacity
expansion in total of M$100 billion by year 2020.
In terms of achieving the NEP objectives of equity 
participation, when the Government first divested 30 
percent of its shares in TNB 44 percent of the total number 
of individual investors were Bumiputras. However, after two
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years, the number of individual Bumiputra shareholders has 
dropped dramatically to 35 percent. Bumiputra institutions 
remain holding about 7 percent of the total shares. One 
notable feature is the increasing number of Government 
shareholders, represented by public enterprises and state 
Government, and the increase in number of international 
shareholders. The increasing number of Government holders 
which come in the form of state government, SEDCs and 
agencies and institutions is a good development in avoiding 
concentration of holdings of shares in a limited few hands. 
The dispersed equity holdings even among Government 
institutions would act as a check and balance mechanism 
against any possible mismanagement of the company. The 
increasing number of international investors in TNB 
reflected their confidence in the future development of TNB 
and is a source of fund for further capacity expansion 
programme of the electricity sector in Malaysia.
Although the Government is committed to introduce 
competition in the electricity industry its implementation 
has cast some serious doubts over its practicality and 
effectiveness in the long run. Failure to adopt an open 
tender system for licence awarding led to practical and 
implementation problem as to how and when effective 
competition can actually be introduced in the industry. The 
guaranteed purchase price of electricity for the IPPs for 
a duration of a 21 year period makes it difficult for the 
introduction of a merit order generation system for the 
benefit of the consumers. The implementation of the Bakun 
hydro project, though will address the issue of security of 
supply, has complicated the issue of gaining efficiency 
through competition. Uncertainty about the price of 
electricity prevails until the completion of the project. 
The issue of electricity pricing and its contribution to 
the supply of the electricity in the country are still far 
from certain. Thus the policy towards competition in the 
long run is still uncertain. With potential capacity of
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30,000 MW the Bakun project could be a major factor in 
upsetting the introduction of more competition from 
potential smaller generating company which could operate at 
300 MW capacity of CCGT plant with efficiency. Whether the 
consumer is going to benefit from the Bakun project hinges 
on the actual date of completion of the project, the actual 
costs incurred and the cost of fuel of its rival in 
generating electricity in the future. However to increase 
efficiency through competition within the existing 
framework (1995 - 2015) further restructuring of the
industry is needed. We argue that TNB should be broken up 
into three different entities with TNB solely operating as 
a generating company. Transmission and distribution 
activities should be undertaken by separate companies to 
ensure fair competition to all participants in the 
industry. To create competition and efficiency within TNB 
we argue that the best alternative is to split the company 
into four regional units each with the formation of 
subsidiary companies while TNB remains as a holding 
company. It is beyond the scope of this research to look 
into the legal aspects of such a proposal although we 
believe that it could be done as TNB is still a government 
company with a majority share of 70 percent. Although the 
Bakun hydro electricity project could be a stumbling block 
in achieving efficiency at the generating level due to its 
potential capacity to dominate the generating capacity, the 
consumers could still benefit from its implementation given 
the right strategy. The Bakun hydro plant should not be 
tied to sell electricity to TNB but remain as a direct 
competitor in providing electricity to the country through 
an independent transmission and distribution company. With 
the implementation of the Asean Grid all the IPPs should be 
allowed to compete and sell electricity to the neighbouring 
countries on a competitive market basis without government 
intervention. Presently, it can be seen that during this 
transitionary period (until 2015) increasing efficiency 
will not be due to effective competition, but more due to
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restructuring of industry structure and the implementation 
of the cap price formula to the generating sector which 
will reduce costs and wasteful practises.
Implementing the above formula needs an effective system to 
regulate the industry. As we have pointed out the existence 
of an independent regulatory body is crucial to ensure 
effective economic regulation of the industry. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 8 and 9 this is a difficult task to 
achieve as the problems of regulatory capture by the 
politicians and senior bureaucrats in the Prime Minister 
Department and the Ministry of Energy remain a threat to an 
independent regulatory systems. We have argued that unless 
there is a full commitment on part of the Government to 
restrain interference on the regulator the objective of 
achieving economic efficiency will be a difficult tasks to 
achieve.
In conclusion, although the Government is advocating an 
electricity sector privatisation programme, the electricty 
sector model pursued in Malaysia has not yielded the 
maximum efficiency benefits as discussed in Chapter 3 
(Section 3.7) . The electricity industry was corporatised 
but no attempt was made to introduce competition, to de- 
integrate the industry or to impose independent regulation. 
As a result, the TNB still exhibits many inefficiency 
characteristics. The TNB is still majority owned by the 
Government and this has led to continued government 
interference in its operations; competition has not been 
introduced; and finally there is an absence of an 
independent regulator as the Electricity Supply Department 
comes under the Ministry of Energy. As we have argued 
throughout this thesis, in order for efficiency to be 
achieved in the Malaysian electricity sector, policies 
should address issues pertaining to introduction of 
competition and industry reform in the Malaysian 
electricity sector.
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9.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND SCOPE FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH
The research reported in this study raises some question 
that can be pursued in future work. In short, the 
performance comparison using the inter-country model as 
used in Chapter 5, has its limitations. Given time a 
comparison between public enterprise such as TNB and other 
private generating firms will overcome the methodological 
problems of comparing "apple with apple" in the electricity 
sector. Further study on whether privatisation has indeed 
increased the efficiency of the TNB could be undertaken 
given enough time to obtain time series data un the post 
privatisation period. DEA models can then be used to 
measure the efficiency between pre and postppri'^tisation 
periods. Such studies have been undertaken by^Weyman Jones 
(1993) on the comparison of pre and post technical 
efficiency of the various generating firms in the United 
Kingdom electricity sector before and after privatisation.
Finally, there are lots of uncertainties on policy matters 
pertaining to competition and regulatory policies which in 
time to come will determine the shape of the electricity 
industry structure and efficiency of the industry as a 
whole. The scope of future research therefore depends on 
the directions of the policies adopted by the Government 
which are full of uncertainties at the moment.
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DATA OF ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN SELECTED LDCs - 1987 Appendix 1
COUNTRY Effic Coef i GDP per capita InstalledCapacity CapacityFactor Total LabourSystemLosses
1. CHILE (C14) 1.0000 1,516 4,033 45 17 3,810
2. COLUMBIA (CIS) 1.0000 1,083 7,291 57 24 20,173
3. EGYPT (C17) 1.0000 688 6,340 59 15 33,000
4. KOREA (Cll) 1.0000 2,881 20,982 44 6 20,489
5. CHINA (CIS) 1.0000 275 102,913 55 9 1, 860,000
6. BRAZIL (C13) 1.0000 2,116 47,244 50 19 165,500
7. YUGOSLAVIA(C9) 0.9951 2,562 16,150 57 13 58,600
8. MEXICO (C19) 0.9212 1,733 26,788 47 13 87,750
9. HUNGARY (C3) 0.8797 2,458 6,629 52 14 38,135
10.VENEZUELA (C2S) 0.8244 2,711 17,623 32 9 18,051
11.GHANA (C18) 0.7926 374 1,185 46 20 3,978
12.PERU (C21) 0.7681 2,235 3,675 47 19 13,699
13.RUMANIA (C23) 0.7654 NA 20,200 43 6 130,000
14.THAILAND (C7) 0.7600 899 7,801 47 10 66,372
15.ARGENTINA (C2) 0.7515 2,300 16,593 37 17 34,480
16.ZIMBABWE (C27) 0.7451 582 2,071 39 10 4,325
17.TURKEY (C24) 0.7165 1,156 12,493 41 13 55,000
18.MALAYSIA (C4) 0.7042 1,893 4,490 43 16 34,177
19.ALGERIA (Cl) 0.6777 2,797 3,836 40 15 18,800
20.INDONESIA (CIO) 0.6720 406 10,430 35 19 51,203
21.PANAMA (C5) 0.6246 2,416 898 35 19 5,785
22.PORTUGAL (C22) 0.6237 3,362 6,851 34 12 18,459
23.URUGUAY (C8) 0.6231 2,140 1,449 36 19 11,000
2 4.BANGLADESH(Cl2) 0.6019 166 1,925 36 37 25,000
25.NIGERIA (C20) 0.4863 229 4,040 28 28 32,912
26.ZAIRE (C26) 0.4850 2,562 2,541 57 13 4,697
27.SYRIA (C6) 0.4813 2,142 2,918 36 12 17,197
-
Source: World Bank (1990)Efficiency coefficient calculated by using DEA method
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DATA OF ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN SELECTED LDCs - 1987 Appendix 1 (cont)
COUNTRY Gross Installed Capacity Production(DMUe) Output Thermal Hydro Nuclear Thermal Hydro Nuclear
1 . CHILE (C14) 15,636 1,754 2,279 - 3,489 12,147 -
2 . COLUMBIA (Cl6) 35,368 2,616 4,675 - 9,810 25,558 -
3 . EGYPT (Cl7) 32,500 3,640 2,700 - 26,500 6,900 -
4 . KOREA (Cll) 80,250 13,030 2,236 5,719 35,592 5,344 39,314
5 . CHINA (Cl5) 497,300 72,700 30,200 - 397,100 100,200 -
6 . BRAZIL (C13) 202,287 6,481 40,106 657 15,770 185,546 971
8 . MEXICO (C19) 104,791 18,358 7,780 1,250 82,024 18,435 7,753
9 . HUNGARY (C3) 29,749 4,940 46 1,643 18,594 169 10,986
10 . VENEZULZA (C25) 50,206 7,718 9,906 - 19,569 30,637 -
11. GHANA (C18) 4,705 113 1,072 - 29 4,676 -
12 . PERU (C21) 14,195 1,525 2,150 - 3,145 11,050 -
13 . RUMANIA (C23) 73,090 15,560 4,640 - 60,500 12,590 -
14 . THAILAND (C7) 29,992 5,545 2,256 - 25,917 4,075 -
15 . ARGENTINA (C2) 52,165 8,984 6,591 1,018 23,791 21,909 6,465
16 . ZIMBABWE (C27) 7,008 1,405 666 - 3,985 3,347 -
17 . TURKEY (C24) 44,353 7,474 5, 004 - 25,677 18,618 -
18 . MALAYSIA (C4) 16,218 3,400 1,090 - 11,656 4,562 -
19 . ALGERIA (Cl) 13,400 3,551 285 - 13,100 300 -
20 . INDONESIA (CIO) 34,810 8,800 1,600 - 27,310 7,290 -
21 . PANAMA (C5) 2,853 347 551 - 829 2,024 -
22 . PORTUGAL (C22) 20,101 3,677 3,173 - 10,949 9,154 -
23 . URUGUAY (C8) 4,526 410 1, 039 - 316 4,210 -
24 . BANGLADESH (C12) 5,895 1,728 197 - 5,365 530 -
25 . NIGERIA (C20) 9,905 2,140 9,905 - 7,695 2,210 -
26 . ZAIRE (C26) 5,295 55 2,486 - 139 5,156 -
27 . SYRIA (C6) 7,161 2, 091 827 - 5,611 1,500 -
- _
Source; World Bank (1990)
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DATA OF ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN SELECTED LDCs - 1987 Appendix 1 (cont)
COUNTRY Installed Cap Production Output/Capacity(DMUs) % Th % Hyd % Nuc % Th % Hyd % Nuc Th Hyd Nu(
1. CHILE (C14) 43 .5 56 .4 - 22 .3 77 .7 - 2 . 0 5.3 -
2 . COLUMBIA (C16) 35.9 64 .1 - 27.7 72 .3 - 3 . 8 5.5 -
3 . EGYPT (Cl7) 57.4 42.6 - 81.5 21.2 - 7.3 2.6 -
4 . KOREA (Cll) 62 .1 10.7 27.2 44.3 6.7 49.0 2.7 2.4 6 .
5 . CHINA (CIS) 70.6 29.4 - 79.9 20.1 - 5 . 5 3.3 -
6 . BRAZIL (C13) 13 .7 84 .9 1.4 7.8 91.7 0.5 2.4 4.6
8 . MEXICO (C19) 68 .5 29.1 2.4 78 .3 17 . 6 4.1 4.5 2.4 6 .
9 . HUNGARY (C3) 74 .5 0.7 24 . 8 62 .5 0 . 6 37 . 0 3 . 8 3.7 6 .
10 . VENEZULZA (C25) 43 .8 56 .2 - 39 . 0 61. 0 - 2.5 3.1 -
11. GHANA (C18) 9.5 90 . 5 - 0.6 99.4 - 0.3 4.4 -
12 . PERU (C21) 41.5 58 .5 - 22 .2 77.8 - 2 .1 5.1 -
13 . RUMANIA (C23) 77 .0 23 . 0 - 82 .8 17.2 - 3.9 2.7 -
14 . THAILAND (C7) 71.1 28 . 9 - 71.1 28 . 9 - 4 .7 1.8 -
15 . ARGENTINA (C2) 54 .1 39 .7 6.1 45 .6 42 . 0 12 .4 2.6 3.3 6 .
16 . ZIMBABWE (C27) 67.8 32 .2 - 56 .1 47.8
17 . TURKEY (C24) 59.8 40.1 - 58 . 0 42 . 0 - 3.4 3.7 -
18 . MALAYSIA (C4) 75.7 24 .3 - 71. 9 28 .1 - 3.4 4.2 _
19. ALGERIA (Cl) 92 .6 7.4 - 97 .8 2.2 - 3.7 1.1 -
20 . INDONESIA (CIO) 84 .4 15.3 - 78 .5 20.9 - 3.1 4.6 -
21. PANAMA (C5) 38 .6 61.4 - 29.1 70.9 - 2.4 3.7 -
22 . PORTUGAL (C22) 53 .7 46 .3 - 53 .7 45 . 8 - 3 . 0 2 . 9 -
23 . URUGUAY (C8) 28 .3 71.7 - 6.7 93 . 0 - 0.8 4.1 -
24 . BANGLADESH(C12) 89.8 10 .2 - 91. 0 9 . 0 - 3.1 2.7 -
25 . NIGERIA (C20) 53 . 0 47 . 0 - 77 .3 22.3 - 3.6 1 . 2 -
26 . ZAIRE (C26) 2.2 97 .8 - 2.6 97.4 - 2.5 2.1 -
27 . SYRIA (C6) 71.66 28 .34 - 78 .4 21.0 - 2.7 1.8 -
Source: World Bank (1990)
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Installed1975-1990 Capacity and Electricity Generation : Appendix 2
YEAR
NEB EGAT CEGB
InstalledCapacity(MW)
ElectricityGeneration(GWh)
Installed Electricity Inst. Elec. Capacity Generation Capacity Generation (MW) (GWh) (MW) (GWh)
1975 1,187.9 5,191.0 2,543.0 8,439.6 63,212 204,623
1976 1,316.4 6,072.0 2,543.0 9,826 . 2 60,733 208,566
1977 1,444.2 6,813.0 2,833.0 11,175.1 60,691 222,091
1978 1,795.8 7,365,0 2,902 . 0 12,636 . 6 61,709 211,914
1979 2,047.6 8,177.0 2,963.0 13,443.0 61,726 221,651
1980 2,177.5 8,797.0 3,448.0 14,426.0 59,729 221,551
1981 2,407.9 9,523 . 0 4,008 . 0 15,377.3 55,487 210,289
1982 2,492.7 10,213.0 4,403 . 0 16,619 . 9 52,828 206,742
1983 2,822 . 5 11,190.0 5,032 . 0 18,856 . 6 50,250 212,728
1984 3,791.8 12,648 . 0 6,128 . 0 21,024.6 48,546 213,673
1985 4,721.2 13,538 . 0 6,705 . 0 23,074.4 47,998 227,554
1986 4,541.0 14,668.0 6,785 . 0 24,716.8 47,860 228,433
1987 4,700.1 16,277 . 0 6,985 . 0 28,652.2 47,442 228,147
1988 4,955 . 0 18,159 . 0 6,997.0 32,464.4 47,201 231,909
1989 4,915 . 0 20,678 . 0 7,366.0 37,406.0 46,871 235,434
1990 4,919.0 21,508.0 8,720.0 44,175 . 0 45,881 239,934
Source: NEB Annual Reports 1975 - 1990 issues.Dang (1991)CEGB Statistical Year Book 1990
329
System Losses (%) : 1975-1990 Appendix 3
Year AU
NEB 
T/D L TL AU
EGAT 
T/D L TL
CEGB
TL
1975 5 . 3 9 . 9 15 .2 3 . 5 9 . 6 13 .1 8 . 3
1976 5 . 0 10 . 4 15 .4 3 . 6 10.2 13 . 8 8.5
1977 4 . 6 10.5 15 .1 3 .7 8 . 6 12 . 3 8.4
1978 4 . 6 10 . 3 14 . 9 4 .1 7 . 7 11. 8 8 . 3
1979 4.7 10 . 0 14 .7 3 . 7 9 . 6 13 . 3 8 .4
1980 4 . 8 9.5 14.3 4 . 3 9 . 8 14.1 8 . 4
1981 5 .1 9 . 5 14 . 6 4 . 0 10 .7 14 . 8 9 . 0
1982 5 .1 9 . 5 14 . 6 4 .1 9 .9 14 . 0 9 .2
1983 4 . 8 10 . 6 15 .4 3 . 6 10 .7 13 . 9 9 .7
1984 4.4 10 . 7 15 .1 4 . 2 10 . 7 14 . 9 10 .5
1985 4 . 8 10 . 9 15 . 7 4 . 7 11. 5 16.2 9 . 9
1986 4 . 2 10 . 9 15 .1 4 .1 9 . 8 13 . 9 9 .7
1987 5 . 3 10 . 9 16 . 2 4 . 2 10 .4 14 . 5 9 . 6
1988 3 . 0 13 . 0 16 . 0 4 . 0 10 . 2 14 . 2 9 . 8
1989 5 . 3 10 . 7 16 . 0 3 . 9 10 . 0 13 . 9 NA
1990 4 . 6 11 . 3 15 . 9 2 . 6 10 . 6 13 . 2 NA
Note : AU - Auxiliary UseT/D 1 - Transmission and Distribution LossesTL - Total LossesThere is no breakdown for CEGB
Source: NEB Annual Reports - 1975 - 199 0 issuesDang (1991).CEGB Statistical Data, 1975 - 1990 issues
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Thermal Plant Efficiency 1975-1990 Appendix 4a
Year NEB EGAT CEGB
_
1975 28 . 6 33 . 6 31 . 3
1976 28 . 8 34 . 0 31 . 6
1977 29 . 6 33.8 31 . 5
1978 29 . 6 34 .1 31. 9
1979 28 . 8 33 . 6 31. 7
1980 29 .7 33.8 33.7
1981 30 . 5 35 .1 34 .1
1982 31 . 0 36 . 0 34 .1
1983 30 . 5 37 . 3 34 . 3
1984 31 .1 37 . 5 34 .3
1985 28 . 6 37 . 7 34 . 7
1986 31 . 8 38 . 3 35 .1
1987 34 . 9 38 . 3 35 . 3
1988 35 . 5 38 . 0 35 . 5
1989 35 . 9 38 . 0 NA
1990 36 .4 36 .50 NA
Source: NEB Annual Reports - 1975 - 1990 issuesDang (1991)Thai Power 1990 issue (1981 - 1990 figures) CEGB Statistical Yearbook 1990
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Labour : NEB, EGAT, CEGB (1975-1990) Appendix 4b
NEB EGAT CEGB
1975 12,780 31,767 6 3 , 2 1 2
1976 13,757 34,943 60,733
1977 15,590 3 6 , 8 2 1 6 0 , 6 9 1
1978 1 7 ,6 7 9 39,629 61,709
1979 19,248 41,305 6 1 ,7 2 6
1980 21,144 4 7 ,2 3 7 59,729
1981 22,137 48,168 55,487
1982 2 2 , 6 0 2 59,759 5 2 ,8 2 8
1983 23,182 6 5 ,0 3 2 50,250
1984 23,044 69,715 4 8 , 5 4 6
1985 24,701 7 0 ,6 0 3 4 7 , 9 9 8
1986 23,347 72,971 4 7 , 8 6 0
1987 2 3 ,8 9 2 73,414 47,442
1988 2 3 , 5 9 6 7 4 ,2 3 2 47,201
1989 23,108 77,658 46,871
1990 23,065 79,522 4 5 , 8 8 1
Source: NEB Annual Report, 1975-1990Dang (1991)CEGB Statistical Year Book 1990
1985 - PRESENT TARIFF SCHEDULE RATES
Appendix 5
332
CATEGORY BLOCK RATES
TARIFF A Domestic
TARIFF B LV Commercial
First 100 units/month Next 900 units/month Each additional unit/month
For all units
20 sen23 sen 26 sen
24 sen
TARIFF Cl MV General Commercial Each kW MD/month For all units $12 18 sen
TARIFF C2 MV Peak Off Peak Commercial
TARIFF D LV Industrial
Each kW MD/month $19All units during peak period 18 senAll units during Off peak period 8 sen
For all units 21 sen
TARIFF El MV General Industrial Each kW MD/Month For all units $12 21 sen
TARIFF E2 MV Peak Off peak Industrial
TARIFF E3 HV Peak Off Peak Industrial
TARIFF F LV Mining
TARIFF FI MV General Mining
TARIFF F2 MV Peak Off Peak Mining
TARIFF G Public & Street Lighting
Each kW MD/Month $17All units during Peak period 16 senAll units during Off Peak period 8 sen
Each kW MD/Month $15All units during Peak period 15 senAll units during Off Peak period 7 sen
For all units
Each kW MD/Month For all units $12
For all units
19 sen
16 sen
Each kW/Month $17All units during Peak period 16 senAll units during Off Peak period 8 sen
30 sen
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Appendix 6
Comparison of Electricity Tariff Rates (1992): Sen/Unit^
Country Domestic Commer­cial Indus­trial Others Average
Malaysia 21.38 23.27 15.40 18.51 18.78
Philippines 29 . 04 28.51 26 .15 17.88 27.77
Singapore 21.18 18 . 65 16 . 09 - 1 9 .9 9
Indonesia 17.00 29.33 16.05 21.48 18 .18
Thailand 15.11 22.07 16.88 - 19.77
Japan 57.50 52.35 34.93 26.26 45 . 05
Taiwan 22.17 25 . 84 20.78 - 21.51
South Korea 24 .10 27 , 03 14 . 38 15.45 17.89
Ranking(Lowest) 5th 3rd 2nd 3rd 2nd
Source : TNB (1993) - Information Booklet, p 14
 ^ The China Light and Power Company, a Hong Kong utility did a similar comparison in July 1992 covering 15 Asia-Pacific countries: Australia, China, Hongkong, Indonesia, Japan, Macau, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia. The ranking for TNB in terms of the lowest electricity tariff is as below:
Category (US Rates cents/Unit ) Ranking
Domestic 8 .68 4th lowest
Commercial 8 .60 7th lowest
Small industries 6 .69 4th lowest
Large industries 6 . 51 4th lowest
Source: TNB (19 93)
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NEB : Operating Profit (M$'000) 1975-1990
Appendix 7
OperatingRevenue [ Operating Expenses OperatingProfit OtherIncome Profit Before Interest in
%Change (A) in
%Change (B) in
%Change (C) in
%Change(E)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
1975 487,881 376,281 111,600 13,367 124,967 - - - -
1976 566,113 461,451 104,663 19,489 124,152 16.0 22.6 (6.2) (0.7)
1977 643,371 502,472 140,899 22,578 163,477 13 .6 8 . 9 34.6 31.7
1978 821,621 698,814 122,807 27,748 150,555 27 . 7 39 .1 (12.8) (7.9)
1979 1,117.982 1,062,953 55,030 14,160 69,190 36 .1 52 . 1 55 . 2 (54.0)
1980 1,618,660 1,425,210 193,450 26,456 219,906 44 .8 34 . 0 251.5 217.8
1981 1,908,864 1,597,530 311,334 31,821 343,155 17 . 9 12 .1 60.9 56 . 0
1982 1,950,075 1,505,395 444,670 23,414 468,048 2.2 (5.8) 42 .8 36.4
1983 2,140,866 1,444,659 696,207 76,000 772,207 9.8 (4.0) 56 .6 65 . 0
1984 2,355,493 1,646,412 709,081 36,940 746,021 10.0 14 . 0 1.8 (3.4)
1985 2,442,655 1,659,700 782,955 164 783,119 3 .7 0.8 10 .4 5.0
1986 2,508,445 1,551,739 956,706 164 956,870 2.7 (6.5) 22.2 22.2
1987 2,708,220 1,628,395 1,,079,825 685 1,080,510 8 . 0 4 . 9 12.9 12.9
1988 2,967,547 1,781,187 1,186,360 165 1,186,525 9.6 9.4 9 . 9 9.8
1989 3,339,915 2,198,580 1,141,335 637 1,141,972 12.5 23 .4 (3.8) (3.8)
1990 3,702,100 2,667,056 1,035,044 47,220 1,082,264 10 .8 21.3 (9.0) (5.2)
—
1 . 2 .
3 .
4 .
Operating revenue from sales of electricityOperating expenses: Costs on generation, transmission, distribution, consumer services, meter reading, billing, collection accounts, training and welfare, administration and general expenses.Depreciation included in generation, transmission, distribution and general transport and workshop expensesOther income: Income from tax exemption. Government subsidies for rural and diesel.
NEB Annual Reports 1975-1990
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NEB Borrowing (M$'000)1975-1990 Appendix 8
Government Loan(GL) Domestic Loan(DL) Foreign Loan(FL) Total Loan (TL) % FL to TL % GL to DL % GL to TL
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (P) (G)
1975 220,410 27,000 418,968 639,405 66 . 5 99 . 9 34
1976 272,661 32,204 448,610 753,475 59 . 5 89 . 0 36
1977 330,564 3,156 584,190 917,910 63 . 6 99 . 0 36
1978 466,991 33,044 629,974 1130,009 55 .7 93 . 0 41
1979 517,551 226,866 575,856 1320,273 43 . 6 70 . 0 39
1980 735,769 186,946 551,216 1473,931 37.4 80 . 0 50
1981 657,986 465,109 589,839 1712,934 34 .4 59 . 0 38
1982 869,897 267,964 981,180 2119,041 46 . 3 76 . 0 40
1983 1084,847 401,558 1124,139 2610,544 43 .1 73 . 0 42
1984 1328,543 412,296 1390,176 3131,015 44 . 4 76 . 0 42
1985 1357,742 116,247 2080,148 4604,137 45 . 2 54 . 0 29
1986 2642,578 463,484 2047,223 5153,285 39.7 85 . 0 51
1987 3109,760 303,605 2247,938 5661,303 39 . 7 91 . 0 55
1988 2863,446 459,691 1753,226 5076,363 34 . 5 86 . 0 56
1989 2722,303 471,700 1489,567 4683,570 31 . 3 85 . 0 58
1990 3344,062 514,470 1286,178 5144,710 25 . 0 85 . 0 65
Source : NEB Annual Reports 1975 -1990
NEB : Profit After Tax (M$'000) 1975-1990
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Appendix 9
ProfitBeforeInterest
Interest Charges Loan Overdraft ProfitBeforeTax
Taxation ProfitAfterTax
(a) (b) (c) d:(a-b-c) (e) (f) : (d-e)
1975 129,967 27,882 1, 974 100,111 11,000 89,111
1976 124,152 29,521 2,371 92,260 25,000 67,260
1977 163,477 44,591 3,897 114,989 15,000 99,989
1978 150,528 55,326 5 , 635 89,567 - 89,567
1979 69,190 72,874 4,138 (7,822) - (7,822)
1980 219,906 76,847 17,304 125,755 - 125,755
1981 343,155 82,938 5,071 255,146 - 255,146
1982 468,048 77,551 5,250 385,247 - 385,247
1983 772,207 107,561 3 , 359 661,287 - 661,287
1984 746,021 121,100 640 624,281 27,502 969,779
1985 783,119 176,806 - 606,313 - 606,313
1986 956,870 247,961 - 708,909 164,404 544,505
1987 1, 080,510 297,974 2,494 780,042 54,210 725,832
1988 1,186,525 295,710 19 890,796 98,994 791,802
1989 1,140,698 312,748 - 827,950 230,000 597,950
1990 1,082,823 294,251 - 788,572 200,000 588,572
Notes :
1, 1982 and 1990 respectively are Extraordinary not shown. items of 5,250 and 115,0002. 1978 to 1983 Exempted from tax payment4. 1985 tax in 1986 provision
Source NEB Annual Reports 1975-1990
Appendix 10
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NEB : (Ringgit Key Average Exchange Rates Malaysia Per Unit of Foreign Currency)
Year US Dollar Japanese Singapore Pound DeutschYen (YlOO) Dollar Sterling Mark
1983 2 .3208 0.9776 1.0980 3.5194 0 . 9110
1984 2.3433 0.9871 1.0985 3.1292 0.8257
1985 2.4824 1.0471 1.1286 3.2099 0.8488
1986 2.5808 1.5437 1.1851 3.7878 1.1949
1987 2.5238 1.7406 1.1963 4.1111 1.4004
1988 2.6181 2.0466 1.3012 4.6617 1.4938
1989 2.7077 1.9688 1.3886 4.4421 1 . 4431
1990 2.7044 1.8762 1.4938 4.8253 1.6772
1991 2.7498 2.0451 1.5924 4.8613 1.6627
Source : Annual Statistical Bulletin - 1983 to 1991 issues
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Appendix 11
NEB : 1995- Appropriations of 1990 Profit After Tax (M$'000)
Profit After Tax
(A):(B+C+D)
DividendPaid
(B)
Transfer to General Reserve
(C)
Transfer to Current Development Account (D)
1975 . 84,112 5, 032 13,600 65,480
1976 67,260 6,377 7,800 53,083
1977 99,989 7,102 7,700 85,187
1978 89,593 8,700 17,800 63,093
1979 (7,822) - (7,822) -
1980 125,755 - 83,522 142,233
1981 255,146 - 26,200 228,946
1982 390,438 44,921 1,800 343,717
1983 661,287 39,921 16,700 604,666
1984 569,779 42,421 19,500 534,858
1985 606,313 44,539 - 561,774
1986 544,504 32,497 - 512,008
1987 725,832 35,205 12,529 678,098
1988 791,802 35,205 25,533 731,064
1989 597,950 35,205 34,300 528,445
1990 495,897 35,205 - 460,692
Source: NEB Annual Reports 1975-1990
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Appendix 12
Electricity Tariff, Operating Cost, Fuel Cost and Inflation Rates (1975-90)
Average tariff/ unit (sen) (a)
Operatingcost/unit(sen)(b)
Fuel cost/ unit (sen)
(c)
CPI
(d)
GDPDeflator
(e)
1975 13 .31 8 .28 4.6 4.5 8.1
1976 13 .15 8 .71 4.6 2.6 7.1
1977 13 .33 8 .47 4.7 4.7 9.9
1978 14 .77 10.68 6.3 4.9 12 . 0
1979 16.98 14 .63 10.2 3.6 7 .1
1980 22 .14 18 .26 12 .9 6.7 0.8
1981 23 .93 19 . 09 13 .8 9.7 2.5
1982 24.09 18 .11 13 .1 5 . 7 5.6
1983 24.10 15 .93 10.8 3.7 5.3
1984 24.12 16 .60 11.0 3.9 (1.4)
1985 22 .36 14 .31 7.4 0.5 4.3
1986 20.50 12 .64 5.2 0.6 0
1987 20 . 03 11.94 5.0 0.8 7.3
1988 18 .72 11.68 4.7 2.5 2.3
1989 18 .70 14 .44 5.6 2.8 7.6
1990 18 .60 15.15 6.9 3 .1 3.5
Source : NEB Annual Reports, 1975-1990 Malaysian Statistical Bulletin 1975-1980
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Appendix 13
NEB : Internally Generated Funds (M$'000) (1975-1990)
Profit Deprecia- Transfer tion to CDA
InternallyGeneratedFund
EquityInjected
(A) (B) (C) = (A+B) (D)
1975 65,480 50,079 115,559 -
1976 53,083 63,010 116,093 69,000
1977 85,187 74,812 159,999 -
1978 63,093 84,787 147,880 130,706
1979 - 92,268 92,268 -
1980 42,233 117,809 160,420 222,000
1981 228,946 124,743 353,689 309,000
1982 343,717 122,530 466,247 -
1983 604,666 161,658 766,324 -
1984 534,858 211,565 746,423 -
1985 561,774 283,808 845,582 42,362
1986 512,008 338,630 850,638 11,913
1987 678,098 289,387 967,485 -
1988 731,064 460,702 1191,766 -
1989 528,445 462,652 991,097 -
1990 460,692 465,949 926,641 -
Note ; 
Source ;
Internally other than  NEB Annual
\generated fund did not take account into other income sales of electricity and depreciation.Reports 1975-1990
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